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Résumé 
Cette thèse étudie un certain nombre de sujets liés à la réglementation du secteur bancaire. 
Elle passe d'abord en revue les études empiriques sur le lien entre la réglementation et la stabilité 
du système bancaire, utilise ensuite un modèle à changement de régime Markovien pour évaluer 
empiriquement l'impact de la réglementation sur la stabilité du système bancaire et enfin analyse 
les effets des réglementations bancaires (tels que les restrictions sur la composition du portefeuille 
et les exigences minimales de fonds propres) sur la croissance et le bien-être. 
Le premier chapitre passe en revue les travaux déjà réalisés sur le lien entre la réglementation 
bancaire et la stabilité du secteur bancaire. Il compile la littérature théorique sur ce lien avant de 
présenter la littérature empirique. Bien.qu'il existe plusieurs types de réglementations, les études 
se concentrent surtout sur un nombre restreint de règlementations et plus précisément: l'exigence 
minimale de fonds propres, l'assurance-dépôts, les réserves obligatoires, et les barrières à l'entrée. 
La prédiction théorique de l'impact de la quasi-totalité des types de réglementations sur la stabilité 
du secteur bancaire reste encore indéterminée. La raison sous-jacente en est l'existence de nombreux 
types de faillites de marché dans le secteur bancaire. Par conséquent, une mesure réglementaire 
peut réussir à prémunir le système bancaire d'une défaillance du marché, mais en même temps 
contribuer à accroître les autres types de faillites. 
Dans le second chapitre nous évaluons empiriquement l'efficacité de la réglementation bancaire 
en matière de stabilisation. À cette fin, nous construisons d'abord un indice mensuel de la fragilité 
du système bancaire. Notre indice capte la quasi-totalité des risques que l'on rencontre dans 
le système bancaire. Nous utilisons ensuite cet indice pour estimer l'effet de "la réglementation 
bancaire sur la stabilité dans le contexte d'un modèle à changement de régime Markovien. Nous 
dérivons théoriquement les effets marginaux des réglementations sur la probabilité que le système 
bancaire soit en crise. Nous appliquons ensuite notre méthode au système bancaire Indonésien. 
Nos principales conclusions sont que les barrières à l'entrée sont efficaces contre l'instabilité. De 
plus, ils réduisent la durée des périodes de crises dans le cas oil celles-ci finissent par se produire. 
L'assurance-dépôts stimule les crises bancaires, mais réduit leurs durées. Les réserves obligatoires 
améliorent la stabilité du système bancaire, tandis que les exigences minimales de fonds propres 
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ont un effet mixte sur la stabilité du système bancaire. 
. Dans le troisième chapitre nous analysons. le coût en bien-être de la réglementation bancaire. 
Cette analyse est motivée par le fait que les Accords de Bâle cherchent à promouvoir l'adoption de 
l'exigence minimale de fonds propres afin d'améliorer la stabilité du secteur bancaire. Malheureuse-
ment, ce type de réglementation peut entraver la croissance économique en transférant les fonds 
destinés aux investissements les plus productifs, mais risqués, vers les investissements les moins 
productifs. Nous analysons ce problème dans un modèle à générations imbriquées d'accumulation 
de capital et étudions comment elle affecte la croissance économique, la stabilité du secteur bancaire 
et le bien-être. Dans ce modèle, une crise bancaire est le résultat d'un choc de productivité, ce 
qui conduit certaines banques à ne pas être en mesure de s'acquitter de leurs obligations envers les 
prêteurs. La réglementation bancaire est modélisée comme une contrainte sur la part maximale du 
portefeuille des banques allouées aux actifs à risque. 
Ce modèle nous permet d'évaluer quantitativement le principal arbitrage inhérent à ce type 
de réglementation bancaire, entre la stabilité du secteur bancaire et la croissance économique. Le 
modèle implique un niveau optimal de réglementation qui élimine les crises bancaires. Dans le même 
temps, la réglementation est préjudiciable pour la croissance. Nous constatons que l'effet global 
du niveau optimal de la réglementation sur la protection sociale est positif lor~que la probabilité 
d'une crise bancaire est suffisamment élevée, et les agents économiques sont suffisamment averses 
au risque. 
Mots clés: les modèles à changement de régime Markovien, les modèles à générations imbriquées, 
la crQissance économique, l'équilibre concurrentiel, la stabilité bancaire, la réglementation bancaire. 
Classification JEL: C25, D50, D94, E44, G21, G28. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation studies a number of topics related to the banking sector regulation. lt 
focuses on the impact of various types of regulation on the banking system stability and also on 
the implication of sorne types of regulation for economic dynamic and welfare. In fact, due to 
numerous market failures present in the banking industry, banks are viewed as fragile. This has led 
governments to regulate heavily the banking sect or , which is nowadays one of the most regulated 
industries in the world. This dissertation first reviews the theoretical and the empirical literature 
On the banking system regulation, then uses the Markov-switching model to assess empirically the 
impact of regulation on the banking system stability, and finally analyzes the growth and welfare 
effects of banking regulations, such as asset holding restrictions and capital adequacy requirements. 
More precisely, the first chapter reviews the work already done on the link between banking 
regulation and the banking sector stability. It brings together and adds structure to the empirical 
literature on the link between banking regulation and banking system stability. In addition to clar-
ifying the theoretical underpinnings for studying banking regulation, it points to sever al directions 
for future empirical research, necessary to fill the gaps in our understanding of the link between 
banking regulation and stability. Itfinds that although there are many types of banking regula-
tion, studies focus mainly on a group of regulations such as the capital adequacy requirement, the 
deposit insurance, and the reserve requirement. The theoretical prediction of the effect of almost 
each type of regulation on the banking sector stability is mixed. The key reason behind this is the 
fact that there are many types of market failures in the banking industry. Therefore, a regulatory 
measure can succeed to cure a given market failure but at the same time help to increase the other 
market failures. 
In "The Empirics of Banking Regulation", we assess empirically whether banking regulation is 
effective at preventing banking crises. We use a monthly index of banking system fragility, which 
captures almost every source of risk in the banking system, to estimate the effect of regulatory 
measures (entry restriction, reserve requirement, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy require-
ment) on banking stability in the context of a Markov-switching model. We apply this method 
to the lndonesian banking system, which has been subject to several regulatory changes over the 
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last couple of decades and at the same time has experienced a severe systemic crisis. We draw 
the following findings from this research: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and also the 
probability of their occurrence; (ii) larger reserve requirements reduce crisis duration, but increase 
banking instability; (iii) deposit insurance increases banking system stability and reduces crisis 
duration; (vi) capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration 
of banking crises. 
Finally, in "The Welfare Cost of Banking Regulation", we are motivated by the fact that the 
Basel Accords promote the adoption of capital adequacy requirements to increase the banking 
sector's stability. Unfortunately this type of regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting 
banks' portfolios from more productive risky investment projects toward less productive but safer 
projects. 
We introduce banking regulation in an overlapping-generations model of capital accumulation 
and studies how it affects economic growth, banking sector stability, and welfare. In this model, a 
banking crisis is the outcome of a productivity shock, which leads sorne banks to be un able to fulfill 
their obligations toward lenders. Banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on the maximum 
share of banks' portfolios that can be allocated to risky assets. 
This model allows us to evaluate quantitatively the key trade-off inherent to this type of banking 
regulation, between banking sector stability and economic growth. The model implies an optimal 
level of regulation which eliminates banking crises. At the same time, regulation is detrimental to 
growth. We find that the overall effect of the optimallevel of regulation on social welfare is positive 
when the likelihood of a banking crisis is sufficiently high and economic agents are sufficiently 
risk-averse. We use the model to evaluate whether the proposed Basel Accord regulation might be 
welfare-improving, given plausible magnitudes for the likelihood of a crisis and agents' risk aversion. 
Key words: Markov switching models, overlapping generations models, competitive equilibrium, 
economic growth, banking stability, banking regulation. 
JEL Classification: C25, D50, D94, E44, G21, G28. 
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Introduction générale 
L'industrie bancaire est l'une des industries les plus réglementées et contrôlées au monde. En 
fait, il n'existe pas moins de huit types de réglementation bancaire (Voir Mishkin, 2000). Deux 
principales raisons expliquent ce fait. D'une part, les banques sont perçues comme des institutions 
fragiles qui ont besoin de l'aide du gouvernement pour évoluer dans un environnement sain et 
d'autre part, l'instabilité des banques est coûteuse à l'économie toute entière; ceci est dû au rôle 
central que jouent les banques dans l'intermédiation financière en approvisionnant l'économie en 
liquidités, et en fournissant l'information économique et financière. 
En règle générale, les gouvernements délèguent leur pouvoir de réglementation aux banques 
centrales. Ces dernières organisent le système réglementaire compte tenu de lem rôle de prêteur en 
dernier ressort. Depuis la grande vague de libéralisation financière des années 1980, de nouveaux 
types de règlements ont vu le jour, le plus important étant les Accords de Bâle avec son exigence 
d'adéquation des fonds propres et ses pratiques de surveillance. Il s'en est aussi suivi au cours 
des années 1990 une baisse du taux de réserves obligatoires, l'émergence de l'assurance-dépôts, 
et l'émergence de la supervision bancaire dans un grand nombre d'économies. Ce nouveau cadre 
réglementaire a été acclamé pour sa contribution à la convergence internationale des techniques de 
gestion des risques bancaires et pour l'amélioration des normes bancaires dans de nombreux pays. 
Toutefois leur conception et leur mise en œuvre ont souvent été responsables de la création ou de 
l'amplification de plusieurs défaillances du marché dans le secteur bancaire. 
Beaucoup de travaux théoriques ont été effectués sur la quasi-totalité des types de réglementations 
existantes mais leurs résultats sont généralement contradictoires, ceci est essentiellement dû au fait 
qu'il existe plusieurs sources d'instabilité dans le système bancaire. Ainsi, un type de réglementation 
peut réussir valablement à contrer un certain type de faillite de marché mais en même temps ac-
,croître un autre type de faillite de marché. L'exemple le plus illustratif est celui de l'assurance-
dépôts qui est efficace pour contrer les crises dues à une faillite de coordination des retraits mais 
qui malheureusement accroît les problèmes d'aléas moraux en amenant les épargnants à être moins 
regardant sur le niveau de risque auquel la banque s'expose. Ainsi malgré les progrès récents dans 
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la recherche sur la fragilité bancaire, il n'existe toujours pas de consensus sur la meilleure façon de 
concevoir et de mettre en œuvre la réglementation bancaire dans ce nouveau contexte de grande 
liberté bancaire. Il s'ensuit que pour déterminer l'impact des réglementations sur la stabilité du 
système bancaire, l'analyse empirique semble plus appropriée. 
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse nous passons en revue et mettons de la structure 
aux travaux empiriques déjà réalisés sur le lien entre la réglementation bancaire et la stabilité du 
secteur bancaire. Bien qu'il existe de nombreux types de réglementations bancaires, les études se 
concentrent surtout sur un groupe de règlementations, plus précisément: la condition d'adéquation 
des fonds propres, l'assurance-dépôts, les réserves obligatoires, et les barrières à l'entrée. Deux 
grandes approches sont employées: une approche qui utilise une mesure d'instabilité implicite telle 
que le taux d'actif risqué dans le portefeuille des banques et la volatilité des profits, et une approche 
qui utilise une variable muette qui prend la valeur 1 pendant les années de crise et la valeur 0 en 
dehors. 
Ces deux méthodes utilisent des techniques économétriques différentes pour effectuer leurs esti-
mations: la méthode de risque implicite repose très souvent sur les modèles à équations simultanées 
et les modèles de survie; alors que la méthode de risque explicite repose très souvent sur les modèles 
de régression logit ou probit. 
Jusqu'à présent, ces études ne réussissent pas à fournir un résultat convaincant quant à l'impact 
de nombreux types de réglementations sur la stabilité bancaire. Par conséquent, au lieu de fournir 
une solution aux résultats théoriques conflictuels, ces études empiriques en ajoutent à la confusion. 
D'autre part les études utilisant une mesure implicite d'instabilité ne font pas l'unanimité dans le 
sens que l'exposition au risque couplé à une bonne technique de gestion de risque n'est en aucun cas 
un signe d'instabilité. Pour les études utilisant la méthode explicite, les résultats sont généralement 
peu robustes. Ces études souffrent principalement de biais de sélection qui vient .de la méthode 
utilisée pour construire la variable mesurant l'instabilité bancaire. 
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Dans le second chapitre nous développons une méthode empirique pour tester l'impact de 
certains types de réglementations sur la stabilité bancaire et la durée des crises bancaires. Comme 
nous l'avons constaté dans le premier chapitre, en général, les effets théoriques de presque tous les 
types de règlementations sont ambiguës et les études empiriques déjà réalisées sur ce sujet présentent 
des limitations importantes: un biais de sélection et une absence d'évaluation de l'impact de ces 
règlements sur la durée des crises bancaires. 
Le biais de sélection vient de la méthode utilisée pour construire la variable de crise bancaire. 
En fait, la pluspart des indicateurs de crises bancaires identifient une année de crise en utilisant une 
combinaison de symptômes observables sur le marché tels que les fusions et l'adoption des mesures 
d'urgence par le gouvernement ou la Banque Centrale. Nous nous référons à cette approche de 
datation de crise bancaire, comme approche-événementielle. Cette approche n'identifie les crises 
que si elles sont suffisamment graves pour déclencher une réaction du marché. En revanche, les 
crises contenues avec succès par des politiques correctives sont négligées. Par conséquent, les 
travaux empiriques sur ces données souffrent d'un problème de biais de sélection. 
Le premier objectif de ce chapitre est de faire face à ce problème de biais de sélection en utilisant 
une autre méthode d'estimation, le Modèle à Changement de Régime Markovien (MCRM), afin 
d'évaluer l'effet de différents types de réglementation bancaire sur la stàbilité du système bancaire. 
Le deuxième objectif est d'évaluer l'effet de ces règlements sur la durée des crises. 
Pour atteindre ces objectifs, nous calculons dans un premier temps un indice de fragilité du 
système bancaire, et l'utilisons comme variable dépendante pour estimer la probabilité des crises 
bancaires. Nous mettons en œuvre un MCRM à trois états: la crise systémique, la tranquillité, et 
l'expansion. Nous introduisons des mesures de réglementation comme variables explicatives de la 
probabilité de transition d'un état à un autre pour évaluer leur effet sur l'apparition d'une crise 
bancaire systémique. Nous ferons référence à cette méthode comme le Modèle à Changement de 
Régime Markovien avec Probabilités de Transition Variables (MCRM-PTV). Nous dérivons de la 
MCRM-PTV l'effet marginal de chaque mesure réglementaire sur la probabilité d'être dans l'état 
de crise systémique. Nous utilisons ensuite cette spécification pour évaluer des mesures 
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réglementaires sur la durée de crise bancaire. Nous effectuons une analyse de sensibilité: pour cela 
nous utilisons d'abord un autre indice de fragilité afin de voir si les résultats sont robustes. Nous 
utilisons également une procédure de Monte Carlo pour vérifier la sensibilité des résultàts pour 
des modèles à deux états. Enfin, nous évaluons l'importance des biais de sélection résolus par le 
MCRM-PTV. 
Nous appliquons notre méthode à une économie de marché émergente, l'Indonésie qui a souffert 
de crises bancaires au cours de la période 1980-2003 et où il y a eu une certaine dynamique sur les 
mesures réglementaires au cours de la même période. Nous concentrons notre analyse sur quatre 
grandes mesures de réglementation: (i) les restrictions à l'entrée, (ii) l'assurance-dépôts, (iii) les 
réserves obligatoires, et (iv ) l'exigence d'adéquation de fonds propres. 
Nous constatons que les restrictions à l'entrée sont efficaces contre les crises bancaires et 
rédlJ.isent la durée des crises. Un taux élevé de réserves obligatoires réduit la durée de crise, mais 
semble accroître la fragilité bancaire. L'assurance-dépôts accroît la stabilité du système bancaire et 
réduit la durée des crises bancaires. L'ex~gence d'adéquation de fonds propres améliore la stabilité 
et réduit la durée de crise bancaire. 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous analysons l'effet de la réglementation bancaire sur le bien-être en 
supposant que cette réglementation soit efficace en matière de stabilisation. Plus particulièrement 
nous nous intéressons aux réglementations qui finissent par être une contrainte sur le portefeuille 
des banques en matière du choix du type d'actifs. En effet, ce type de réglementation peut entraver 
la croissance économique en transférant les fonds des investissements productifs vers les investisse-
ments moins productifs et moins risqués. Bien qu'il existe encore des débats sur l'efficacité de ces 
types de réglementation bancaire, nous supposons dans ce chapitre que l'exigence adéquation de 
fonds propres actuellement en vigueur est efficace en matière de stabilisation. 
Le principal problème de la réglementation, lorsque l'on étudie son impact sur le bien-être 
au niveau macro-économique, est d'évaluer l'arbitrage entre assurer la stabilité et promouvoir la 
croissance économique. En fait, quand un régime de réglementation est efficace, il améliore le bien-
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être parce qu'il réduit la probabilité de crise bancaire, mais en même temps il entrave la croissance 
donc, peut réduire le bien-être. 
Le présent chapitre vise à fournir un cadre pour étudier cet arbitrage. Ce cadre est un 
modèle à générations imbriquées dans lequel les banques servent d'intermédiaires financiers et la 
réglementation bancaire est modélisée comme une contrainte sur le portefeuille des banques. 
Notre modèle est construit dans un cadre d'équilibre généraL Dans ce modèle, chaque jeune 
agent a accès à deux types de technologie de production Cobb-Douglas: une technologie risquée, 
très productive et une technologie sans risque, moins productive. Ces technologies servent à pro-
duire deux biens intermédiaires, qui sont utilisés pour produire un bien final par l'intermédiaire 
d'une technologie de type CES. Les jeunes individus sont des entrepreneurs, tandis que les vieux 
--' agents sont des bailleurs de fonds. N'ayant pas une dotation initiale de capitaux, l'entrepreneur 
a recours aux prêts du secteur bancaire. Les banques transfèrent les ressources des vieux vers les 
entrepreneurs en prêtant à un taux d'intérêt d'équilibre. 
Nous tirons de nombreux résultats intéressants de ce modèle. Tout d'abord, nous montrons que 
lorsque des chocs de productivité sont idiosyncratiques, l'allocation d'équilibre compétitif est un op-
timum de premier rang et dans ce cas la réglementation entrave la croissance et maintient l'économie 
à un niveau de production inférieur à celui de l'économie non réglementée. Deuxièmement, en 
présence d'un choc non anticipé de productivité, l'existence de fonds propres réglementaires a un 
effet positif sur la stabilité bancaire. L'intuition derrière ce résultat étant qu'en cas de crise il existe 
plus de ressources dans une économie réglementée que dans une économie non réglementée. 
La règlementation affecte le bien-être social à travers quatre canaux. Le premier canal est son 
effet sur la proportion d'entrepreneurs impliqués dans le projet risqué. Les deuxième et troisième 
canaux sont ses effets sur les revenus des entrepreneurs impliqués dans les projets risqués et 
entrepreneurs sans risques. Le dernier canal est l'effet de la réglementation sur les intérêts. Certains 
de ces canaux sont liés à l'effet de stabilisation de la réglementation tandis que d'autres sont liés à 
l'effet de croissance. L'ampleur du choc, et le comportement des individus face à l'incertitude sont 
les principaux déterminants de l'importance de l'effet de stabilisation de la réglementation vis à vis 
6 
de l'effet de croissance. Nous trouvons que l'impact global du niveau optimal de la réglementation 
sur la protection sociale dépend de manière déterminante de l'ampleur du choc de productivité, sa 
probabilité, et du niveau d'aversion aux risques des agents économiques. 
Chapter 1 
Regulation and Banking Stability: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies 
7 
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1. Introduction 
Banking is one of the most regulated and monitored industries in the world. In fact, there exist 
no less than eight types of banking regulation. 1 Two main reasons have been pointed out to explain 
why this is the case. Firstly, is the perception of banks as fragile institutions that need the help of 
government to evolve in a sound and safe environment; and secondly, banking instability is costly 
to the entire economy as a result of the key role banks play in financial intermediation by providing 
liquidity insurance, monitoring services, and providing economic and financial information. 
Generally, governments delegate their regulatory power to Central Banks, which organize the 
regulatory system given their role of the lender of last resort. However, this has not always been 
the case (see, e.g., Allen and Herring (2001)). In fact, Central Banks were initially founded for 
different purposes. Tt is only in the nineteenth century that the focus of Central Banks shifted 
towards financial stability and their role increasingly came to be to eliminate crises. Moreover, the 
experience of bank panics during the Great Depression had a profound effect on bank regulation 
in the US. and in almost ail countries in the world. As a result banks became heavily regulated in 
e·very country. Furthermore, in sorne countries the government intervened directly in the financiul 
system to allocate resources. Interest rates were strictly controlled and systemic risk was avoidecl. 
Financial stabilization became the objective of banking regulation. 
The costs of banking crises were perceived to be so high that they had to be avoided at ail costs. 
Even though intensive regulations were able to eliminate systemic risk associated with banks in the 
post war period, over time it became increasingly less obvious that heavily regulated banking were 
optimal. This led to a worldwide wave of financialliberalization. Unfortunately, it also led to the 
return of financial crises. More importantly, it induced a new generation of regulations. 
Since the re-introduction of financial liberalization in the 1980s, new types of regulation have 
emerged, the most important being the Basel Accords with its capital adequacy requirement and 
its supervision practices. We also noticed the decline of the level of the reserve requirement, the 
adoption or the redesign of deposits insurance, and the emergence of banking examination and 
lsee, e.g., Mishkin (2000), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), and Allen and Rerring (2001) 
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supervision in a great number of economies. This new regulatory framework has been praised 
for the international convergence of banks' risk management standards and for the improvement 
of these standards in many economies. Their design and implementation have been blamed for 
increasing several market failures in the banking industry. For example Brimmer (1992) argued 
that: 
"Gontrary to expectations,(. .. ) the banking bill which became Law in December 1991, will most 
likely undermine the stability and the efficiency of the banking system in coming years. In the 
mistaken belief that it was helping ta enhance the "safety and soundness" of individual banks-
and simultaneously protecting Federal insurance funds-Càngress actually established an inflexible 
regulatory regimewhich will cut back on the scope of the financial activities in which banks can 
engage, increase the lev el and costs of capital requirements, make the money market Zess efficient, 
and involve regulators much more extensively in the internal affairs of banking institutions. JJ 
Existing banking regulations can be grouped into three broad categories: regulatory measmes 
affecting the bank's balance sheet (capital adequacy requirements, reserve requirements, and asset 
holding restrictions), regulatory measures affecting the structure of the banking system (separation 
of the banking and other financial industries like securities, insurance, or real estate (e.g., the Glass-
Steagall act of 1933); restrictions on competition), and regulatory measures for banks' owners' 
and managers' behavior (risk-based deposit insurance premiums, disclosure requirements, bank 
chartering, and bank examination). 
Despite the recent progress in the research on banking fragility, there is still no consensus on how 
best ta design and implement banking regulation in this new context of free banking. According ta 
Santos (2001), this is the result of our lack of understanding of the mechanisms between banking 
regulation and market failure, and also the interaction of these regulations among them. It lS also 
a consequence of our limited understanding of the implications of those regulations in a 
equilibrium framework. 
Notwithstanding of these limitations, the research already undertaken has produced someim-
portant results, specifically on the link between the type of banking regulation and banking system 
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stability. This paper contributes to this literature by bringing together and adding structure to the 
contemporary theoretical and empirical literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as foIlows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical review 
of the link between regulation and banking stability. Section 3 reviews the design of banking 
regulations. Section 4 assesses the existing methodologies used in the literature. Section 5 reviews 
the empirical literature of various types of banking regulation. Section 6 presents a proposaI for 
new directions of research on the link between banking regulation and banking system stability, 
and concludes. 
Before proceeding, we should mention sever al important topics clo:;;ely related to banking regula-
tion that our article does not deal with, as weIl as some of the references to these topics. Specifically, 
our study does not deal with the link between regulation, banking profitability, and/or financial 
development (see, e.g., Bath, Caprio, and Levine (2004)). It also does not deal with the link be-
tween regulation and bank governance (see, e.g., Beek, Demirguç-Kunt, and Levine (2006b)). The 
last preliminary point is on the selection of countries that we talk about. Most of the available 
empirical evidence comes from the United States and the group of ten member countries of the 
Basel committee. One reason for this is the fact that data are generally more easily available for 
these economies than for others, and another is that a great number of economic researchers is 
located in these c6untries. 
2.' Reviewing the Link Between Regulations and Banks' Stability 
In the introduction we argued that one of the key rationales for banking regulation is the 
prevention of banking crises. Renee, we start our paper with a brief review of the sources of 
banking instability, and the channels through which regulations can prevent it. 
There are two main reasons for banks' failure. A bank can fail because the assets it owns or 
the credit it has made, have realized an unexpected low return such that the bank no longer has 
the resources to pay back depositors. A bank can also fail if a sud den rush of withdrawals forces it 
to seIl off assets at a very low priee. Let us st art with the latter. 
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A financial crisis can be initiated by a sudden rush of withdrawals; hereafter, a run on a bank. 
This sudden rush is generally a result of a coordination failure among the bank's depositors. In 
fact, banks are characterized by balance sheets where banks' liabilities (deposits) are generally 
short-term, while their assets are long-term and illiquid. A run on a bank occurs when the bank's 
demand for withdrawals by depositors exceeds the short-term value of its assets. 
Many reasons have been given in the literature as the trigger of bank runs. The most important 
is an arbitrary shift in expectations generally called sunspot; see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
Another trigger is a shift in expectations due to the release of "bad news" (see, e.g., Morris and 
Shin (1998, 2000), Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), Chari and Jagannathan (1988)). Finally a 
productivity shock can trigger a bank run (e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2001a, 2001 b), and Chen 
(1999) and Dasgupta (2000)). 
But even if coordination failure can cause the failure of a bank, we need a linkage between 
banks in the form of information spillovers or credit exposures to turn a bank run into a systemic 
banking crisis, see e.g., Allen and Gale (2000a); Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000). 
The coordination failure problem in banking is a type of market failure, which can be solved by a 
propet identification of unnecessary withdrawals, suspension of withdrawals, and/or the institution 
of deposit guarantee, which can give incentive to depositors not to join the rush even if others are 
rushing. 
The information spillovers market failure can be mitigated by markets' transparency, which 
helps to reduce information asymm~try and gives confidence to the other banks' depositors not to 
join the run occurring in the neighbour bank. Moreover, efficient lender-of-Iast-resort operations 
by the Central Bank can provide liquidity into the banking system and mitigate the negative effect 
of credit exposure and reduce the risk of contagion, see, e.g., Allen and Gale (2000). 
A banking crisis can aIso be initiated by a high level of unexpected non-performing loans in a 
bank. When this information is known by the depositors, they rush to the bank to get back their 
deposits before the other depositors. If markets for liquidity are inefficient because of market power 
or information asymmetries, liquidity problems at healthy banks can turn into solvency problems. 
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In fact, in this case the bank is forced to sell its long-term assets below their fair value, see, e.g., 
Allen and Gale (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Donaldson (1992), and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997). 
In order to mitigate the risk due to non-performing loans, banks can choose to hold an important 
proportion of their portfolio in safe assets. Regulators can help them to do so by increasing the 
required capital ratio. Another channel which can be used to mitigate this type of risk is the 
increase of competition among banks so as to reduce their market power and provide them with 
an incentive to organize efficiently the interbank lending market. 2 
3. Review of the Design of Banking Regulation 
According to Allen and Herring (2001), there are 16 types of banking regulation.There are 
broadly four goals for these regulations, namely: preventing systemic risk, providing protection 
for investors, enhancing efficiency, and improving the social welfare. None of the regulations can 
achieve all of these objectives. Given our interest in banking stability we focus only on regulations 
put in place to prevent systemic risk. According to this paper there are eight types of regulation 
which help to achieve stability. These regulations are: (i) the asset restrictions; (ii) the capital 
adequacy requirement; (iii) the deposit insurance, (iv) the fit and proper entry tests; (v) the 
interest rate ceilings on deposits, (vi) the liquidity requirement; (vii) the reserve requirements; 
(viii) the restrictions on services and product lines. 
Other studies have also focused on the design of the banking system regulation around the 
world. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) provide an extensive assessment of the existing regulation 
and supervision.3 Mishkin (2000) provides a list of eight types of regulation. 4 Although these 
2For a detailed review of the theoreticalliterature on banking instability see Lai (2002). 
3From Barth, Caprio,· and Levine (1998) there are 12 basic types of banking regulation: (i) entry into banking, (ii) 
ownership, (iii) capital, (iv) activities, (v) external auditing requirements, (vi) internai managements/organizational 
requirements, (vii) liquidity and diversification requirements, (viii) the deposit requirements, (ix) the accounting 
/information disclosure requirements, (x) the discipline/problem institutions/exit, and (xi) supervision. 
4The eight basic regulatory measures pointed out by Mishkin (2000) are: (i) restrictions on asset holdings and 
activities, (ii) separation of the banking and other financial industries like securities, insurance, or real estate, (iii) 
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studies do not report the same regulations, they do report many in common. 
For a structured presentation of the design of banking regulation let us organize the presentation 
around the three groups that we presented above. 
3.1 Regulations Affecting Bank's Balance Sheet 
Among the regulatory measures presented by the ab ove three studies, three measures are aimed 
at affecting the bank's balance sheet: restrictions on asset holdings, capital adequacy requirements, 
and reserve and/or liquidity requirements. 
a) Restrictions on asset holdings aim at reducing the proportion of some type of risky assets 
in the portfolios of banks. It is then a constraint on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet. 
Its theoretical justification is based on the presence of information asymmetries between depositors 
and the bank manager, which can lead the manager to take too much risk without being disciplined 
by the withdrawal of deposits. It is a regulation, which has been adopted by many countries around 
the world. However, findings of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) show that the level of restriction 
is higher in lower-income countries than in higher-income countries. 
b) Capital adequacy requirements ask bank managers and/or Qwners to keep, in the form of 
equities, a given proportion of the amount of the risky loans that they have made. It has a direct 
effect on the composition of the liability size of a bank's balance sheet. More importantly, it aims 
at providing incentives for banks to hold less risky portfolios. In fact, this regulation can reduce 
their incentive to provide too many risky loans since in the case of a failure they may lose aIl their 
equities, and if their amount of equity is important, it means that they willlose a lot. 
There are many types of capital adequacy requirement; their design has also evolved over time. 
According to Mishkin (2000) bank capital requirements typically take three forms: (i) the first type 
is based on the so-called leverage ratio, which is the amount of capital divided by the bank's total 
assets; (ii) the Basel l Accord type where assets and off-balance sheet activities are allocated into 
four categories, each with a different weight to reflect the degree of credit risk; (iii) the third type 
restrictions on competition, (iv) capital requirements, (v) risk-based deposit insurance premiums, (vi) disclosure 
requirements, (vii) bank chartering, and (viii) bank examination. 
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is the capital requirement based on the level of market risk taken by banks. 
Given the importance of the capital adequacy requirement in the regulatory framework of almost 
every country in the world today, we found useful to present sorne insight a,bout the design of the 
capital adequacy requirement as stated by the Basel II Accord. The risk-weighted capital adequacy 
requirement is based on the concept of the capital ratio where the numerator represents the amount 
of capital a bank has available and the denominator is a measure of the risks faced by the bank and 
is referred to as risk-weighted assets. The resulting capital ratio may be no less than eight percent. 
The assessment of the risk-weighted assets taken by a bank depends heavily on the technique used 
to measure it. The Basel II accord specifies the technique that should be used to assess each type 
of risk. Let us recall that the Basel committee identified three types of risk in the banking industry: 
credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. 
To measure the credit risk the bank can use three approaches: the standardized approach, 
the foundation internaI ratings based (I RB) approach, and the advanced l RB approach: (i) the 
standardized approach uses only a predetermined risk weight for different types of loans; (ii) the 
model underlying the internaI ratings based approach is the one-factor Gaussian copula model of 
time to default.5 
To assess the market risk, Basel II accord proposed the VaR. The market risk capital require-
ment for banks when they use the internaI model-based approach is calculated at any given time 
as k * VaR + SRC, where k is a multiplicative factor and SRC is a specifie risk charge. The value 
at risk, VaR, is the greater of the previous day's value at risk and the average value at risk over 
the last 60 days. The minimum value of k is 3. 
In addition to improving the way banks calculate credit risk capital, Basel II required banks 
to keep capital for operational risk. The regulators offered three approaches to measure this: the 
5More precisely, consider a large portfolio of N loans. Let us denote: WCDR: the worst-case default rate during 
the next year that we are 99.9% certain will not be exceeded, PD: the probability of default for each loan in one 
year, EAD: the exposure at default on each loan (in dollars), LGD: the loss given default, Le., the proportion ofthe 
exposure that is lost in the event of a default. Suppose that the copula correlation between each pair of obligors Îs 
p. We have WCDR = N[((N-1(PD) + ";pN 1(O.999))/(~))]' It follows that there Îs a 99.9% chance tha.t 
the loss on the portfolio will be less than N times EAD x LGD x WCDR. 
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basic indicator approach, the standardized approach, and the advanced measurement approach. 
The basic indicator approach sets the operational risk capital equal to the bank's average annual 
gross income over the last three years multiplied by 0.15. 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the stringency of capital requirements is lower for 
lower-income countries than for higher-income countries. The overall capital stringency is lower in 
developing countries than in developed countries. 
c) Reserve and/or liquidity requirements are a form of regulation which forces banks to maintain, 
in the form of a reserve, a given proportion of their deposits in an account of the Central Bank, 
and/or to maintain, in the form of liquidity, a given proportion of deposits in their account. This 
type of regulation affects the composition of the asset size of the bank's balance sheet. This 
regulation can mitigate the incentive of a bank's owner and manager to get involved in too risky 
activities. Besides, the reserve requirement is probably one of the most ancient types of banking 
regulation. It has been viewed as a form of taxation on banks by governments, since generally these 
required reserves do not bear interest. Many US economists have argued that a reserve requirement 
was needed in the US because of the existence of a deposit insurance run by the government. But 
this is no longer the view of a lot of Central Bank economists in developed economies .. In fact, 
in the 1990s sorne countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have abandoned the use of 
this required reserve and even countries which have not removed it, have reduced it substantially 
and more frequently. Meanwhile, in developing countries the reserve and/or liquidity requirement 
is still used. Sorne countries have significantly reduced their reserve requirement and increased the 
liquidity requirement. More than four-fifth of the countries still maintain a reserve requirement 
and about one-eighth of the countries has a liquidity requirement. 
3.2 Regulations Affecting the Banking Sector Structure 
Sorne regulations have an important impact on the structure of the banking system in a given 
country. From the previous example of regulations the following can have a significant influence 
on bank structure: regulations separating banking and non-banking business, and restrictions on 
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entry in the banking industry. 
a) Regulations separating banking and non-banking business: sorne governments restrict banks 
from involvment in commercial activities, which are considered to be outside the core banking 
business and, therefore, may be more risky. In the United States there was an even more restrictive 
policy, which was under application during the period 1933-2003: the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.6 
We observed from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) survey that almost every country (except 
New-Zealand) has at least a restriction on banks' involvement in activities such as: securities, 
insurance, real estate, and a bank owning non-financial firms. They also found that restrictions 
imposed on bank activities are greater for lower-income countries than higher-income countries; 
and that government ownership of banks increases in countries, on average, as one moves from the 
higher-income level to the lower-income level. 
b) Regulation on entry into the banking industry: there are many types of restrictions to the 
entry into the industry. It ranges from the minimum amount of capital that the owner'should 
provide to the regulatory agencies, to the restriction of foreigners to own or invest in banks. If the 
goal of the minimum amount of capital needed to enter into the banking sector is mainly to limit 
competitiôn, the goal of restricting foreign funds is three-fold: to limit competition, to reduce the 
exposure to capital flight, and to reduce the exchange-rate risk. From Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) almost every country has a minimum amount of capital to obtain a licence or 'a charter for 
banking activities. Although the entry of foreign funds was prohibited for acquisition, subsidiary, 
and creation of a branch during the 1980s, according to Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) almost 
no banking system is now restricting foreign funds to invest in banking. Meanwhile, they found 
that the percentage of entry applications denied is greater for low-income countries than for high-
incarne countries; and that developing countries place more limitations on foreign bank ownership 
of domestic banks and foreign bank entry through branching than developed countries. 
6The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 forces banks to be separated from other financial industries such as securities, 
insurance or real estate. 
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3.3 Regulations Affecting the Managers' and/or Owners' Behavior 
Since the theoreticalliterature has pointed out many market failures which can lead managers 
to take too much risk or to take improper actions without being disciplined by a free well-functioning 
financial market, many regulations have been designed to deal with this issue: the risk-based deposit 
insurance, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank examination. 
a) Deposit insurance was first introduced in the US after the Great Depression and has since 
been adopted by many countries. In their survey of 2001 Barth, Caprio, and Levine observed that 
at least 77 countries were applying it while Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2006) found that 
87 countries were applying it by the end of 2003. Its aim is to reduce the likelihood of bank runs 
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and panics in the banking system. However, complete insurance is likely to introduce moral hazard 
into the banking system and therefore increase its fragility. That is why a new type of deposit 
insurance has emerged, namely risk-based deposit insurance premiums. If the deposit insurance 
premium, provided by the government, is priced appropriately to reflect the amount of risk taken 
by a bank, it will solve the moral hazard issue.7 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that 
developing countries are almost three times as likely as developed countries not to have an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme. 
b) Disclosure requirements aim at mitigating the asymmetry of information available in the 
banking industry. Generally, regulators require that banks adhere to certain standard accounting 
principles and disclose a wide range of information that helps the market assess the quality of a 
bank's portfolio and the degree of the bank's exposure to risk. This type of regulation is widely 
used by high-income countries and less by developing countries. For example, Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004) point out that the percentage of banks rated by international credit rating agencies 
is seven times greater for high-income countries as compared to low-income countries. 
c) Bank chartering aims at preventing dishonest people and overly ambitious entrepreneurs from 
engaging in highly speculative activities. In fact, chartering proposal for new banks are screened 
7Risk-based deposit insurance premiums are theoretically appealing but in practice they have not worked very 
well mainly because it is hard to accurately determine the amount of risk a bank is actually taking 
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to prevent dishonest and speculative people from controlling banks. Almost every country has this 
type of regulation. 
d) Bank examination, or supervision, or monitoring helps to limit moral hazard incentives 
for excessive risk taking. Since it is not enough to have regulations which encourage less risk 
taking, banks must be monitored to see if they are complying with these regulations. This type of 
regulation improves the quality of the financial information given to the public by bank owners and 
managers and can also serve to enforce the existing regulations. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
found that the degree of private monitoring increases as one compares lower-income cOl.lntries to 
higher-income countries and that the tenure of supervisors is less in developing countries than in 
developed countries. 
4. Review of Empirical Methodologies 
The empirical analysis of the link between regulation and stability of the banking system 
had so far taken two main directions. The first direction is to compute, using a measure of risk 
assessment, the risk taken by the banks during a period under which a given type of regulation was 
under implementation and to see if the dynamic of the risk is associated with the given regulation. 
We will refer to this method as the implicit-risk method. This method is generally applied on 
bank-Ievel data in a given economy or on bank-Ievel data of a group of economies. 
The second direction is to talk about banking fragility in a given economy. The risk measure 
here takes the form of a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a banking system is assumed 
to be in a systemic banking crisis situation during a given year, and 0 if not. Under this method 
cross-country data and ·discrete regression model are widely employed. 
4.1 Implicit Risk Method 
A least three classes of econometric models use the implicit measure of risk to assess the impact 
of regulation on banking stability. These classes are: the simultaneous equation model, which is 
generally used to study the impact of capital adequacy requirement on bank's risk, the discrete 
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regression model which is mainly used in studies using the rate recorded by credit rating agencies, 
and the survival and hazard models used to model the probability of a bank's failure. 
4.1.1 Simultaneous Equation Model 
The simultaneous equation model was introduced by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to analyze 
adjustments in capital ratio and risk following the imposition of capital adequacy requirement in 
the US banking system.8 The key Ingredient of this model is that observed changes in bank capital 
ratios and portfolio risk levels can be decomposed into two components, a discretionary adjustment, 
and a change caused by an exogenously determined random shock, such that 
lldCAPjt + Éjt 
lldRISKjt + Ujt 
where llCAPjt and llRISKjt are observed changes in capital ratios and risk levels for bank j 
in period t, lldC,Ap and lldRISK represent discretionary adjustments in capital ratios and risk 
levels, and E and U are exogenous shocks. Recognizing that banks may not be able to adjust their 
desired capital ratios and risk levels instantaneously, the discretionary changes in capital and risk 
are modeled using a partial adjustment framework. 
= 
{ 
llCAPjt 
llRISKjt = 
fL(CAPlt - CAPj,t-l) + Ejt 
(3(RISKjt - RISKj,t_l) + Ujt 
Thus, observed changes in bank capital ratios and portfolio risk in period t are functions of the 
target capital ratio C APj*t and target risk level RIS Kjt, the lagged capital ratio C APt-l and risk 
levels RISKt_l and any random shocks. 
The target capital ratio level is not observable, but is assumed to depend upon some set of 
observable variables, including the changes in portfolio risk (llRISKjt ), while the exogenous shock 
that could affect bank capital ratios is the regulatory pressure. Also, the target risk level is not 
observable, but is assumed ta depend on a set of observable variables including the changes in 
portfolio risk (llCAPjt ), while the e?Cogenous shock that could affect bank capital ratios is the 
has since then been used by a great number of authors e.g., 
Nachane et al. (2000). 
and Nigro (1997), Rime (2000), and 
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regulatory pressure. This assumption helps to recognize the possible simultaneous relati~nship 
between capital and risk. 9 
To complete the empirical estimation of the simultaneous equation system one must provide a 
measure of the bank capital and a measure of the portfolio risk of banks. In the literature, portfolio 
risk is measured in two ways: using the ratio of total risk weighted assets to total assets, and using 
the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets (see, e.g., Avery and Berger (1991), 
Berger (1995), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992)). The literature also uses two definitions of a bank's 
capital ratio: the ratio of capital to total assets (see, e.g. Shriev~s and Dahl (1992), and the ratio 
of capital to risk-weighted assets (see, e.g. Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) 
and Ediz et al. (1998)). 
In this literature also, the regulatory pres'sure is a cornerstone of the hypotheses involving 
minimum capital standards; hence, it should be captured. Generally, the regulation pressure (REG) 
is a binary variable. 
Let us denote by OTHERS the other variables affecting the banking capital and the bank's 
risk. The model can be broadly set as 
{ 
fj.CAPjt tto + ttlREGjt + tt20THERSjt + tt3fj.RISKjt + tt4CAPjt-l + Ujt 
fj.RISKjt 130 + f31REG jt + f320THERSjt + f33fj.CAPjt + f34RISKjt-l + Vjt 
where Ujt and Vjt are error terms. This model is generally estimated using a two or a three-stage 
least-square procedure. Authors using the three-stage method argue that it allows them to take 
into account the simultaneity of banks' adjustments in capital and risk and to get estimates that 
are asymptotically more efficient than under the two-stage technique. 
4.1.2 Methodology with the Credit Rating 
Sorne authors working on bank level data use the rate of commercial banks provided by the 
international rating risk agencies as their measure of risk. Typically these agencies rate banks' 
9Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argued that a positive relationship between changes in capital and risk may signify, 
among other possibilities, the unintended impact of minimum regulatory capital requirements or even managerial 
risk aversion. Jacques and Nigro (1997) argued that a negative relationship may result because of methodological 
f1aws in the capital standards. 
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financial strength on a N - point scale, ranging from E to A+. Since these rates form a limited 
dependent variable, the appropriate econometric model used to assess the impact of regulation on 
the banking system stability here is an ordered pro bit or logit. Specifically, the regression equation 
estimated is: 
where the subscript i denotes the country and the subscript j denotes the bank; with RAT for 
rating, REG for regulation, BKC for banking characteristics, INS for institutions, MEV for 
macroeconomic variables. ID 
4.1.3 Survival Model 
Sorne authors use the probability of bank failure as their measure of risk or fragility. They then 
study the impact of regulation on this probability of failure. In the literature survival econometric 
model of Kaplan-Meier is generally used.ll 
4.2 Explicit-Instability Method 
So far in the literature, we have reported two econometric methodologies used to study the 
link between banking regulation and banking instability when the dependent variable is the explicit 
dummy variable of banking crisis. The most frequent one is the Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), hereafter DK D98 method, which consists of using a discrete regression model in the context 
of panel data. More precisely, DKD98 built a model similar to this: 
Let .~~ denotes an unobservable variable representing the probability that the banking system 
of country i suffers a systemic crisis at time t, and Pit - a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 when country i suffers a systemic banking crisis at time t and 0 otherwise. The probability of a 
systemic banking crisis is modelled as follows: 
if Pi~ > C 
if Pi~::; C 
lOSee Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tresse! (2006) for more details. 
llSee, e.g., Erlend and Baumann (2006), and She!don (2006) for more details 
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With 
and where X it represents the matrix of all exogenous variables; i the country index; t the time 
index, and C a threshold value of the banking crisis probability. 
The impact of each regulation on the banking system stability can be assessed by augmenting 
the above benchmark model of banking crises with variables capturing sorne characteristics of 
the banking regulation. Let us denote by Lit the matrix of variables representing the regulatory 
measures in country i at time t. The reduced form equation can be given by 
If e is significant and negative, then regulation reduces the probability of the banking system being 
in a systemic crisis. 
This model is estimated using the logit regression model in the context of panel data. The sign 
of the estimated coefficients for each exogenous variable shows how an increase of that explanatory 
variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis. However, as is well known for a binary 
model, the estimated coefficients cannot represent the magnitude of the effect of a marginal change 
in the exogenous variable on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Each coefficient instead refiects the 
effect of a change in a given explanatory variable on ln(Pit/(l- Pit)), so that the magnitude of the 
effect on the probability of a crisis depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function 
at f3' X it + e' Lit: it follows that the magnitude of the change in the probability of a banking crisis 
depends on the initial values of aU the exogenous variables and their coefficients. Hence, after the 
estimation of the logit model, the following step is to compute the marginal coefficient estimates 
which are evaluated at the sample mean. These estimates represent the magnitude of the link 
between each exogenous variable and the probability of a systemic banking crisis evaluated at the 
sample mean. 
The literature tends to use the logit instead of the panel-Iogit to estimate this model because 
the former is always convergent and the latter may not be. 
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The second method consists of using the discrete regression model but in the context of cross-
section data. More precisely, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) use the cross-section data over 
a five-year period time. Their dependent variable, which is the dummy variable for a crisis, is 
defined as follows: if a country has suffered a systemic banking crisis during the five-year period, 
the dummy variable takes on the value 1; if not it is O. The regulatory variables are taken from a 
survey, and the macroeconomic control variables are the average of this variable over the five-year 
period. They then use a simple logit model to assess the impact of each regulatory measure on the 
banking instability. 
5. Review of Empirical Studies 
We will carry out our empirical review with respect to the above groups. Let us first st art 
with the implicit-method. 
5.1 Empirical Studies Using the Implicit-Risk Method 
A great number of theoretical and empirical studies have been carried out on the impact of 
the capital adequacy requirement on the banking stability or the risk-taking behavior of bank 
managers in developed economies over the last decade. A lot of research has been done on the US 
banking system. Generally, these works use individual bank-level data and compute a measure of 
risk taken by each bank. Let us first present the work aIready done for the US banking system 
before presenting the work for other economies. 
5.1.1 Capital Standard and Stability in the US Banking System 
The capital standard was first introduced in the US banking system in 1981.12 Even before 
the introduction of the Basel l accord on capital requirement, many theoretical studies have been 
carried out on this regulation regarding the risk-taking behavior of bank owners and managers. 
12This was even before the introduction of the Basel 1 accord which was adopted by the GIO countries in 1988. 
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The most important studies were Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988). 
The message of this theoretical work was that capital standard may not be effective under various 
sets of conditions. Since then a lot of economists have carried out empirical studies on the US 
banking system to test this theoretical conclusion. 
The first empirical work for the US banking system is the paper of Furlong (1988). He used the 
data of 98 large US bank holding companies from 1975 to 1986. He defined the risk taken by banks 
as the volatility of underlying asset values. He computed this by inverting the caU option pricing 
formula, and found that asset risk measured in this way doubled during the period 1981-86 in 
the part of his sample in which banks were under capital requirements, compared with the earlier 
period. However, banks which were well-capitalized in 1981 before the introduction of capital 
requirement experienced the same rise in volatility as those which were not. He then argued that 
these findings do not support the view that an increase in capital adequacy requirement leads banks 
to increase their risky-assets. 
As noted by Jackson et al. (1999), his interpretation is true only if one assumes that the level 
of bank capital in 1981 was representing the desired or the equilibrium capitallevel. In this case 
Furlong's findings would be inconsistent with the Kim and Santomero's theoretical findings since 
weU-capitalised banks would not have been subjected to any additional constraint.13 But, it is 
possible that, through the effects of capital requirements on market discipline, the introduction of 
fixed capital standards led to an increase in target capital rates for both highly capitalised and 
,. 
weakly capitalised banks. In this event, Furlong's findings might be seen as consistent with Kim 
and Santomero's findings. 
This work has been criticized for not controlling for many variables which could have affected 
risk-taking behavior during that sample period. Also, it hasn't taken into account the endogeneity 
of capital ratio and risk. This has motivated the emergence of a new set of studies. Shrieves 
13i.e., although capital requirements with differentiated weights will probably give banks an incentive. to ,shift 
towards lowly-weighted asset categories, for any category of assets which bear the same proportional capital charge, 
banks will shift towards the more risky assets in the category, which will end up increasing risk-taking behaviour in 
the banking system. 
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and Dahl (1992) built a simultaneous equation model to take into account the fact that changes 
in both capital and risk have endogenous as well as exogenous components, and to focus on the 
determination of discretionary changes in risk which are induced by either endogenous or exogenous 
changes in capital. They then investigated the relationship between changes in risk and capital in 
a large sample of US banks over the period 1983-1987, and found a positive association between 
changes in risk and capital. 14 In fact, their results established that risk exposure and capital 
levels are simultaneously related, and that the majority of banks mitigate the effects of increases 
in capital levels by increasing asset risk posture, and vice versa. They argued that the fact that 
these relationships were present even in banks which were in excess of the minimum regulatory 
requirements for capital adequacy, supports the conclusion that a positive association between risk 
and capital in such banks is not strictly the result of regulatory influence, but rather reflects the 
view that risk-taking behavior tends to be constrained by bank owners' and/or managers' private 
incentives. Their findings suggest then that capital standard tends to increase the risk in the US 
banking system. 
A partial conclusion at this stage is, that taking into account the endogenous part of an increase 
in capital and risk can make a huge difference to the results. But this conclusion will not be entirely 
fair, since the sample period and banks are slightly different and the measures used to assess risks 
in banks are also different. Besides, when Jacques and Nigro used the same empirical methodology 
on a different sample period, they obtained a different result. In fact, Jacques and Nigro (1997) 
studied the impact of risk-based capital standards on capital ratio and risk is the US banks under 
the period 1990-91 and found that changes in the capital ratio and risk are negatively related, i.e., 
an increase in the level of capital reduces the risk taken by US banks.15 
14Where risk is measured using the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets, and bank's capital 
ratio is the ratio of capital to total assets. 
15The confiicting empirical findings on the effect of capital standard on banking stability is confirmed by the study 
of Haubrich and Watchel (1993) which found that the implementation of the Basle risk standards caused poorly-
capitalised banks to reconfigure their portfolios away from high-risk and towards low-risk assets, and which runs 
contrary to that of Hancock and Wilcox (1992) who found out that, banks that had less capital than required by the 
risk-based standards, shifted their portfolios towards high-risk assets. 
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The implicit-risk method failed then to close the debate about the effectivity of capital standard 
for banking stability in the US banking system. To end this subsection, let us review the Dahl and 
Spivey (1995) paper which provides an indirect way of assessing the importance of capital standard 
on banking stability. They used US bank data over the period 1980-88 to assess the likelihood 
and timing of bank recovery from undercapitalization. They noted that there appears to be only 
a limited capacity for banks to change positions of undercapitalisation by growth limitations or 
dividend restrictions, and that the impact of profitability on recovery is greater the longer a bank 
remains undercapitalised. Hence, the design of the capital requirement has important implications 
not only for optimal capitallevels, but also for the level of risk and the safety and soundness of the 
banking system as a whole. 
5.1.2 Capital Standard and Stability in Other Countries' Banking Systems 
Outside of the US, studies on the impact of capital adequacy requirement on banking stability 
using the implicit-risk method are scarce. So far, we have found two studies on the Switzerland 
banking system (Rime (2000), and Sheldon (2001)), a study on the group of ten member countries 
of the Basel committee (Sheldon (1996)) and a study on the Indian banking system (Nachane et 
al. (2000)). 
Using a modified version of the Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001) built a simultaneous 
equations model to analyze adjustments in capital and risk in Swiss banks and found that regula-
tory pressure to implement capital adequacy requirement induced banks to increase their capital 
ratio but did not affect the level of risk. In his study, risk is measured by the ratio of risk-weighted 
earnings to total assets. He argued that his findings indicate that for Swiss banks, an increase in 
available capital through retained earnings or equity issues is less costly than a downward adjust-
ment in the risk of the portfolio, and that a rationale for this can be the absence of a developed 
market for asset-backed securities in Switzerland. However, this runs contrary to the result found 
by Sheldon (2001) on banks that operated in Switzerland during the period 1987-99. He estimated 
the impact of the capital standard on the probability of banks' failure and found that over this 
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period the capital adequacy requirement succeeded in increasing the banks' safety, although it de-
creased the profitability of banks, and finaHy that the level of adequacy requirement was too high 
from a welfare point of view. As in the case of the US banking system the difference in results can 
be due to sample periods and the methodology used. 
Nachane et al. (2000) provided an empirical assessment of the impact of capital adequacy 
requirement on the risk-taking behavior of India's commercial banks. Their study examined 27 
Indian public sector banks using year-end data for 1998. Their measures of risk were: the ratio 
of risk-weighted assets to total assets and the ratio of gross non-performing loans to total assets. 
They found that banks adjusted their capital ratios significantly, but their risk positions adjusted 
relatively slowly to the respective target levels. They argued that this suggests that changes in. 
capital and risk are negatively related. 
Sheldon (1996) performed an analysis of the equity and asset volatilities of 219 banks from the 
group of ten member countries of the Basel committee over the period 1987 to 1994. He found that 
bank asset volatility in the US banks rose and that this was the case both for banks which increased 
their capital ratios and for those which did not. In Japan, asset volatility feH, although most banks 
raised their capital ratios. He conc1uded that he found litt le evidence that the implementation of 
the Basel guidelines had a risk-increasing impact on bank portfolios. 
5.1.3 Other Regulations and Banking Stability 
In the literature of implicit-risk there are few studies about the impact of other types of 
regulation on banking stability. There is a study of Horiuchi (1999) about the safety-net in the 
Japanese banking system, two other studies on safety-net in cross-section analysis, and two studies 
using a broad notion of regulation. 
We have found one study of the J apanese government safety-net and its links with stability. It is 
the paper of Horiuchi (1999) which examines how the Japanese government safety-net mechanism 
generated fragility in the banking system during the 1990s. He found that even though the Japanese 
safety net protected depositors from losses associated with bank failures, it did not implement 
28 
prudential regulations to prevent moral hazard associated with it. The later translated into the 
systemic banking crisis that Japan experienced during that period. This study therefore associated 
deposit insurance with banking crises in J apan. 
Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) found a similar result using the volatility of credit to the private 
. sector as the proxy for risk in a cross-country analysis. More precisely, they found that the .decision 
ta introduce deposit insurance increases the volatility of credit ta the private sector in countries 
with weak institutions. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) also found a similar result about the 
association of deposit insurance with banking fragility. They used bank-level data ta study the 
effect of deposit insurance on market discipline of baTIks. They focused on the disciplinary role of 
interest rates and deposit growth and found that market discipline is stronger in countries with 
better institutions, but that the presence of generously designed deposit insurance is able to reduce 
its effect significantly, leading to banking system fragility. Nier· and Baumann (2006) found the 
same result using bank-based data that "govemment safety nets result in lower capital buffers and 
that stronger market discipline resulting from uninsured liabilities and disclosure results in larger 
capital buffers, all else equal,". In other words, the deposit insurance is less important for banking 
stability than market-discipline.16 
Some studies used a broad notion of regulation. These defined an index of banking regulation as 
a weighted average of many types of regulation. For example, Gonzalez (2005) provided a channel 
through which banking regulation affects banking stability: charter value. The study used a panel 
database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact of bank regulations on bank charter 
value and risk-taking. He found, after c<?ntrolling for the presence of deposit insurance and for the 
quality of a country's contracting environment, that regulatory restrictions increase banks' risk-
taking incentives by reducing their charter value. More precisely, banks in countries with stricter 
regulation have a lower charter value, which increases their incentives to follow risky policies. In 
16This result about a positive association of deposit insurance and banking instability was found as a byproduct of 
their research on market dls':lplme. Nier and Baumann (2006) found, using a cross-country panel data set consisting 
of observations on 729 individual banks from 32 countries over the years 1993 to 2003, that competition leads to 
greater risk. 
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other words, there is a negative relationship between regulatory restrictions and the stability of 
banking systems. He aiso found that the deposit insurance can have a positive effect on stability if 
it is exogenous, but if it is endogenous, it is not relevant for stabilization purposes. Gonzalez used 
non-performing loans to totalloans and bank stock priee volatility as the measure of risk in banks. 
Also, viewing bank concentration as a symptom of regulatory restriction, Evrensel (2007) ap-
plied non-parametric and parametric methods of survival analysis to study the impact of bank 
concentration on banking crises. The empirical results suggest that concentration in the banking 
sector increases the survival time. other words, it reduces the probability of bank failure. An-
other resuit is that the GIO and non GIO countries constitute two distinct groups of countries, 
where the non - GIO countries have a higher incidence of bank crises.17 The parametric survival 
time regressions confirmed the possibility that the effects of the covariates on bank crises may 
have different dynamics in the GIO and non - GIO countries. The study states that the different 
dynamics associated with banking crises in developed and developing countries seem to be related 
to the absence of competitive forces in the economic and political environment. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2006) studied whether compliance with the Basel 
Core Princip les for banking supervision (BOP) improves bank soundness. Theyargued 
that BOP compliance assessments provide a unique source of information about the quality of bank 
supervision and regulation around the world. They found a significant and positive relationship 
between bank soundness (measured with Moody's financial strength ratings) and compliance with 
princip les related to information provision. Specifically, they found that countries, which require 
banks to report their ·financial data regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants, 
have sounder banks. They found similar results when the soundness was measured through z -
scores yields. interpreted their findings as evidence that transparency makes supervisory 
processes effective, strengthening market discipline, and that it is the most important element of 
the core principles. 
GlO refers to the group of eleven countries member of the Basel Committee on Banking S111I1prVt.Q1{,n 
preciselYt Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
dom and the United States. 
More 
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The general result found in the implicit-risk literature about the relationship between capital 
standard and st ab ilit y is that the previous implémentation of capital requirement before the Basel 
II Accord had not shown convincingly that it has any effect in fighting risk-taking in the banking 
sèctor. This had motivated regulators to introduce the Basel II capital standard. So far no empirical 
assessment of the impact of the Basel II Accord on risk-taking in banking have been found in the 
literature. It will take sorne time to be able to carry out a good study on this new accord. This 
time may even be longer than usual, since the introduction of Basel II in the US has been coupled 
with a banking crisis. 18 A key issue one should take into account should be the endogenous part 
of the level of the capital ratio. 
Apart from the capital standard, other types of regulation have not been scrutinized by many 
authors. Their findings however show that regulation directly affecting the bank manager's and/or 
owner's behavior (excluding full deposit insurance) seems effective for stabilization purpose. How-
ever, one cannot conclude strongly whether the empirical findings presented in this section are 
robust, since we have only a few studies. Therefore, these regulations need addition al empirical 
scrutiny. 
However, the implicit-risk method will always bring controversy as sorne would argue that the 
measure of the risk which is taken into account is not the one which matters for stability. 
5.2 Explicit-Risk Method 
A recent and growing literature of the empirical studies on banking regulation and stability 
using an explicit measure of banking instability departs from the work of DK D9S. These studies 
use cross-country data on banking regulation and banking crises to assess, using a discrete variable 
regression model such as the logit or the probit model, if a given regulatory measure has successfully 
contained or reduced the probability of the occurrence of a banking crisis in a given set of economies. 
Sorne studies -use aU countries with available data, while others focus on a group of countries such 
as developing countries, developed countries, etc. 
18This crisis caused by the subprime loans for housing cannot be accounted for as a consequence of Basel II; more 
reasonably, it can be viewed as an evidence of the weakness of the Basel l Accord on capital standard. 
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GeneraIly, these studies are motivated by the confiicting theoretical results of the effect of 
regulation on the banking system stability. However, the most important reason for the increase 
in empirical research on regulation and stability seems to be the availability of data. Since 1998, 
a group of researchers at the World Bank : Barth, Caprio, Levine, and others have developed a 
comprehensive survey of the banking regulation practices around the world. From the first survey 
in 1998-1999 to the third survey in 2007, the number of countries covered has increased significantly 
from 100 to almost every country in the world. The number of questions and types of regulation 
practices covered by these surveys have also increased over this period. They have also assembled 
a database on banking crises. 
Many studies have used these datasets to answer different types of questions, ranging from the 
effect of entry restriction on banking stability, to the effect of deposit insurance, capital adequacy 
requirement, and a broad range of criteria in banking regulation. 
5.2.1 Banking Entry Restriction 
A key question which has earned empirical scrutiny is whether {a lower level of} entry re-
striction into the banking system is likely to increase the stability of the banking sect or . Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) provided an empirical answer to this question. They used data 
for 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, and applied the DKD98 discrete regression model. They found 
that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems. Moreover, the data 
showed that regulations that thwart competition are linked with greater banking system fragility. 
Furthermore, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis 
is positively associated with greater limitations on foreign bank entry; and they found no evidence 
of positive association between domestic entry restrictions and banking stability. 
But before aIl this research Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) have provided the first 
empirical assessment of the link between lower entry restriction in banking and financial fragility 
using a dummy variable of banking crises. Their study used a panel of data of 53 countries over the 
period 1980-1995. They found that banking crises were more likely to occur in countries with more 
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liberalized financial systems. They pointed out that the financialliberalization's impact on a fragile 
banking sect or is weaker in countries with strong institutions-especially where there is respect for 
the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforcement. They also found that 
even in the presence of macroeconomic stabilization, less entry restriction is likely to be linked with 
the occurrence of banking crises in countries where institutions to ensure legal behaviour, contract 
enforcement, and effective prudential regulation and supervision are not fully developed. 
Conversely, Noy (2004) found a different result when studying the effect of liberalization on 
banking stability. He examined the hypothesis that insufficient prudential supervision of the bank-
ing sector after the removal of entry restriction results in excessive risk-taking by financial interme-
diaries and a subsequent crisis. The paper evaluated the empirical validity of this hypothesis using 
a panel-probit model of the occurrence of banking crises controlling for macro-economic, institu-
tional and political variables. It concluded that such a development is, at worst, only a medium 
run threat to the health of the banking sector. He found that a more direct danger is the loss of 
monopoly power that liberalization typically entails. 
5.2.2 Capital Standard 
80 far we have found in the literature only one study of the impact of capital standard on 
banking stability using the explicit-risk method. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found a signif-
icant negative relationship between higher ratio of capital requirement and non-performing loans. 
However, when they used the explicit dummy variable for banking crises, they found sorne spec-
ifications in which capital requirement entered with a negative and significant coefficient. They 
interpreted this result as evidence that the relationship between capital adequacy requirement and 
banking stability is not very robust. 
5~2.3 Deposit Insurance 
Before the important empirical research of Demirguc~Kunt and Detragiache (2002), hereafter 
DK D02, there was a large body of theoreticalliterature on deposit insurance and its association 
to fragility. However, there was a large divergence in the results of these studies too. D K D02 used 
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cross-country panel data on 61 countries over the period 1980-1997 and found that explicit deposit 
insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises, the more so where bank interest rates 
are deregulated and the institution al environment is weak. They also found that the negative effect 
of deposit insurance on banks' stability is stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to 
depositors, where the scheme is funded, and where it is run by the government. Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004) found a positive association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme 
and the bank fragility. Their rel~tionship was robust to alterations in the control variables. This 
was consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only substantially aggravates moral hazard 
but also produces deleterious effects on banking stability. 
However this result has not been found to be robust by Arteta and Eichengreen (2006). In 
fact, they assessed the link between banking fragility and deposit insurance using a' sample of 75 
emerging market economies over the period 1975-1997 and found no significant effect of deposit 
insurance on the probability of the banking system being in a systemic crisis. They argued that 
what led to this difference vias that they had more data on deposit insurance on emerging market 
than DKD02. 
5.2.4 Overall Banking Regulation 
Using the above databases sorne studies such ,as: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000, 2004, 
2006), and Barth, Gan, and NoUe (2006) have assessed the stabilization effect of existing banking 
regulations. 
In a book entitled "Rethinking Banking Regulation: Till Angels Govern" based on the World 
Bank survey, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) assessed the importance of each type of regulatory 
policy on the stàbilization of the banking system. They provided empirical results for a range 
of regulations. They found that regulation is not effective for stability, and for a long range of 
criteria. They argued for paying doser attention to the foundations of the financial sector, and that 
without good information and adequate incentives, market participants will not be able to effectively 
monitor banks. These findings are the summary of findings already done in one of their previous 
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works: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). In this work they used their database on bank regulation 
and supervision covering 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and 
supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. More precisely, they 
examined the effect on banking stability of regulations such as: restrictions on bank activities; entry 
restriction; capital adequacy requirement; deposit insurance system design features; supervisory 
power, independence, and resources; loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and 
• 
diversification guidelines; regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring 
of banks; and government ownership. They found that regulatory .measures that rely excessively 
on direct government restriction on bank activities is not good for stabili~y and can ev en create 
fragility. More precisely, they found that the relationship between capital adequacy requirement 
and banking stability is not robust. They also found that regulatory policies that rely on guidelines 
that force accurate information disclosure, empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and 
foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control, worked best to promote stability. 
They argued that their findings do not mean that regulations which have not been proven 
effective have no role in strengtheI?-Ïng the banking sector. Rather, their interpretation is that 
it suggested a supporting role for regulation, one in which the regulators' job is to verify that 
the information being disclosed by banks is accurate, and to penalize banks that dis close false, 
misleading or inadequate information~ 
Furthermore, Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) found, using cross-section data on twin banking 
crises and controlling for institutional factors, mixed evidence that deposit insurance, the removal 
of capital controls, a lack of central bank independence, and financial liberalization increase the 
chance of banking crises.19 Using cross-country data on bank ownership, regulation and supervision, 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000) investigated the link between bank ownership and regulation on 
banking fragility. They found that the tighter the restrictions placed on this activity (a bank is not 
permitted to do securities, insurance and real estate activities), on average, the more inefficient are 
banks and the greater the likelihood of a banking crisis. The likelihood of a banking crisis is also 
19Their dataset consists of over 30 countries covering 13 institutional factors for the period 1984-2002. 
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greater, on average, the tighter the restrictions placed on bank ownership of non-financial firms. 
They also found that restricting the mixing of banking and commerce is associated with greater 
financial fragility. Whereas restricting non-financial firms from owning commercial banks is not 
associated with financial fragility, restricting banks from owning non-financial firms is positively 
associated with bank instability. Finally, countries that restrict banks from owning non-financial 
firms have a robustly higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis. 
It follows from the empirical studies, using explicit measures of banking crises, that regulations 
affecting a bank's balance sheet or the banking sector structure are generally at least not effective 
for stabilization purposes, and can even increase the fragility of the bankingsystem. Conversely, 
regulation affecting a bank managers' and/or owners' behavior is effeètive. The importance of 
taking the institutional factors into account has emerged as these factors are often linked with 
instability. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The empirical literature on banking regulation has so far tried to solve the theoretically con-
flicting results on banking regulatios and banking stability. It has taken two main directions in 
respect of the stability measure which is used in the study. The so called implicit-stability method 
uses an implicit measure of risk such as: the ratio of non-performing loan on the total asset, bank 
stock price volatility, and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; while the explicit-stability 
method uses the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis in a given economy as the measure of in-
stability. 
These two methods ditfer also in terms of econometric techniques that they use for their esti-
mations. The implicit-stability method relies mainly on a simultaneous equation model, and on 
a survival and/or hazard model; while the explicit-stability method relies on a discrete regression 
model such as logit or pro bit in the context of panel data. 
So far, many studies have been done on the US banking system but only few on other banking 
systems. Most importantly, many works focus on a given type of regulation, generally on the 
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capital adequacy requirement, deposit insurance, entry restriction, and supervision practices in 
the banking sect or. So far, also these studies have failed to provide a convincing result about the 
impact of many 1iypes of regulation on banking stability. No regulation assessed so far had been 
found by aU the empirical studies done on it to present the same result about its effect on stability. 
Hence, instead of providing a solution of the confiicting theoretical findings, empirical studies add 
confusion to them. 
These conflicting results are mostly due to the methodologies used. In fact, even for studies 
using the implicit-instability technique, the results on banking regulation and instability vary from 
studies using simultaneous equation models to those using hazard or survival models. They vary also 
in the function of the control variable used to account for the characteristics of the banking system, 
and finaUy on the sample periods or sample countries. The difference between the simultaneous 
equations model and the others may be that the former takes into account the endogeneity effect 
of sorne types of regulation. 
For studies using a cross-section dummy variable of systemic banking crises as the measure of 
the banking stability, the result is generaUy not robust, showing that regulations such as entry 
restriction and capital requirement have no significant effect on stability. ,These studies suffer 
mainly from selection bias, which cornes from the method used to build the banking crisis variable. 
In fact, as pointed out by von-Hagen and Ho (2007), aU datasets on the banking crises variable 
identify a crisis year using a combination of market events such as closures, merges, runs on financial 
institutions, and government emergency measures such as a freeze. Hence, they identify crises only 
when they are severe enough to trigger market events. In contrast, crises successfuUy contained by 
corrective policies are neglected. 
There is a need to find a good measure of banking stability in order to assess the importance 
of regulation on stability. The measure of banking instability can be constructed using banking 
system indicators which are positively correlated to banking crises, such as the growth of credit to 
the private sector, and the growth of banks' deposits. 20 Thereafter, one can use methods such as 
2°8ee, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2007) 
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the Markov-switching model, suitable for modelling changes in the state of a variable, to detect 
banking crises episodes. 
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Chapter 2 
The Empirics of Banking Regulation 
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1. Introduction 
Banks have always been viewed as fragile institutions that need government help to evolve in 
a safe and sound environment. Market failures such as incomplete markets, moral hazard between 
banks' owners and depositors, and negative externalities (like contagion) have been pointed out to 
explain this fragi1~ty. These have motivated government regulatory agencies or central banks to 
introduce several types of regulatory measures, such as entry barriers, reserve requiremerits, and 
capital adequacy requirements. 
Generally, the theoretical effect of any given regulation is mixed. For example, full deposit 
insurance the banking system to avoid'bank panics (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). 
In fact, it provides insurance to depositors that they will in any case obtain their deposits. However, 
as aB authors acknowledge, it increases the moral hazard issue in the banking industry. Therefore, 
the general equilibrium result of deposit insurance is not as straightforward as one would have 
thought (see, e.g., Matut"es and Vives (1996)).1 For almost every type of regulation the general 
equilibrium result is not straightforward on theoreticat'grounds (see, e.g., Allen and Gale (2003, 
2004), Morrison and White (2005)). It follows then that the question of th; effectiveness ofbanking 
regulation is of first-order empirical importance. 
A fair amount of empirical work has already been done on the impact of banking regulation 
on banking system stability. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) assessed the impact of an available 
regulatory measures across the world on banking stability. More specifically, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detriagache (2002) focused on the effect of deposit insurance on banking system stability, while 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) focused on the impact of banking concentration. An 
these studies use discrete regression models such as the logit model. Although this ls an important 
attempt to test empirically the effect of regulation on banking system stability, it presents some 
important limitations: a selection bias and a lack of assessment of the impact of these regulations 
on banking crisis duration. 
lMatutes and Vives found that deposit insurance has ambiguous welfare effects in a framework where the l'narket 
structure of the banking industry is endogenous. 
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The selection bias comes from the method used to build the banking crisis variable. In fact, 
available banking crisis indicators identify a crisis year using a combinat ion of market events such 
as closures, mergers, runs on financial institutions, and government emergency measures. After 
Von Hagen and Ho (2007) ,we refer to this approach of dating banking crisis episodes as the 
event-based approach.2 This approach identifies crises only wh en they are severe enough to trigger 
market events. In contrast, crises successfully contained by corrective policies are neglected. Rence, 
empirical work based on the event-based approach suffers from a selection bias. 
The first goal of this paper is to deal with this selection bias problem by using an alternative 
estimation method, the Markov-switching regression model (MSM), to assess the effect of various 
types of banking regulation on banking system stability.3 The second goal is to assess the effect of 
these regulations on cri sis duration. 
To achieve these goals, we first compute an index of banking system fragility and use it as 
the dependent variable to estimate the probability of banking crises. Secondly, we implement 
a three-state Markov-switching model, where the three states are: the systemic crisis state, the 
tranquil state, and the booming state. We introduce regulatory measures as explanatory variables 
of the probability of transition from one state to another to assess their effect on the occurrence 
of a systemic banking crisis. We will refer to this method as the Time-Varying Probability of 
Transition Markov-Switching Model, hereafter TVPT-MSM. We der ive from the TVPT-MSM the 
marginal effect of each regulatory measure on the probability of being in the systemic banking crisis 
state. Thirdly, we use this specification to assess the effect of regulatory measures on banking crisis 
duration. Fourthly, we carry out a sensitivity analysis: we first use an alternative index to see if 
the results are robust; we aIso use a Monte Carlo procedure to check the sensitivity of the results to 
having less than two states and to having state-dependent standard deviations. Finally, we assess 
the importance of selection bias resolved by the TVPT-MSM. 
We applied our methodology to an emerging market economy, lndonesia, which has suffered 
20n this issue of selection bias see von-Hagen and Ho (2007). 
3In fact, as pointed out by Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (2003), the Markov-switching mode! is useful because of 
its ability to capture occasional but recurrent .regime shifts in a simple dynarnic econometric mode!. 
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from banking crises during the period 1980-2003, and where there have been sorne dynamics on 
the regulatory me as ures during the same period. We focus our analysis on four major regulatory 
measures: (i) entry restriction; the removal of entry restriction is assumed by many authors such 
as Allen and Herring (2001) to have contributed to the reappearance of systemic banking crisis; (ii) 
deposit insurance, which is supposed to reduce instability by providing liquidity, therefore reducing 
the possibility of bank runs. However, it has been found by many authors to increase the moral 
hazard problem in the banking industry; (iii) reserve requirements,which most economists viewed 
as a tax on the banking system that can lead to greater instability in the banking system; and (iv) 
the capital adequacy requirement, which is promoted by the Basel Accords and is supposed to be 
effective in reducing the probability of a banking crisis. 
We find that reducing entry restriction increases the duration of a crisis and the probability 
of being in the banking crisis state. The reserve requirement reduces crisis duration but seems 
to increase banking fragility. Deposit insurance increases the stability of the lndonesian banking 
system and reduces the duration of banking crises. The capital adequacy requirement improves 
stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises. This later result is obtained when 
we control for the level of entry barrier. 
Our paper builds on the previous literature of banking crisis indices and the Markov-switching 
regression. The paper most closely related to ours is by Ho (2004), who also applied the MSM to 
the research on banking crises. lt uses a basic two-state Markov-switching model to detect episodes 
of banking crises. However, his paper does not apply the MSM framework to study the effect of 
banking regulations on the banking system stability, which is the main feature we are interested 
in. The papers by Hawkins and Klau (2000), Kibritçioglu (2003), and Von-Hagen and Ho (2007) 
are related in that they build banking system fragility indices, and use them to identify episodes 
of a banking crisis.4 The objective of this method is to construct an index that can reflect the 
vulnerability or the fragility of the banking system (i.e., periods in which the index exceeds a given 
threshold are defined as banking crisis episodes). 
4These authors follow the approach taken by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994, 1995, and 1996) for the 
foreign currency market and currency crises. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the TVPT-MSM and 
its estimation strategy. Section 3 analyzes the Indonesian banking system. Section 4 assesses 
empirically the effect of banking regulations on the occurrence and the duration of banking crises. 
Section 5 carries out a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 assesses the selection bias. We conclude in 
section 7. 
2. The Model and the Estimation Strategy 
To estimate a Markov-switching model we need an indicator that we will use to assess the 
state of the banking activity. Therefore, in this section, we first present an index of banking system 
fragility, before presenting the TVPT-MSM. 
2.1 The Banking System Fragility Index 
The idea behind the banking system fragility index (hereafter BSFI) , introduced by Kit-
ritçioglu (2003), is that aH banks are potentially exposed to three major types of economic and 
financial risk: (i) liquidity risk (i.e., bank runs) , (ii) credit risk (i.e.) rising of non-performing 
loans), and (iii) exchange-rate risk (Le., bank's increasing unhedged foreign currency liabilities).5 
The BSF 1 uses the bank deposit growth as a proxy for liquidity risk, the bank credit to the do-
mestic private sect or growth as a proxy for credit risk, and the bank foreign liabilities growth as a 
proxy for exchange-rate risk. Formally, the BSFI is computed as follows: 
BSFlt 
NDEPt + NCPSt + NFLt 
with (1) = 
1 3 
NDEPt 
DEPt-
while DEPt= 
LDEPt-LDEPt- 12 (2) 
(!dep LDEPt- 12 
NCPSt 
CPSt -
while CPSt 
LCPSt-LCPSt _ 12 
and (3) = , (!cps LCPSt- 12 
NFLt 
FLt 
.while F Lt= 
LFLt -LFLt _ 12 (4) = 
(! fi LFLt-12 
5 Demlrgilç-Kunt , Detragiache and Gupta (2006) have found in a panel of countries, which have suffered from 
systemic banking crises during the last two decades, that in crises years, one observes an important decrease in the 
growth rate of banks' deposits and of credit ta the private sector. 
50 
where J.L(.) and 0'(.) stand for the arithmetic average and for the standard deviation of these three 
variables, respectively. LCPSt denotes the banking system's total real daims on the private 
LF Lt denotes the bank's total real foreign liabilities; and LDEPt denotes the total deposits of 
banks. One should notice that nominal series are def:lated by using the corresponding domestic 
consumer price index. 
2.2 The Markov-Switching Model 
In this subsection we present and provide the estimation method of our econometric model. 
2.2.1 The Model Setup 
We adapt the Garcia and Perron (1996) MSM to assess the state of the banking activity. 
To ease the presentation, we present only the model with three states (which happen to be more 
appropriate for our data), although we have studied the other specifications. These three states are 
: (i) the systemic crisis state with a mean J.Ll and variance O'f, (ii) the tranquil state with a mean 
J.L2 and variance O'~) and (iii) the booming state with a mean J.L3 and a variance O'~. 6 Let y be a 
banking system fragility index (as provided in the above subsection). We assume that the index's 
dynamics are only determined by its mean and its variance. We set up the model as follows: 
(5) 
and Sjt 1, if St = j, and Sjt = 0, otherwise, for j = 1,2,3. The stochastic pro cess on St can be 
summarized by the transition matrix Pij,t = Pr[St = jlSt-l = i, Zt], with Pij,t 1. Zt is the 
L'-''''''AU"'' and Klau (2000), and Kibritçioglu (2003) argue that banking crises are generally by a. period of 
high increase of credit to the private sector and/or high increase of deposits and/or high increase of Iiabilities. 
Some studies even labelled the booming state as the pre-crisis state. 
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vector of N exogenous variables which can affect the transition probability of the banking crisis. 
It is a vector of real numbers. The (3X3) transition matrix Pt at time t is given by 
[ 
PU,t P21,t P31,t 1 
Pt = P12,t P22,t P32,t . 
P13,t P23,t P33,t 
(6) 
We assess the effect of regulations on banking crises by assuming that the transition proba-
bility from one state to another is affected by regulatory measures taken by the government such 
as the entry barrier, the reserve requirement, the deposit insurance, and the capital adequacy 
requirement.7 Formally, we assume that for i = 1,2,3 and aIl t, 
exp(Àij,o + L:f=l Àij,kZkt) (7) 
for j == 1,2; while, 
1 (8) Pi3,t = N N 
1 + exp(Àil,o + L:k=l Ài1 ,k Z kt) + exp(Ài2 ,O + L:k=l Ài2,k Z kt) 
Note that the model specification with constant probability of transition is a special case of the 
above model where Zt is the null matrix. 
This model is weIl suited to account for selection bias since it uses a measure of banking system 
activity more robust to prompt and corrective action, and also because the Markov-switching model 
is an endogenous regime switching model that, according to Maddala (1986), is a good framework 
for a self-selection model. The TV PT - M SM is also suitable to account for endogeneity bias 
since the states of nature and the effect of regulation on the occurrence of these states are jointly 
estimated. In other words, the TV PT - M SM is a type of a simultaneous equations models. 
2.2.2 The Estimation Method for the TVPT-MSM 
We jointly estimate the parameters in equation (5) and the transition probability parameters 
in equation (7) by maximum likelihood.8 For this purpose, we first der ive the likelihood of the 
7See Filardo (1994) for a deeper assessment of a Markov-switching model with time varying probability of transi-
tion. 
sIn the MSM literature there are sorne other estimation techniques for the TVPT-MSM. For example Diebold, 
Lee, and Weibach (1994) proposed the EM algorithm to estimate a related model and Filardo and Gordon (1993) 
.52 
model. The conditional joint-density distribution, f, summarizes the information in the data and 
links explicitly the transition probabilities to the estimation method. 
If the sequence of states {St} from 0 to T were known, it would be possible to write the joint 
conditionallog likelihood function of the sequence {Yt} as 
[ ( 1 )] 
T ~ { ( ) {Yt - J.1- St}2} • ln f YT,···,YO ST,· .. ,SO,ZT, ... ,Zo = -"2 ln27f - ~ ln U St + 2 . 
t=2 2uSt 
(9) 
Since St is not observed, but only Yt from time 0 to T, we adapt the two-step method of Kim 
and Nelson (1999) to determine the log likelihood function. (See details in appendix A). 
2.3 Estimating the Marginal Effect of Regulation on Banking Stability 
When the regulatory measures are inc1uded in the probability of transition, the result obtained 
from the standard Markov-switching estimation is the estimated value of the parameters defining 
the transition probabilities. Since many parameters are involved in the computation of these 
probabilities of transition, the direct estimates of these parameters do not tell us the full story 
about the effect of each regulatory measure on the transition probability. More importantly, it 
does not provide an assessment of each regulatory variable on the probability of the banking 
system being in a given state. In other words, to obtain the effect of a regulatory measure (zt) on 
the banking stability one should compute the marginal effect of each regulation on the probability 
of the banking system being in the systemic cri sis state. We derive the result in the proposition 
below, but first present a lemma that will help in the derivation. 
Lemma Let Zlt be a time series variable, if Zlt is a continuous variable, the marginal effect of Zlt 
used a Gibbs Sampler to estima te the same type of model. 
on Pij,t for i = 1,2,3 is given by: 
âPij,t 
ÔZlt 
g(Àij) [Àij,l + (Àij,l - Ài1,l) g(Àid + (Àij,l - Ài2 ,1) g(Ài2)] 
[1 + g(Àid + g(Ài2)J2 
for j = 1,2; and; 
- [Àil,lg(Ài1 ) + Ài2 ,lg(Ài2)] 
[1 + g(Àil) + 9(Ài2 )]2 
N 
exp().,ij,O + L ).,ij,kZkt). 
k=l 
Let Zlt be a dummy variable, the marginal effect of Zlt on Pij,t is given by 
where Z-lt is the matrix Zt without Zlt .. 
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(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
PROOF. These results are straightforward from a partial differentiation of (7) and (8). See 
details in appendix A. • 
Proposition The marginal effect of any exogenous continuous time series variable Zlt on the 
probability of the banking system ta be in state St = 1 is given by: 
The marginal effect of any exogenous dummy variable Zlt on the probability of the banking 
system ta be in state St = 1 is given by: 
3 
6..1 [Pr(st = 1)] = L [Pil,t(Llt, 1) - Pil,t(Llt. 0)] [Pr(St-1 = i)]. (14) 
i=l 
PROOF. The idea of this proof is to compute the unconditional probability of state 
St = 1, and then derive it with respect to Zlt. Details are available in appendix A. Ii 
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We know that a given continuous variable Zk has a positive effect on the banking system 
stabilization if it has a positive effect on Pr(St = 1). i.e., at any time t, 8P~~:t=1) 2 O. Using the 
above proposition, this is achieved when for all i 
(15) 
In other words, the regulatory measure (Zk) increases the probability of the banking system to get 
into a systemic banking crisis when (15) is met. Conversely, if for all i 
(16) 
the regulatory measure (Zk) reduces the probability of the banking system to suffer a systemic 
banking crisis. 
The other combinations of parameters are difficult to handle analytically, but fortunately with . 
the above proposition we can compute the marginal effect of each explanatory variable at its mean. 
To do this we follow the literature of the discrete variable model, which computes the marginal effect 
at the mean of the explanatory variable.We then use the delta method to compute the standard 
error of this marginal effect. 
2.4 Effect of Regulation on Banking Crisis Duration 
A heuristic idea of the effect of a regulatory measure (Zk) on the crisis duration is given by the 
sign of 8Pll,t. From the above lemma 8Pll,t > 0 if az;; az;; -
Àll,k :::; 0, and Àll,k :::; À 12 ,k. (17) 
It follows that the regulatory measure Zk reduces the probability of remaining in state 1, ( i.e., 
remaining in the banking crisis state) if condition (17) is met. This can be viewed as a positive 
effect on the banking crisis duration. c 
However, to assess properly the expected duration of a given state j, at each time t, we keep in 
mind that the adoption of any type of regulation is assumed to be exogenous and that its adoption 
is not predictable. We will then consider that the expected duration at a given point in time is 
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based on the transition probability observed at that time. More precisely, the expected duration of 
a given state j, at time t, conditional on the inferred state (crisis state, tranquil state or booming 
state, respectively) is given by: 
00 
Et(Dj) = L dPr(Dj = dIYt-l, Zt) (18) 
d=l 
~ d [pr(St+d =f. flSHd-l = j, Zt) TI Pr(St+i = jlSHi-l = j, Zt)] 
~ d [Cl - P,CS'+d ~ jIS,+d-l ~ j, Z,j) TI P,CS'+i ~ jIS,+i-l ~ j, Z,j J. (19) 
Since for aIl i 
(20) 
the expected duration is similar to the case of absence of constant probability of transition. In fact, 
substituting (20) in (19) yields 
(21) 
3. The Data 
We now apply our estimation strategy to the Indonesian banking system. We will first present 
the background of the banking activity in Indonesia during the period 1980-2003, before describing 
the data used in our empirical investigation. 
3.1 The Background of the lndonesian Banking System 
The Indonesian banking system has experienced some important structural developments dur-
ing the 1980-2003 period. One can distinguish four stages of this development: (i) the ceiling 
period (1980 -1983) where interest rate ceilings were applied; (ii) the growth period (1983 -1988), 
which was a consequence of the deregulation reform of June 1983 that removed the interest rate 
ceiling; (iii) the acceleration period (1988-1991) where the extensive banking liberalization reform 
starting in October 1988 was being implemented graduaIly; the bank reforms in October 1988 led 
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to a rapid growth in the number of banks as well as total assets. Within two years Bank lndonesia 
granted licenses to 73 new commercial banks and 301 commercial banks' branches; and (iv) the 
consolidation (1991 2003) in which prudential banking principles were introduced, including cap-
ital adequacy requirement. In February 1991, prudential banking principles were introduced, and 
banks were urged to merge or consolidate.9 
The Indonesian banking system experienced two episodes of banking crises over the 1980-2003 
period: the 1994 episode, which was labelled by Caprio et al. (2003) as a non-systemic crisis, 
and the 1997-2002 episode, which was recorded by Caprio et al. (2003) as a systemic crisis. 
During the 1994 episode, the non-performing assets equalled more than 14 percent of banking 
system assets, with more than 70 percent in state banks. The recapitalization costs for five state 
banks amounted to nearly two percent of GDP, (see, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2002)). 
At the end of the 1997-2002 episode, Bank lndonesia had closed 70 banks and nationalized 13, 
out.of a total of 237. The non-performing loans (NPLs) for the banking system were estimated at 
65 - 75 percent of total loans at the peak of the crisis and fell to about 12 percent in February 
2002. At the peak of the the share of NPLs was 70 percent, while the share of insolvent 
banks' assets was 35 percent (see, Caprio et al (2003)). From November 1997 to 2000, there were 
six major rounds of intervention taken by the authorities, including both "open bank" resolutions 
and bank dosures: (i) the closure of 16 smaH banks in November 1997; (ii) intervention into 54 
banks in February 1998; (iii) the take-over of seven banks and dosure of another seven in April 
1998; (iv) the dosure of four banks previously taken over in April 1998 and August 1998; and (v) 
the dosure of 38 banks together with a take-over of seven banks and joint recapitalization of seven 
banks in March 1999; and (vi) a recapitalization of six state-owned banks and 12 regional banks 
during 1999-2000. 
The lndonesian banking regulations have changed over the period of study. The reserve require-
ment was in place before 1980; it was reduced from 15 percent to two percent during 1983-1984 
and remained at this level until1998 when it was increased to five percent. The first act of bank-
e.g. Batunanggar (2002) and Enoch et al. (2001) for details about the evolution of the Indonesian banking 
system during thisperiod. 
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ing liberalization was introduced in June 1983; entry barrier was abolished in October 1988. The 
capital adequacy requirement was effective in 1992 and has since then been modified frequently. 
An explicit deposit insurance was introduced in 1998.10 
3.2 Data Sources 
Before proceeding let us recall that the index of banking system fragility is given by 
BSFh=NDE~+NCP~+NF~ 
3 
where NDEP, NCPS and NFL are centralized and normalized values of LDEP, LCPS, and LFL 
respectively. 
We use the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). More precisely, LCPS is taken from IFS's line 22D, LFL is taken from line 26C, LDEP 
lS considered as the sum of lines 24 and 25 in the IFS. We deftated nominal series by using the 
corresponding domestic consumer priee index (CPf) taken from IFS line 64. The dummy variable 
for explicit deposit insurance is taken from Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2006). The reserve 
requirement is taken from Van't Dack (1999), and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). The capital 
adequacy requirement is taken from the Indonesian Bank Act 2003. The entry restriction variable 
is constructed based on Abdullah and Santoso (2000) and Batunanggar (2002). 
3.3 Banking System Fragility Index 
Figure 1 shows the BSFI index for Indonesia. It presents three phases: a phase with higher 
index value consisting of two periods (1988-1990, and 1996-1997), a phase with the index value 
around zero over two periods (1980-1987, and 1991-1996), and a phase with lower index value for 
one period (1998-2003). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
lOThere exists a full blanket guarantee in lndonesia sin ce 1998 (see, Dernirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Leaven (2006) 
p.64). 
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The two higher value periods are driven by different causes. The 1988-1997 period was a 
. consequence of the introduction of the first major package of removal of entry restrictions. In 
fact, in October 1988, the government introduced a new legislation that allowed the private sect or 
to create and manage banks. This legislation stimulated the banking activity through the credit 
channel, since newly created banks provided new loans to the private sector, which in turn translated 
into new deposits. The lndonesian banI:ing system took approximately two years to return to the 
normal trend in its activities. By contrast, the 1996-1997 period was driven by an increase of 
credit to the private sector due to an increase of foreign capital in the Indonesian banking system. 
It was also a consequence of the 1994 regulation removing the ceiling on the maximum share of 
investment a foreign investor can withdraw, and also the 1996 regulation allowing mutual funds to 
be 100 percent foreign-owned. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The two medium-value periods are periods with smooth dynamics in the banking activity. In 
those periods there is no important change in regulation, nor in the banking system structure. 
Figure 2 (b) shows that during these periods the annual growth rate of credit to the private sector 
and bank deposits are stable around 20 percent. 
The lower index phase is a consequence of the Asian financial crisis, which followed the collapse 
of the Thailand currency during the second semester of 1997. As we can see in figure 2 (a) and (b), 
the dynamics of the three banking indicators changed dramatically in 1997, that is a change in the 
level and in the trend. We guess that these three phases characterize the states of the Indonesian 
banking activities during the sample period of 1980-2003. INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] Figure 
3 compares the episodes of .crises obtained with the MSM on the BSFlindex and the episodes 
provided by Caprio et al. (2003). The episode of 1997-2002 matches perfectly, there is a cri sis in 
1992 not reported by Caprio et al. 
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4. Results 
The econometric methods assess the degree to which TV PT - M SM characterize banking 
crises, and assess the impact of regulatory measures. Tables 1 and 2 contain the estimates and 
the tests of banking regulation. The estimates of interest are the state-dependent means in each 
state, /-LI, /-L2, and /-L3, and the coefficient of transition probabilities ).,ij,k. More specifically, from 
the proposition in section 2 we know that these coefficients provide straightforward results on the 
impact of a given regulatory measure only if condition (15) or (16) is verified. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 HERE] 
The first panel of Table 1 presents the mean, and the foUowing panels present the effect of 
regulatory measures on the probability of the banking system to be in a given state. 
Column (1) presents the estimated parameters without regulation, column (2) the estimates 
of specification with entry restriction, column (3) the estimates with reserve requirement, column 
(4) the estimates with deposit insurance, column (5) the estimates with capital adequacy require-
ment, column (6) the estimates with deposit insurance and reserve requirement, column (7) the 
estimates with entry restriction and capital adequacy requirement, and finally column (8) presents 
the estimates of the specification with all these regulatory variables. 
We obtain that aU three states are significantly different from one another, since the confidence 
intervals at 95 percent on their means do not coincide. Also we obtain that the mean of the crisis 
state is negative, while the mean of the tranquil state is around 0 and the mean of the booming 
state is strictly positive, suggesting that the states are in fact representing periods of contraction, 
normal activity, and expansion in the banking sector. 
Furthermore, the mean of the crisis state is close to -0.86 and its variance is 0.22, a significantly 
larger number than the estimated variance in the tranquil state. The MSM succeeded in capturing 
the fact that in July 1997 the lndonesian banking system was in a state of crisis. As we explained in 
section 3 describing the Indonesian banking system, the banking crisis which started in the second 
semes ter of 1997 was characterized by a huge decrease in the growth of credit to the private sector, 
banking deposits, and foreign liabilities. 
60 
Besides, the estimated mean of the tranquil state is around 0.11 for each of our estimations, 
which is an indication that during the tranquil period, the weighted average of growth rates of credit 
to private sector, banking deposits and foreign liabilities was slightly positive. In other words, the 
tranquil period is characterized by a slight positive growth rate in banking activity. Its estimated 
variance of 0.07 is lower than the variance in the other states. This was expected as tranquil states 
tend to be periods of less volatility; generally, there are periods of business as usual, Le., no external 
shocks nor changes in the banking industry. 
Finally, the estimated mean of the booming state is around 1.9 with a variance of 0.7. This 
value is high compared to the expected maximum value of 3 at a 99 percent confidence level. It 
means also that in booming periods the weighted average of credit to the private sector, banking 
deposits, and foreign liabilities grows very fast. In fact, the two periods of fast growth of the 
Indonesian banking sector were characterized by sudden and very high increase of banking deposits 
and credit to the private sector. 
4.1 Impact of Regulation on Banking Stability 
[INSERT TABLE 3 RERE] 
Entry Restriction: The estimated parameters provided in Table 2 do not verify neither 
condition (15) nor condition (16). Renee, the only way to assess the impact of entry restriction 
on stability is by using the marginal effect results developed in section 2. Table 3 shows that this 
marginal effect is estimated at -0.111 and it is significantly different from zero, i.e., entry restriction 
reduced the fragility of the lndonesian banking system. In fact, the crisis of 1997 was preceded 
by a period of removal of entry restriction. Specifically, in 1994 a regulatory bill allowed foreign 
investors to withdraw without limit their deposits in the banking system, and in 1996 Indonesian 
regulation allowed mutual funds to be 100 percent owned by foreigners. When we control for the 
level of capital requirement the result remains unchanged. This supports the view of Allen and 
Rerring (2001) that entry restriction is associated with banking instability. More precisely, Allen 
and Rerring link the re-appearance of systemic banking crisis in the 1980s to the reduction and/or 
61 
removal of entry restriction in many banking systems. 11 
Reserve Requirement: Like for entry restriction, the estimated parameters do not satisfy 
the conditions derived from the p~oposition. We then refer to Table 3, where the marginal effect 
of an increase in the reserve requirement level on the probability of the banking system to be in 
the systemic crisis state is computed. The estimated coefficient is -0.135 and it is significant at 
the 10 percent level. In other words, an increase in the reserve requirement by 1 point reduces 
the probability of being in the crisis state by 0.135 point. This does not come as a surprise since 
during the period 1984 1998 the level of the reserve requirement in Indonesia was very low, at 2 
percent. It was increased in 1998 to 5 percent as the aftermath of the 1997 systemic banking crisis. 
It was also raised at a time when the government was putting in place its explicit and universal 
deposit insurance. This may not be a coincidence, since the deposit insurance regulation literature 
emphasizes the need of reserve requirement to reduce the moral hazard problem associated with 
the existence of an explicit deposit guarantee.12 It is then important to control for this. When we 
control for the existence of an explicit guarantee for banking deposits, we observe that the sign of 
this elasticity is different. The elasticity is now positive and equal to 0.155 and it is significant at 
the one percent level. In other words, when we control for the existence of deposit insurance, the 
reserve requirement is actually positively associated with banking instability. 
This second result is more appropriate. In fact, the first estimation can be viewed as an 
estimation with an omitted variable, which means that the parameters estimated in this context 
are biased and inconsistent. Finally, we do not worry about multicollinearity as the coefficient of 
correlation between deposit insurance and reserve requirement is smaU (-0.11). 
Deposit Insurance: Table 3 shows that the marginal effect of deposit insurance on the prob-
ability of the Indonesian banking system to be in a crisis lS equal to -0.033, i.e.) the introduction 
of deposit insurance reduces instability. When we control for the level of reserve requirement the 
result becomes even st ronger. The new elasticity is -0.043 and it is significant at a 5 percent 
a1so conforInS with an earlier empirica! work of Dernirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), whlch found a 
positive link between less entry restriction in the banking activity and banking fragility. 
12See e.g., Bryant (1980) for a theoretica.! rationa!e. 
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level. In other words, the Diamond and Dydvig (1983) view on the effect of deposit insurance 
for stabilization purposes seems to find supporting evidence here. It is then the converse of the 
empirical result of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) who found that the moral hazard effect 
of deposit insurance is dominant. Like in the previous paragraph, the second specification is more 
appropriate. 
Capital Adequacy Requirement: The estimated parameters for the capital adequacy re-
quirement in the TVPT-MSM specification do not satisfy any of the sufficient conditions (15) and 
(16); hence we should refer to Table,3. It shows that the marginal effect of the capital adequacy 
requirement is equal to 0.198 but it is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, without 
control it has no impact on Indonesian banking stability. But we know that capital adequacy 
requirement was introduced in Indonesia following the removal of entry restriction on domestic 
private investors in 1988. When we control for the level of entry restriction, we obtain that instead 
the capital adequacy requirement has reduced the probability to be in the banking crisis state by 
-0.033 and it is significant at 5 percent.13 
There is, however, a negative correlation between entry restriction and the other regulatory 
measures that we have studied. This correlation is close to -0.48 for reserve requirement, -0.55 
for deposit insurance, and -0.67 for capital adequacy requirement. This can be a source of mul-
ticollinearity. However, we have controlled for multicollinearity by dropping 2.5 percent, and 5 
percent of the sample data, and we have found that the result remained almost the SanIe. There-
fore, we concluded that multicollinearity was not an important issue. 
4.2 Expected Duration 
Another goal of this paper is to study the expected duration of the systemic crisis state. The 
three-state MSM with constant probabilities of transition shows that the expected duration of 
banking crises is equal to 42 months. As we can see in Figure 4, the expected duration is affected 
by banking regulations. More precisely, the presence of deposit insurance tends to reduce crisis 
result does not confirm the Kim and Santomero (1988), and Blum (1999) view that capital adequacy 
requirement increases the risk taking behavior in the banking industry. 
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duration. An increase of the capital adequacy requirement tends also to reduce crisis duration. An 
increase in the reserve requirement reduces crisis duration, while entry restriction increases crisis 
duration. 14 
. [INSERT FIGURE 4 and TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.3 Disentangling the TVPT-MSM Contribution from the MSM Contribution 
In this subsection we want to see if the results obtained so far about the link between the type 
of regulation and banking stability would have been obtained by implementing a simple three-state 
MSM model, and useits filtered probabilities to estimate with a simple OLS regression the effect 
of each regulation on the stability of the banking system. We will refer to this method as the 
MSM - OLS regression. 15 In Table 5, we report the results obtained from the MSM - OLS 
regression. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Deposit insurance appears to have a positive and significant effect on the probability of the 
banking system to be in the systemic cri sis period. When we control for other regulatorymeasures, 
this effect is equal to 0.82; with macroeconomic variables the new number is 0.81. 
The effect of a reserve requirement, when we control with the entire set of major regulatory 
variables, is equal to 0.95 and is 0.81 when we add key macroeconomic variables. The capital 
adequacy requirement has a negative and significant effect on the probability of the banking system 
to be in the crisis state. In fact, wh en we control with the other regulatory variables, this effect 
is equal to -0.78; while it is equal to -0.32 when we control with other macroeconomic variables. 
Finally, the effect of entry restriction is significant and negative even when we control with other 
regulatory measures. 
Let us now assess the difference between the two methods. Deposit insurance increases the 
probability of being in a crisis in the MSM - OLS regression but not in the TVPT - MSM. 
14 A policy implication which can be derived from this fin ding is that there is a need to design regulatory measures 
that can improve the crisis duration, and not only to prevent its occurrence. 
15The M SM - OLS is very tractable and allows the introduction of many control variables. 
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This difference can be explained by the fact that deposit insurance was put in place in 1998, a 
crisis year. Therefore, the MS M - OLS perceives a positive correlation between its presence 
and the occurrence of the banking crisis even though the crisis preceded it. The MSM - OLS 
shows a higher impact of the capital adequacy requirement for stabilization purposes than the 
TV PT - MSM. A rationale behind this is that just after the beginning of the banking crisis 
in 1997, the lndonesian government has reduced the rate of its capital adequacy requirement and 
then started to increase it slowly. He~ce, the MSM - OLS perceives a stronger link between 
the reduction of the capital adequacy requirement and the presence of banking crises. The result 
on entry restriction is not too different. In the TV PT - MSM, reserve requirements have a less 
positive impact on banking stability than in the MSM -OLS. More generally, the marginal effects 
produced by the TV PT - MSM tend to be less important in magnitude. 
5. Robustness 
In this section, we verify the robustness of our results. First, we assess the impact of banking 
regulation using another index of banking crisis, and then we verify whether we used the appropriate 
number of states. 
5.1 Sensitivity ta the Index 
In the BSFI, each type of tisk is weighted equally. This can be a source of misidentification 
as it tends to give each type of risk the same importance in causing banking crises. We modify 
the BSF 1 to take into account this issue and we rename the new index as the banking system 
crisis index (hereafter the BSC!). We use the weighting procedure of the monetary condition 
index (MCl) literature (see, e.g., Duguay (1994), and Lin (1999)), but instead of running a free 
regression we estimate a constrained regression. More precisely, we assume that a banking crisis can 
be determined by a number of macroeconomic and financial variables: economic growth (hereafter 
CYt), interest rate changes (hereafter Crt), variation in the banking reserves ratio (hereafter Crt ), 
ex change rate fluctuations (hereafter Cet), growth of the credit to the private sector, rate of growth 
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of bank deposits and growth of foreign liabilities. 
The new weights Wc, Wd, and W f for the credit to the private sector, the banks' deposits, and 
the foreign liability respectively, are obtained using a constrained ordered logit model. In each 
period the country is either experiencing a systemic banking crisis, a smaU banking crisis or no 
crisis. Accordingly, our dependent variable takes the value 2 if there is no crisis, 1 if there is a smaU 
crisis and 0 if there is a systemic banking crisis. 
The probability that a crisis occurs at a given time t is assumed to be a function of a vector of 
n explanatory variables X t. Let Pt denote a variable that takes the value of 0 wh en a banking crisis 
occurs, 1 if a min or banking crisis occurs and 2 when there is no banking crisis at time t. 16 (3 is 
a vector of n unknown coefficients and F((3' X t ) is the cumulative probability distribution function 
taken at (3' X t . The log-likelihood function of the model is given by 
T 
LogL = L lot In(F( -(3' X t )) + llt ln [F(C - (3' X t ) - F( -(3' X t )] + ht ln [1 - F(C - (3' X t )] , 
t=l 
where lit = 1 if Pt = i, 0 if not; for i = 0,1,2; and where X t represents the matrix of aU exogenous 
variables, N the number of countries, T the number of years in the sample and C a threshold value. 
We assume here that 
(22) 
and that there must three real numbers a, b, c, such that 
Wc exp(a)jexp(a) + exp(b) + exp(c), 
Wb exp(b)jexp(a) + exp(b) + exp(c), 
Wf exp(c)jexp(a) + exp(b) + exp(c). 
The BSCl index is then computed as: 
16 Although this variable does not provide the crisis date with certainty, we assume that it contains sufficient 
information to help us compute the weight of each type of risk in introducing banking crisis. 
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(23) 
To obtain the index with the Indonesian data, we complete our previous dataset so as to be 
able to compute Gy, Gr, Gr and GeP The variable for banking crises is obtained from Caprio et 
al. (2003). For Indonesia the estimate of the reduced form model presented in (22) is given by: 
(-0.20) (8.4S) (-4.61) (1.11) (-1.77) ... 
0.8049NCPSt +0.19SNDEPt +[7.04E - 8]NFLt 
(2.02) (1.98) (0.77) 
The student t-statistics are in parentheses. We obtain from the above estimation that Wc = 0.8049, 
Wd = 0.19S, and wf = 7.04E - 08. We observe that the weight for the credit to the private sector 
is greater than the weight of bank deposits. More importantly, the weight for foreign liability is 
practically zero. This may be due to the fact that the Indonesian banking crisis was introduced by 
non-performing loans. In fact, in mid-1997 most domestic firms could not service their liabilities 
to international and domestic banks.18 This later translated into a severe liquidity problem arising 
from increased burdens of firms servicing external debts, and was exacerbated by mass withdrawal 
of deposits. 
[INSERT FIGURE S HERE] 
Figure S presents the new index. We observe that the graph of the BSC! is similar to the 
graph of the BSF J. We can then guess that we should obtain the same results. 
[INSERT TABLE 6, TABLE 7 and TABLE 8 HERE] 
17To compute Ce we use the data on exchange rate available from IFS's line AF. To compute Cr we use the 
nominal interest rate from IFS's line 60B. To compute Cy we use the information on the real GDP growth" available 
" in the World Development Indicator (WDI) 2006. To compute C, we use the demand deposits from (IFS line 24) 
, the time and saving deposits (IFS line 25), the foreign liabilities (IFS line 26C) of deposit money banks and the 
credit from monetary authorities (IFS line 26G). 
lBSee e.g., Enoch et al. (2001) for a better description of the state of the Indonesian banking system during that 
period. 
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Table 6 and Table 7 provide the raw parameters while Table 6 provides the marginal effect of 
each regulatory measure on the probability of the banking system to go into crisis. We observe 
that the results are fundamentally the same for each type of regulation. The results differ slightly 
on the crisis duration. In fact, the expected crisis duration is 42 months for the BSF l index while 
it is 21 months for the BSCI; but the impact of each type of regulation on the expected duration 
is exactly the same. 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
5.2 Sensitivity to the MSM Specification 
In this subsection we verify that the three-state specification with different variances for each 
state is the appropriate Inodel. We compare this specification with the two-state specification 
and with the three-state specification but with constant variance. Our choice of model is based 
on the likelihood ratio (LR) test. The distribution of the LR statistic between constant variance 
and state-varying variance is the standard X2 . But it is no longer the case between the two-state 
and the three-state specification.19 This is due to the fact that under the null of a Q - l-state 
model, the parameters describing the Qth state are unidentified. To solve this problem we follow 
Coe (2002) in performing a Monte Carlo experiment to generate empirical critical values for the 
sample test statistic. For each index, we first run a two-state MS M. We then use its estimated 
parameters to generate an artificial index. We use this index to estimate both the two-state model 
and the three-state model by the maximum likelihood method. Finally, we calculate the likelihood 
ratio test statistic. Let us denote by M Li the maximum likelihood of the i-state model. The test 
statistic is given by 
(24) 
We generate this index randomly one thousand times, and follow this procedure the same number 
of times to obtain the empirical distribution of the test statistic. In Table 9 we report the critical 
values of these test statistics. 
19In fact, from Garcia (1998) we know that the LR test statistic in this context does not possess the standard 
distribution. 
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[INSERT TABLE 9 and 10 HERE] 
Let's now implement the test. The test statistics (obtained in Table 10) show that the value of 
the likelihood ratio test is above the critical one percent values presented in Table 9. It follows 
that on the basis of this test the three-state specification should be chosen instead of the two-state. 
The same result holds with the BSCf index. 
6. Assessing the Selection Bias 
We now assess the selection bias in the existing work. For this purpose we compare our 
estimates, to estimates obtained with the logit method used in the previous literature. Since the 
previous works were conducted mostly with cross-country data, we first develop another discrete 
regression model to have specific coefficients on Indonesia. 
6.1 The Ordered Logit Madel (OLM) 
We estimate the probability of a banking crisis using an ordered logit model. In each period 
the country is either experiencing a systemic banking crisis, a small banking crisis or no crisis. 
Accordingly, our dependent variable takes the value 2 if there is no crisis, 1 if there is a small crisis 
and 0 if there is a systemic banking crisis. 
The probability that a crisis occurs at a given time t is assumed to be a function of a vector 
of n explanatory variables X t . Let Pt denote a variable that takes the value of 0 when a banking 
crisis occurs, 1 when a minor banking crisis occurs and 2 when no banking crisis occurs at time 
t. (3 is a vector of n. unknown coefficients and F((3' X t ) is the cumulative probability distribution 
function taken at (3' X t . The log-likelihood function of the model is given by 
T 
LogL = L fot In(F( -(3' Xt )) + ht ln [F(C - (3' Xt ) - F( -(3' Xt )] + f2t ln [1 - F(C - (3' Xt )] , 
t=l 
where fit = 1 if Pt = i, 0 if not; for i = 0,1,2; and where X t represents the matrix of all exogenous 
variables, N the number of countries, T the number of years in the sample and C a threshold value. 
We then use the estimated parameters to compute the marginal effect of each regulatory measure 
on the probability of the banking system to be in a systemic crisis. 
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[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
In Table 11 we report the results using the ordered logit model. The banking crisis variable 
is given by Caprio et al. (2003). We observe that deposit insurance appears to have a positive 
and significant marginal effect on the probability for the banking system to be in the systemic 
crisis period. When we control with other regulatory measures, this marginal effect is equal to 
0.69. The reserve requirement has no marginal significant effect on the probability of the banking 
system to be in the systemic crisis period. The marginal effect of the capital adequacy requirement 
is not significantly different from zero when we control for other regulatory measures. Finally, the 
marginal effect of entry restriction is significant and negative even when we control for the existence 
of capital adequacy requirement. 
6.2 Results of the Previous Work 
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE] 
Table 12 shows that previous works link deposit insurance to instability. We found that in 
the Indonesian case if we used the OLM or the MSM OLS we still have the same result. But 
the result is different if we use the TV PT - MS M. In the later case deposit insurance improves 
banking stability. Hence, the selection bias is not the only issue to deal with. This suggests that 
the simultaneity bias due to the adoption of full deposit insurance during the crisis is better taken 
into account by the TV PT - M SM than by the other models. 
Previous studies found a non-significant link between the capital requirement and banking 
fragility.20 But, with Indonesia, we obtain a significant negative link at 10 percent. When we used 
the OLM, the link is also significant and negative, but lower than the coefficient of the event-
based method. We can then infer a negative selection bias. But even here the magnitude of the 
TVPT MSM coefficient is significantly different from the MSM - OLS coefficient. We guess 
that this is due to the simultaneity bias. In fact, the Indonesian government reduced the level of 
ex ample , Barth et al. (2004) found a negative coefficient of the capital adequacy requirement varies from 
-1.201 to -1.026 wh en they are significant and not significant in some of their specifications; while Beck et al. (2006) 
found a non significant term for the link between capital adequacy requirement and banking crisis. 
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the capital adequacy requirement during the crisis and started to increase it as the situation was 
improving. The TV PT - MS M is more able to take this feature into account. 
Entry restriction has been linked to stability by the previous studies. We obtain the same result 
here and no significant bias. 
Concerning the reserve requirement, studies using event-based data found mixed results on the 
link betwee'u it and instability. This is not the case with the MSM - OLS. Instead, we found 
a positive and significant link between higher reserve requirement and instability. Therefore, the 
selection bias is positive. As in the previous case we found that the simultaneity bias is also 
important. 
7. Cond usion 
The first goal of this research was to provide an estimation strategy that was less subject to 
selection bias and to use it to assess empirically the effect of banking regulations on the banking 
system stability. The second goal was to assess the effect of each type of regulation on crisis 
duration. To this end, we developed a three-state Markov-switching regression model. Specifically, 
we introduced four major regulations (entry restriction, deposit insurance, reserve requirement, and 
capital adequacy requirement) as explanatory variables of the probability of transition of one state 
to another in order to assess the effect of these regulations on the occurrence and the duration of 
systemic banking crises. 
Given that the time~varying probability of transition TVPT-MSM does not provide a straight-
forward measure of the marginal effect of exogenous variables on the probability of the system to 
be in a given state, we derived analytically the marginal effect of each exogenous variable on the 
probability of the system to be in a given state. This is our theoretical contribution to the MSM 
literature. We then applied our strategy to the lndonesian banking system, which has suffered from 
systemic banking crises during the last two decades and where there has been some dynamics on 
the regulatory measures during the same period. 
We found that: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and the probability of being in the 
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crisis state. This result is consistent with other results available in the banking crisis literature 
linking banking crises and an easing in entry restrictions; (ii) reserve requirements increase bank-
ing fragility; but this result is obtained only when we take into account the existence of deposit 
insurance. At the same time reserve requirements tend to reduce banking crisis duration; (iii) the 
deposit insurance increases the stability of the lndonesian banking system and reduces the banking 
crisis duration. This result is different from the.Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) result 
about the link between the existence of explicit deposit insurance and banking fragility, and it 
raises a fiag about the importance of the simultaneity bias in this type of studies; (iv) the capital 
adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of a banking crisis; 
this result is obtained when we control for the level of entry restrictions. 
We have also provided an idea of the selection bias present in the previous literature. We found 
that studies using the event-based method present a positive selection bias on deposit insurance and 
reserve requirements, a negative selection bias on capital adequacy requirement but no selection 
bias on entry restriction. 
It then appears that the TV PT - MS M can improve our understanding of the impact of 
regulation on banking activities by aIlowing us to work on a given country, taking into account 
the selection bias as weIl as the simultaneity bias. In fact, in the TV PT - M SM, the states of 
nature and the effect of regulation on the occurrence of each state are jointly estimated. In other 
words, the TV PT - M SM is a type of a simultaneous equation model. FinaIly, it helps to provide 
an assessment of the impact of regulatory measures on the expected duration of crises. However, 
it presents an important limitation. It is less tractable when the number of exogenous variables 
explaining the probability of transition is important. In fact, in a three-state TV PT - M SM 
the introduction of an additional variable leads to the estimation of six new pa~ameters. This 
makes the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimation technique more difficult to achieve 
and complicates the estimation process. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Appendix A 
Application of the Kim and Nelson Method on the the TVPT-MSM 
Step 1. We consider the joint density of Yt and the unobserved St variable, which is the product 
of the conditional and marginal densities: f(Yt, Stl'l,bt-l) = f(Yt!St, 'l,bt-l)f(st!'l,bt-l). 
Step 2. To obtain the marginal density of Yt, we integrate the St variable out of the above joint 
density by summing over all possible values of St: 
3 
f(Ytl'l,bt-l) = L f(Yt, Stl'l,bt-l) 
St=l 
3 L f(YtISt,'l,bt-l)f(stl'l,bt-l) 
St=l 
3 
-. L f(Ytlst = i, 'l,bt-l) Pr(st il'l,bt-l) 
i=l 
The log likelihood function is then .given by 
(25) 
The marginal density given above can be interpreted as a weighted average of the conditional 
densities given St = 1, St = 2, and St = 3, respectively. 
We adopt the following Jilter for the calculation of the weighting terms : 
Step 1. Given Pr[St-l = il'l,bt-l], i = 1,2,3, at the beginning of time t or the t th iteration, the 
weighting terms Pr[st = jl'l,bt-l], j = 1,2,3 are calculated as 
3 
Pr[st = jl'l,bt-l] = LPr[st = j, St-l = il'l,bt-l] 
3 
LPr[St = jlSt-l = i, Zt-l]Pr[St-l = il'l,bt-l], 
i=l 
where Pr[st = jlSt-l = i, Zt-l], i = 1,2,3, j = 1,2,3 are the transition probabilities. 
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Step 2. Once Yt is observed at the end on time t, or at the end of the t - th iteration, we update 
the probability term as follows: 
Pr[st = jl~t] = Pr[st = jlYt, ~t-l, Yt, Zt] 
f(st = j, Ytl~t-l, Zt) 
= f(Ytl~t-l, Zt) 
= 
f(Ytlst = j, ~t-l, Zt) Pr[st = jl~t-l, Zt] 
Et=l f(Ytlst = i, ~t-l, Zt) Pr[st = il~t-l, Zt]· 
The above two steps may be iterated to get Pr[st = jl~t], t = 1,2, ... , T. To start the above 
filter at time t = 1, however, we need Pr [so 1 ~o]. We can employ the method of Kim and 
Nelson to obtain the steady-state or unconditional probabilities 
[ 
Pr[so = 11~0] 1 
1': = Pr[so = 21~0] 
Pr[so = 31~0] 
of St to start with. Where 1': is the last column of the matrix (A' A)-l A' with 
1 - PIl,O -P21,0 -P31,0 
A= -P12,0 1 - P22,0 -P32,0 
-P13,0 -P23,0 1 - P33,0 
1 1 1 
By now, it is clear that the log likelihood function in (25), is a function of J.Ll, J.L2, J.L3, ar , a~ , a5, {Àij,k} 
i = 1,2,3; j = 1,2; k = 0,1, ... , N. 
Proof of the Lemma PROOF. Let Zlt be a time series variable. Let us set 
N 
g(Àij) = exp(Àij,o + L Àij,kZkt). (26) 
k=l 
With this notation for i = 1,2,3; 
Pij,t = (\) (\) 1 + g Ail + 9 Ai2 
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for j = 1,2; and 
1 (27) Pi3,t = (\) ( ) . 1 + 9 "il + 9 À i 2 
If Zlt is a continuous variable, its marginal effect on Pij,t can be computed as: 
ÔPij,t 91(Àij ) [1 + g(Àil) + 9(Ài2 )]- g(Àil) [gl(À i1 ) + gl(Ài2)] 
ÔZlt = (1 + g(Ài1) + 9(Ài2 ))2 (28) 
Besides, direct derivation of (26) in respect with Zlt yields, 
(29) 
Substituting (29) in (28) yields 
ÔPij,t _ Àij,19(Àij) [1 +g(Àil )+ g(Ài2)]- g(Ài1) [Àil,lg(Àil) + Ài2 ,lgl(Ài2)] 
ÔZlt (1 + g(Àil) + 9(Ài2))2 (30) 
Developing and regrouping the right hand side of equation (30) gives 
Let us now compute 8:i3 " for i = 1,2,3. A direct differentiation of (27) yields 
Z!, 
ÔPi3,t - [gl(Àil ) + gl(Ài2)] 
ÔZlt = (1 + g(Àil) + 9(Ài2 ))2' (31) 
Substituting (29) in (31) yields 
For dummy variable ta king the value 1 or 0, the marginal effect is obtained by computing 
Pij,t = [Pij,t(Llt, 1) - Pij,t(Llt, 0)]; where Lit is the matrix Zt without Zlt. Il 
Proof of the Proposition PROOF. We know that 1rt = Pt1rt-l, and since 
[
pr(St=l)] 
1rt == Pr(st = 2) , 
Pr(st = 3) 
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it follows that we can rewrite it as 
[ ;:~:: : ~; 1 = [::::: ::::: ::::: l [;:~::~: 
Pr(St = 3) P13,t P23,t P33,t ( Pr(St-l 
1) 1 2) . 
3) 
(32) 
This implies that 
1) = Pll,tPr(St-1 = 1) + P21,tPr(St-l 2) + P31,tPr(St-l 3) (33) 
Pr(St = 2) = P12,tPr(St-l = 1) + p22,tPr(St-l = 2) + P32,tPr(St-l 3) (34) 
Pr(St 3) = P13,tPr(St-1 = 1) + P23,tPr(St-l 2) + P33,tPr(St-1 3). 
They can be regrouped in the following general form 
3 
Pr(St = j) = I>ij,tPr(St-l = i). 
i=l 
(35) 
ft is obvious that Pr(St-l = i) is not a function of Z/t. Hence, if Zlt is a continuous variable 
âPr(st = j) ~ (âPij,t) P ( ') 
-----:':--'.....-....=....:. = L...- -- r St-l = 2 • (36) 
âZ lt i=l âZtt 
Substituting (10) or (11) in equation (36) gives 
â ~ (g(Àij ) [Àij,l + (Àij,l - Àil,l) g(Ài1) + (Àjj,i - Ài2 ,1) 9(Ài2)]) P ( 
= L...- 2 r St-l 
i=l [1 + g(Ài1 ) + g(Àdl . 
for 1,2 
â~r(st 3) 
8zIt 
More precisely, 
8Pr(st = 1) _ ~ (g(À}j) lÀ}j,l + (Àil,l- Ài2 ,1)9(Ài2)l) P ( 
- L...- 2 r St-l 
8 Zlt i=l [1 + g(Àil) + g(Ài2)] . i). 
i) 
And if Zlt is a dummy variable, its marginal effect on the probability of being in a given state 
j is given by 
3 
D.i [Pr(St = j)] = L D.lPij,t [Pr(St_l = i)]. (37) 
i=l 
More precisely, 
3 
D.l [Pr(St = 1)] = L [Pil,t (Lit , 1) - Pit,t (Lit , 0)] [Pr(St-l = i)]. 
i=l 
• 
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8.2 Appendix B: Tablés. and Figures 
Table 1: BSFI: Estimates and Tests of the Statistical Significance of Banking Regulation. 
No Reg. Regulation 
Para. En. Res. Dep. Cap. Dep.-Ins. En. Res. & AIl 
Res. Req. Ins. Req. Res.-Req. Cap.-Req. Reg. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
/-lI -0.862*** -0.852*** -0.864*** -0.859*** -0.859*** -0.862*** -0.855*** -0.839*** 
(0.062) (0.075) (0.053) (0.047) (0.054) (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) 
/-l2 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.081*** 0.102*** 0.109** 0.099*** 0.101 *** 0.108*** 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021 ) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
/-l3 1.734*** 1. 753*** 1.533*** 1.732*** 1.990*** 1.706*** 1.907*** 1.986*** 
(0.236) (0.224) (0.305) (0.221 ) (0.201) (0.248) (0.238) (0.197) 
0'2 1 0.226*** 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.201 *** 0.233*** 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031 ) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) 
0'2 2 0.071 *** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
0'2 3 0.916*** 0.889*** 0.896*** 0.917*** 0.685*** 0.876*** 0.831 *** 0.691*** 
(0.271) (0.291 ) (0.252) (0.195) (0.233) (0.218) (0.275) (0.233) 
>-11,0 12.357 13.646*** 16.940** 12.844*** 70.312*** 18.253** 14.211 ** 18.542** 
(14.701) (2.500) (6.645) (0.508) (24.297) (8.869) (5.565) (7.611) 
>-12,0 7.257 2.452 10.787* 0.684 47.483*** 2.569 -0.442 -12.249** 
(14.720) (10.432) (6.146) (0.967) (17.047) (1.885) (0.712) (5.158) 
>-21,0 -9.294 -15.721*** -30.587* -11.531*** -97.505*** -14.290* -27.311 ** -24.628** 
(18.247) (3.986) (17.577) (1.241 ) (35.989) (8.066) (13.867) (10.317) . 
>-22,0 4.525*** 3.179*** 2.089 4.342*** 4.971 *** 3.349*** -2.504** 0.381 ** 
(0.762) (0.972) (1.384) (0.625) (1.049) (0.829) (1.147) (0.171) 
>-31,0 -3.465*** -2.911 -3.514*** -3.232*** -7.618*** -3.249*** 3.709 4.318** 
(1.083) (6.882) (1.152) (0.632) (2.026) (0.967) (4.940) (1.921) 
>-32,0 -2.751*** 7.882 -2.824*** -2.939*** -10.301*** -2.812*** 18.314*** 17.728** 
(0.885) (16.694) (0.828) (0.242) (3.421 ) (0.723) (6.207) (7.319) 
L -131.565 -125.532 -124.841 -125.617 -122.081 -120.006 -119.101 -113.232 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
L is the value of the log likelihood function. 
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Table 2: BSFI: Estimates and Tests of the Statistical Significance of Banking Regulation (Cont.) 
Para. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
À11,1 -1.984 50.709*** 2.040*** 
(7.200) (17.592) (0.778) 
À 12,1 -5.004* 51.735*** 8.069*** 
(2.940) (17.078) (3.347) 
À21 ,1 1.197 7,278** 24.173** 
(1.292) (3.417) (9.879) 
À22 ,1 0.870** 1.034 -15.450** 
(0.418) (0,738) (6.322) 
À31 ,1 -0.321 -7.828 0.397** 
(6.222) (5.449) (0.162) 
À32,1 -10.698 -21.400*** 2.981 ** 
(16.769) (6.611) (1.245) 
À 11 ,2 2.308* 3.6771 * -5.671** 
(1.268) (2.182) (2.416) 
À12.2 9.779* 5.958** 10.887** 
(5.609) (2.978) (4.495) 
À21.2 4.278 5.308** 7.771*** 
(2.783) (2.615) (3.156) 
À22.2 7.544* 23.119* 12.896** 
(4.556) (14.071) (5.407) 
À31 ,2 -1.532 5.846** 2.214** 
(1. 703) (2.923) (0.894) 
À32,2 12.831 4.329* 1.058** 
(0.559) (3.239) (0.833) 
À 12 ,3 6.371*** 13.753* 10.877** 
(0.155) (7.274) ( 4.404) 
À21.3 -3.862** -2.948 4.485*** 
(1.567) (2.024) (1.897) 
À22 ,3 11.777*** 18.863* -0.125*** 
(1.500) (9.705) (0.128) 
À31.3 -2.579** 0.422 -5.389** 
(1.086) (1.058) (2.277) 
À32 ,3 5.031*** 7.356 -18.800":* 
(1.067) (4.564) (7.710) 
À11,4 -62.916*** 0.203 0.611 * 
(23.724) (1.102) (0.231) 
À12.4 91.886*** 6.451 ** 2.448*** 
(34.190) (3.063) (1.101) 
À21 ,4 -17.636** 8.227** -0.161 
(6.823) (2.541) (0.157) 
À22 ,4 -17.761 -1.477 -1.963** 
(16,069) (1.233) (0,926) 
À 31 ,4 87.750*** 19.642* 13.026** 
(32.376) (11.092) (5.463) 
À32,4 138.019*** 20.479* 14.339** 
(51.971) (11.042) (5.976) 
Standard deviation in parentheses;* means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
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Table 3: BSFI: Impact of Regulation on Stability. 
Regulatory ~easures (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Deposit Insurance (a) -0.033* -0.044** -0.069** 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.030) 
Capital Requirement 0.198 -0.342** -0.195* 
(0.657) (0.172) (0.111) 
Entry Restriction -0.111* -0.104** -0.133** 
(0.07) (0.042) (0.051 ) 
Reserve Requirement -0.135* 0.152*** 0.065** 
(0.079) (0.051) (0.026) 
Log-Likelihood -125.62 -122.08 -125.53 -124.84 -120.01 -119.10 -113.23 
Nb. of Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
(a) means that we computed the difference of moving from the absence of deposit insurance to its presence. 
Table 4: BSFI: Impact of Regulation on the Probability of Remaining in the Crisis State 
Regulation ~easures (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Deposit Insurance -0.015 -0.041 ~0.069 
Capital Requirement -0.033 -0.035 -0.028 
Entry Restriction -0.038 -0.014 -0.030 
Reserve Requirement -0.023 -0.016 -0.071 
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Table 5: BSFI: Effect of Regulation on the ProbabilÙy ta be in the Cri sis State. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep.-Ins. 0.974*** 0.971 *** 0.952*** 0.961 *** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.029) (0.044) 
Cap.-Req. 5.659*** -2.344*** 0.617*** -0.074* 
(0.413) (0.916) (0.378) (0.335) 
En.-Res. -0.310*** -0.396*** 0.006 -0.020 
(0.020) (0.390) (0.024) (0.024) 
Res.-Req. -1.125*** -0.224** -0.067 -0.219 
(0.260) (0.099) (0.233) (0.237) 
Gy -0.008 
(0.0298) 
Ge -0.071 *** 
(0.0113) 
Gr 0.149*** 
(0.0155) 
Cons. 0.023** -0.007 -0.281 *** 0.326*** 0.035*** 0.901*** -0.006 0.084* 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.029) (0.035) (0.015) (0.094) (0.047) (0.051) 
Nb. of Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
F (7,280) 9391.99 187.75 292.58 18.66 618.73 143.63 18849.92 3706.76 
Probl,7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-Squared 0.919 0.276 0.519 0.017 0.919 0.534 0.931 0.950 
Root MSE 0.126 0.376 0.306 0.438 0.126 0.302 0.117 0.100 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
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Table 6: BSCI: Estimates and Tests of the Statistical Significance of Banking Regulation. 
No Reg. Regulation 
Para. En. Res. Dep. Cap. Dep.-Ins. En.-Res. & Ali 
Res. Req. Ins. Req. Res.-Req. Cap.-Req. Reg. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
J.t1 -1.601 *** -0.853*** -1.598*** -0.699*** -1.524*** -1.139*** -0.850*** -1.607*** 
(0.147) (0.006) (0.145) (0.001) (0.150) (0.0003) (0.139) (0.118) 
J.t2 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.150*** 0.061 ** 0.153*** 0.172*** 0.141 *** -0.104*** 
(0.0247) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) 
J.t3 1.822*** 1.815*** 1.817*** 1.052*** 1.743*** 1. 783*** 1.822*** 0.643*** 
(0.183) (0.171) (0.177) (0.113) (0.172) (0.216) (0.232) (0.052) 
0'2 1 0.723*** 1.180*** 0.725*** 1.425*** 0.763*** 0.959*** 0.133*** 0.773*** 
(0.152) (0.220) (0.154) (0.280) (0.167) (0.159) (0.022) (0.114) 
O'~ 0.115*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.072*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.0566*** 0.032*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) 
0'2 3 0.438*** 0.442*** 0.440*** 0.490*** 0.482*** 0.479** 2.094*** 0.376*** 
(0.153) (0.145) (0.148) (0.108) (0.155) (0.202) (0.439) (0.046) 
).11,0 10.496 13.554 57.631 12.466 30.968*** 7.055*** 63.861 6.159*** 
(11.705) (22.279) (50.427) (50.351) (10.128) (0.953) (35.105) (1.274) 
).12,0 7.519 11.036 51.975 0.868 17.670*** 0.080 51.468** 4.166*** 
(11.831) (22.359) (48.196) (1.242) (5.970) (0.934) (29.552) (1.488) 
).21,0 -0.049 1.212 -1.328 -0.618 -0.738 -10.232*** -67.566** -1.755* 
(0.865) (1.582) (1.576) (1.579) (1.983) (1.054) (39.614) (0.937) 
).22,0 4.705*** 4.629*** 2.830** 4.364*** 4.967*** 4.298*** 0.929*** 4.690*** 
(0.607) (11.922) (1.319) (0.919) (0.933) (0.766) (2.316) (0.800) 
).31,0 -10.573 -7.911 -59.226 -15.909 -35.501*** -2.907*** 26.360** -1.088 
(12.558) (11.922) (53.223) (12.526) (5.942) (1.006) (16.981) (1.360) 
).32,0 -2.177*** 4.294 -2.190*** -2.923*** -13.882*** -2.802*** -5.329*** -3.231 ** 
(0.715) (11.956) (0.713) (0.933) (5.454) (0.623) (1.642) (1.448) 
L -181.581 -169.952 -173.371 -171.104 -170.221 -151.ü13 -145.854 -135.435 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
L is the value of the log likelihood function. 
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Table 7: BSCI: Estimates and Tests of the Statistical Significance of Banking Regulation (Cont.). 
Para. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
À 11 ,l 0.353 -14.084* 2.513* 
(6.431) (8.321 ) (1.321) 
À12,1 4.867 -82.717* 2.264* 
(6.648) (48.622) (1.196) 
À21,1 1.357 8.829 3.799* 
(1.256) (6.007) (1.216) 
À22,l 0.0426 0.874 0.513 
(0.699) (0.959) (1.028) 
À31,1 6.714 -31.665* -9.341** 
(9.850) (18.153) (3.214) 
À32,1 6.401 ** 1.841 *** -5.985** 
(11.876) (0.882) (2.176) 
Àn ,2 -17.199*** 0.488 0.128 
(6.284) (1.004) (1.029) 
À 12,2 49.233 0.674 1.713* 
( 41.94) (1.006) (1.045) 
À21,2 54.693** -0.062 1.142 
(21.494) (0.999) (1.038) 
À22 ,2 67.219 2.615** 1.248 
(50.218) (1.232) (1.078) 
À31 ,2 22.085 0.356 -0.201 
(17.617) (1.000) (1.061) 
À32,2 -1.026 0.227 -1.741 
(2.215) (0.999) (1.357) 
À 11 ,3 0.057 1.213 8.806 
(26.983) (0.897) (1.713) 
À 12 ,3 8.647 4.348*** 3.826* 
(10.483) (1.069) (0.707) 
À21,3 5.640** -1.475 -1.864** 
(2.685) (0.997) (0.684) 
À22 ,3 3.978 3.297*** -1.131 * 
(7.995) (1.059) (0.453) 
À31 ,3 -4.178 -0.625 -2.469 
( 4.861) (1.007) (0.899) 
À32 ,3 . -14.994** -4.457*** -0.007 
(6.372) (1.023) (0.657) 
Àn ,4 -53.057** -32.288* 0.913 
(21.619) (19.949) (1.027) 
À 12 ,4 58.619** 47.484* 0.293 
(22.803) (28.699) (1.029) 
À21,4 11.107 -6.844* -0.975 
(25.403) (4.391) (1.121 ) 
À22,4 -5.924 30.573* 3.055** 
(14.531) (21.511 ) (1.181 ) 
À31 ,4 -0.147 30.573* 1.587 
(1.004) (18.305) (1.124) 
À32,4 250.121 ** 3.650* 0.188 
(110.898) (2.887) (1.033) 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
Table 8: BSCI: Impact of Regulation on Stability. 
Regulatory 11easures (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Deposit Insurance la -0.023* -0.058** -0.046** 
(0.013) (0.026) (0.021) 
Capital Requirement 0.090 -0.021 ** -0.015* 
(0.214) (0.011) (0.009) 
Entry Restriction -0.109* -0.125* -0.081* 
(0.058) (0.067) (0.045) 
Reserve Requirement -0.104 0.088* 0.037* 
(0.083) (0.046) (0.021) 
Log-Likelihood -171.10 -170.22 -169.95 -173.37 -151.01 -145.85 -135.43 
Nb. Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Standard deviation in parentheses; * means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
la means that we computed the difference of moving from no regulation to regulation 
Index 
BSFI 
BSCI 
Table 9: Critical Value of the Test Statistics. 
10% critical value 5% critical value 1% cri tic al value 
9.626 11. 735 17.008 
9.417 15.368 18.395 
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Table 10: Comparing the Two-State and the Three"State Specification. 
BSFI BSCl 
Two-State Three-State Three-State Two-State Three-State Three-State 
Con.-Var. Con.-Var. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Likelihood -211.66 -150.96 -131.56 -284.22 -204.92 ~181.58 
LR12 121.39 158.61 
LR23 38.80 46.68 
LR13 160.19 205.28 
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Table Il: Effect of Regulation on the Probability of the Banking Crisis. Ordered Logit Model. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NCPS -0.400*** -0.172*** -0.086*** -0.156*** -0.068 -0.089** 
(0.079) (0.036) (0.032) (0.030) (0.085) (0.037) 
NDEP -0.008 -0.094*** -0.002 -0.189*** -0.005 -0.004 
(0.048) (0.026) (0.016) (0.033) (0.010) (0.016) 
NFL 0.173*** 0.062** 0.036*** 0.051 0.030 0.037 
(0.046) (0.033) (0.0137) (0.043) (0.038) (0.016) 
Dep.-Ins. la 0.727*** 0.693*** 
(0.090) (0.134) 
Cap.-Req. 2.133*** -0.111 
(0.547) (0.560) 
En.-Res. -0.116 -0.115** 
(0.034) (0.056) 
Res.-Req. -0.947*** -2.072 
(0.315) (1.306) 
Nb.Obs. 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Wald Chi2(4) 127.81 114.57 229.51 74.75 112.81 229.56 
Probl.chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.44 0.54 0.55 
Log Pseudolikelihood -99.69 -109.26 -93.54 -116.37 -96.35 -74.61 
Predict, Outcome 0.159 0.082 0.0348 0.097 0.027 0.026 
1 a means that we computed the difference on moving from non regulation to regulation 
Standard deviation in parentheses;* means significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
Table 12: Comparing the Marginal Effect. 
DD02 BDL BCL DD98 OLM MSM_OLS. TVPT-MSM 
Dep.-Ins. 0.696* 0.004* 0.719*** 0.693*** 0.952*** -0.069** 
(0.397) (0.0022) (0.000) (0.139) (0.029) (0.030) 
Cap.-Req. -0.0016 -0.749 -0.111 * -0.617* -0.195* 
(0.0027) (0.471) (0.560) (0.378) (0.111) 
En.-Res. 0.0345/i*** -0.279 1.761/i/b*** -0.115*** -0.067 -0.133** 
(0.0127) (OA95) (0.634) (0.056) (0.233) (0.051) 
Res.-Req. 0.0003 -2.072 0.006 0.065* 
(0.0003) (1.306). (0.047) (0.026) 
/b This is not the marginal effect on the probabiHty to be in crisis but instead the effect of ln[p/(l-p)] 
/i The study used a variable capture less entry restriction . 
Standard deviation in parentheses;* me ans significant at ten percent, 
** significant at five percent, and *** significant at one percent. 
DD98: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998 
DD02:Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002 
BDL: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) 
BCL: Barth,Caprio and Levive (2006) 
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Figure 1: Banking System Fragility Index 
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Figure 2: Banking System Indicators 
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Figure 3: BSFI: Inferred Probability of the Systemic Crisis State 
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Figure 4: BSFI: Expected Duration 
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Figure 5: Banking System Crisis Index 
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Figure 6: BSCI: Expected Duration 
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Chapter 3 
The Welfare Cast of Banking Regulation 
97 
1. Introduction 
As pointed out by Freixas and Rochet (1997), the usuaJ justification for banking regulation 
is to increase banking system stability. Specifically, the Basel committee established a list of 
"best practices" for the regulation and supervision of banks. This has been adopted by many 
countries in the belief that it will improve the stability of their banking systems and promote 
iinancial development. This accord has three pillars, the most important being capital adequacy 
requirements, which aim to provide incentives for banks to hold less risky portfoliosJ Unfortunately, 
this regulation can hamper economic growth by shifting banks' portfolios from more productive 
risky investment projects toward less productive safe projects. 
There is now a fair amount of theoretical and empirical work on the effects of capital ade-
quacy requirements on the stability of the banking system. Some studies of these requirements, 
as implemented under the Basel l Accord, argue that they can end up by increasing the fragility 
of the banking system (see, e.g., Kim and Santomero (1984) and Blum (1999)), but others argue 
that they may be effective in improving banking system stability (see, e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994), Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995), Freixas and Rochet (1997), Gale (2004)). An empirical 
assessment of this issue by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) shows that the link between capital 
requirements and stability was not robust under the experience of the Basel l Accord. The Basel II 
Accord attempts to account for that by improving the assessment of the risk-weighted assets uses to 
compute the capital adequacy ratio. We assume in this paper that this improvement makes capital 
adequacy requirements effective for banking system stability. There are also a number of papers on 
the optimality of capital adequacy requirements (see, e.g., Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) 
Allen and Gale (2003), Gale (2003, 2004), which is an extension of Allen and Gale (2004), and Gale 
and Ozgür (2004)). Finally, there is a paper by Van Den Heuvel (2008), which studies the weIfare. 
cost of bank capital requirements through its effect on liquidity in the context of a neo-cIassical 
growth model. 
lAs pointed out by Bank for International Settlements (2003), the new Basel Accord consists of three pillars: (1) 
minimum capital requirement, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, and (3) public disclosure. 
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These welfare assessment ignore the fact that changes to banks' portfolio composition have a 
significant impact on growth, since they a~e structural shifts, i.e., moving capital from risky assets 
toward safe investments. The main issue of regulation, when studying its impact on welfare at the 
macroeconomic level, is to assess the trade-off between ensuring stability and promoting economic 
growth. In fact, when 'a regulatory scheI?-e is effective, it improves welfare because it reduces the 
probability of banking crisis, but at the same time it hampers growth-therefore, it can then be 
welfare reducing. 
This paper aims at providing a framework to study this trade-off. Tt is an overlapping-
generations model in which banks served as financial intermediaries and banking regulation is 
modeled as a constraint on banks' portfolios. In fact, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Gale 
(2004), argue that equity capital reduces incentives for excessive risk taking. Consequently, banks 
hold less risky portfolios. Therefore, capital requirements and portfolio restrictions end up having 
the same effect on the riskiness of banks' portfolios: They reduce the amount of the risky assets a 
bank can hold. 
Our model is built in a general equilibrium framework. In the setup, each young individual has 
. 
access to two types of Cobb-Douglas production technology: a risky, highly productive technology 
and a risk-free, less productive one. The outcome of the risky production pro cess is stochastic and 
i.i.d. These technologies serve to produce two intermediate goods, which are used to pro duce a 
final good 'via a CES technology. Wh en young, individuals are entrepreneurs, while eIders become 
lenders. Not having an initial endowment of capital, the entrepreneur borrows from the lender 
through a competitive banking sector. We assume that banks can observe the state of nature, 
but lenders cannot. This provides a rationale for the existence of banks. These banks transfer 
resources from eIders to entrepreneurs by borrowing from the former at the equilibrium rentaI rate 
and lending to entrepreneurs using optimallending contracts. 
We derive many interesting results from this model. First, we show that when productivity 
shocks are idiosyncratic, the competitive economy can achieve the first-best allocation. We then 
verify that regulation hampers growth and maintains the economy at a lower level of production 
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than that of the unregulated banking economy. Second, in the presence of an unanticipated ag-
gregate productivity shock, the introduction of capital adequacy requirements has a positive effect 
on banking stability. In fact, in this case, bankruptcy can occur in the unregulated economy, but 
adequate banking regulation can eliminate this bankruptcy outcome by providing more available 
resources when the shock occurs. 
Regulation affects social welfare through four channels. The first channel is its effect on the 
proportion of entrepreneurs involved in the risky project: We will refer to this as the weight channel. 
The second and the third channels are its effects on risky and risk-free entrepreneurs' incomes. We 
will refer to them as type 1 and type 2 incarne channels, respectively. The last channel is the effect 
of regulation on interest, we will refer to it as the interest channel. Some of these channels are 
related to the stabilization effect of regulation while others are related to the growth effect. The 
magnitud~ of the shock, and the behavior of individuals toward uncertainty, are key determinants 
of the importance of the stabilization effect of regulation. 
We find that the overall impact of the optimallevel of regulation on social welfare depends crit-
ically on the magnitude of the productivity shock, its probability, and whether economic agents are 
sufficiently risk-averse. In fact, the stabilization effect deriving from tighter regulation dominates 
the growth effect in these cases. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. In the 
third section, we investigate the effect of regulation on growth in the basic model. In section 4, 
we study the welfare implications of regulation in an economy with an aggregate, unanticipated 
shock. Section 5 provides a quantitative assessment, and section 6 considers extensions to the basic 
framework. Conc1uding remarks are contained in section 7. Proofs of the various propositions are 
collected in an Appendix. 
2. Model 
In this section we consider a simple extension to the standard OLG model, in which banks 
serve as financial intermediaries and banking regulation is modeled as a constraint on banks' port-
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folios. This model is a suitable framework for investigating the effects of banking regulation on key 
macroeconomic variables' and for assessing its social welfare implications. 
2.1 Preferences and Endowments 
The economy consists of a continuum of banks, firms, and individuals. lndividuals live for two 
periods. When young, an individual is called an entrepreneur, and when old becomes a lender. 
The population is constant and normalized to one. Each individu al of generation t 2: 1 is endowed 
with two types of technology when young, but can implement only one, and no technology when 
old. Each member of generation t has preferences over consumption streams given by 
U(cr, cf) = E[u(cn + ,6u(cf)], (1) 
where cr and cf are the consumptions of a young respectively of a old of generation t, and u is strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies lnada's conditions, and ,6 
is a time-preference parameter. Each member of the initial old generation is endowed with an equal 
share of the aggregate capital stock ko and enjoys only last period consumption Le., U (co) = u( co), 
2.2 Production and Investment 
There are two types of technology, a high-return risky technology Ylt = ztf(klt) , and a low-
return safe technology Y2t = f(k2t ), where k denotes physical capital, Zt is an independent and 
identically distributed random variable with discrete probability distribution Prob(zt = Zj) = 'Trj 
, with j E {h, l} and Zh 2: Zl,. We assume that the mean of Zt is z and that it is greater than 
one.2 Let us denote 'Trh by 'Tr. These technologies serve to produce two intermediate goods. We 
assume that f is 0 2 and satisfies f(O) = 0, l' > 0, 1" < 0, lim 1'(k) = 00, and lim 1'(k) = O. 
k--O k--oo 
The assumption f" < 0 is one way of providing a positive revenue to entrepreneurs. The random 
variable Zt de termines the quality of the risky investment. 
There are a large number of competitive firms, which produce the final good using these two 
2This is one way of making the risky technology more productive than the risk-free technology. 
\ 
intermediate goods as inputs according to the production function 
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(2) 
where YIt denotes the risky input and Y2t denotes the risk-free input at time t. Let us recall that 
1 is the distribution parameter. It helps to explain the relative factor shares, so it is in [0, :l.J. Cl, in 
(-00,1], is the substitution parameter-it helps in the derivation of the elasticity of substitution. 
Assuming a CES production function for the final good is one way of taking into account the fact 
that, in any economy in which one sect or receives a shock, other sectors may also be in trouble. 
Capital is durable, and is the only way for young agents to save. One unit of consumption 
placed into investment in period t yields one unit of capital in period t + 1. 
2.3 Banks 
We assume that there is free entry into banking activity. This leads to a competitive banking 
sector. Therefore, sorne banks will be specialized in the risky technology and others in' the risk-free 
one. In fact, if we suppose that this is not the case, then banks can remove resources from one type 
of entrepreneur and give them to others. In this case, a new bank can enter the market, specialize 
in the technology of the "exploited" entrepreneurs, provide a greater amount of transfer to them, 
and thus capture the entire market and make a positive profit.3 
The old generation invests in the bank that promises to pay the highest interest rate. This 
drives aIl banks to promise the same interest rate to each lender. Banks behave as follows. They 
collect savings from the old cohort (with a promise to give them sorne level of consumption good 
in the next period) and lend to entrepreneurs. 
Before presenting the problem of a bank formed in period t, we introduce sorne notation. Pl is 
the priee of the risky intermediate good, while P2 is the price of the risk-free intermediate good. 
Lending contracts are set according to the type of technology: (kIt, Tlt(Zt)) for the risky technology 
3We can also obtain this result by assurning that each type of project requires specialized evaluation and moni-
toring. These evaluations can only be performed via two types of technology with a large fixed cost. Because of this 
fixed cost, each bank can have access only to one type of evaluation technology, these technologies are not accessible 
to individuals. 
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and (k2t , T2t) for the risk-free, where Tit is the transfer provided to an entrepreneur implementing 
technology i at time t. This may be a function of the idiosyncratic shock if the entrepreneur 
implements the risky investment. The optimal contract for those operating the risky technology 
(klt, Tlt(Zt)) solves the following optimization problem: 
(3) 
subject to the zero-profit constraint, 
where Vht, Tt+d is the indirect utility function of each individual and is given by 
where the optimal savings function S (Tit(Zt),Tt+d is given by 
S (Tit(Zt), Tt+d = arg max {u [Tit(Zt) - s] + ,BEdu [(1 + Tt+ds])}. (5) 
s 
Before describing the objective function, we describe the constraint. It states that entrepreneurs' 
transfers plus the interest payment received by lenders is equal to banks' resources, which are 
the nominal value of inputs produeed by entrepreneurs, i.e., the quantity produeed times the 
priee of each unit of input. The objective function describes the expected utility of an individual 
implementing the risky technology at time t. 
The optimal contract for those operating the risk-free technology (k2t, T2t) solves the optimiza-
tion problem: 
subject to the zero-profit constraint, 
max V(T2t, Tt+l) 
(k2t;r2t) 
This problem can be interpreted in the same way as the one above. 
(6) 
Figure 7: Timing of Events for an lndividual Born at Time t 
Chooses the type of 
technology j = 1, 2 
j 
• 
t 
1 
Cives to banks 
zt!(klt ) or f(k2t ) 
j j 
• • • 
1 t + 1 t+2 
Borrows Receives Saves Receives 
klt or k 2t Tlt(Zt) or T2t St(Tlt(Zt), Tt+~) (1 + Tt)St[TI~(Zt), Tt+~) 
or St(T2t,Tt+I) or (1 + TtJSt~T2t, THI) 
-------------------------.-----------Entrepreneur Lender 
2.4 lndividuals 
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At time t, each entrepreneur chooses between two types of technology. Then it borrows from 
banks an amount of capital according to the type of technology chosen. It pro duces intermediate 
goods and gives them to banks. Banks sen the intermediate goods to firmsproducing the consump-
tion good. After production takes place, lenders receive the interest payment and their capital. 
They sen their capital and obtain the consumption good. Therefore, each old agent has (1 + Tt) 
units of consumption good for each unit of capital owned at the beginning of the period. They 
consume an their goods and exit the economy. The entrepreneur receives a transfer and consumes 
and saves according to the transfer and the anticipated interest rate. Figure 7 describes the timing 
of events for an individual born at time t. 
We resolve this problem recursively using indirect utility. To simplify derivation of our model 
we make some further assumptions. We assume that u is a power utility function of the form 
c1- p - 1 
u(c) = . 
I-p 
(7) 
With this assumption, we obtain (as in Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004)) that Vht(Zt), Tt+l) 
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and a linear translation of a log-separable function of Tit(Zt). 
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that final goods and input markets open at any time 
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t. As a benchmark, we investigate the properties of banking regulation in the simple model given 
above. 
3. Economy without Banking Crisis 
In the ab ove IDodel, productivity shocks are idiosyncratic, so at the aggregate level there is no 
uncertainty. Although there is no market failure that can provide a rationale for bank regulation, 
it has been introduced in order to assess its effects on growth. In the remainder of this section 
we characterize the evolution of this economy in an unregulated banking environment, and then 
explore how the paths of variables such as capital and output change in response to the introduction 
of regulation. 
3.1 Unregulated Banking 
Before characterizing the economy, let us define a competitive equilibrium. 
Definition 1. Given ko units of capital in period t = 0, a sequential market equilibrium is defined 
by the consumption level of the initial old genemtion cg, the consumption allocation for en-
trepreneurs who choose the risky technology (hereafter type 1 entrepreneurs) {ci't(Zt) , Clt(Zt)}~o' 
the consumption allocation for those who choose the risk-free technology (hereafter type 2 
entrepreneurs) {~t, c2t} :'0' aggregate capital {kHI} ~o, the proportion of the type 1 en-
trepreneurs {nd~o, contmcts {(kIt, Tlt(zd))~, for those opemting the risky technology, 
and {(k2t, T2t)}~o for type 2 entrepreneurs, allocation {Yi, Ylt , Y2t}~0 for firms, and se-
quences of prices {rt, Plt, P2t} ~o , such that for aU t ~ 0 : 
1. consumers optimize, i.e., Co = ko(1 + ro), for t > 0 and for i = 1,2, Cft(Zt) 
S(Tit(Zt) , rHd and Cit(zt) = (1 + rHds(Tit(Zt), rt+d; 
2. contracts are optimal, i. e., they solve the banks' problem; 
3. ex ante, entrepreneurs are indifferent between technologies, i.e., 
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4. firms optimize, i.e., {yt, Ylt, Y2tl~o solves the firms' problem ; 
5. aggregate capital stock equals supply, i.e., 
6. the risky input market clears, i.e., Ylt = ntzf(klt); 
7. the risk-free input market clears, i.e., Y2t = (1 - nt)f(k2t ). 
We now characterize the portfolio of investments in this economy. 
The concavity ofthe instantaneous utility function drives banks dealing with type 1 entrepreneurs 
to provide them with risk-free contracts. This result holds for the rest of this section, so an economic 
variables are determined with certainty and we will omit Zt in front of variables. 
Before providing the equilibrium values of the key endogenous variables, we first find the input 
demands. The demands for inputs are derived from the firms' problem and satisfy Pit = 8F(r~;Y2t} 
for i = 1,2. We can now characterize optimal contracts. 
Lemma 1. Optimal contracts offered by banks to entrepreneurs are 
(8) 
to type 1 entrepreneurs, and 
(9) 
to type 2 entrepreneurs. 
PROOF. This follows directly from the First Or der Conditions (FOCs) of problems (3) and (6). 
For details, see appendix A. • 
As expected, the optimal contracts show that the demand for capital for the risky technology 
is a decreasing function of the inter est rate, but an increasing function of average productivity and 
the price of the risky intermediate good. The same results hold for the demand for capital for 
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the risk-free technology. The only difference is that the latter is not a function of productivity. 
The transfer is simply the remuneration of entrepreneurship. To obtain a closed-form solution, 
we assume until the end of this paper that inputs are produced with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, i.e., f(x) = xC< with a < 1.4 
Lemma 2. At equilibrium, in any period t, 
(i) each entrepreneur receives the same level of capital regardless of the type of technology imple-
mented, i. e. 
(10) 
(ii) the proportion of the type 1 entrepreneurs is a constant given by 
(11) 
PROOF. These results are obtained using the values for optimal contracts provided by lemma 1, the 
indifference between technologies condition of entrepreneurs, and the market clearing conditions 
for intermediate goods. Details are provided in appendix A. • 
This lemma shows that thE:) share of banks' portfolios used to pro duce the risky input in the 
entire economy is time invariant, so we omit t on nt in the rest of this subsection. It also shows 
that this share increases with productivity, the distribution parameter 'Y, and with the substitution 
parameter a.5 When the substitution parameter increases, the share of bank portfolios allocated 
to the risky technology increases, and when this tends to 1, (i.e., the elasticity of substitution is 
equal to infinity), this share tends to 1. When a < 1, i.e., the elasticity of substitution of inputs in 
the final good's production technology is different from infinity, n* is strictly less than one. This is 
an interesting result, because empirically in economies without capital adequacy requirements or 
4Assuming that a < 1 allows us to fulfill the condition f" < O. 
. 5When a = 0, (case of the Cobb-Douglas technology, Le., F (YI, Y2) = y?y21-""Y) n' = ,. In this case, n is just 
equal to the share of input 1 in the production pro cess. It is then not a function of the inputs'productivity. Wh en 
a = -00, (case of the Leontief technology, i.e., F(YI , Y2) = min (YI, Y2)) n' = ~. 
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asset holding restrictions, the amount of safe assets held by banks is strictly positive.6 We assume 
for the rest of this paper that a E (0,1). 
Direct calculationsshow that priees (Plt and P2t) are time invariant. In fact, they are simply 
a function of n, which is constant. This result was expected, because input priees are a function 
of their relative scarcity and their complementarity in the production proeess. This result holds in 
the rest of this section. 
Finally, by replacing n with its equilibrium value (n*) in the final good production function, 
we obtain that the economy evolves exactly as a standard OLG economy of capital accumulation, 
with 
Yt = cP ('Z) kf, (12) 
[ ~ ~] [1 1 ]-cr , where cP ('Z) = (,'Z") 1-0' + (1 -,) 1-0' (,'Z") 1-0' + (1 -,) 1-0' 
Tt is obvious that the portfolio composition of banks in competitive equilibrium is efficient. In 
fact, this competitive equilibrium yields the same level of transfer, the same level of capital per 
entrepreneur, and also a deterministic inter est rate for the old cohort. Tt is then like a competitive 
equilibrium with a representative agent in a deterministic environment. There is no way to have 
market failure, which could provide a rationale for a planner interventing to achieve a better 
portfolio of assets. Besides, we will focus on equilibrium where the Balasko-Shell (1980) criterion 
for optimality is met (i.e., the indifference curves have neither fiat parts nor kinks, aggregate 
endowments are uniformly bounded from above, and the infinite sum of t-period gross interest 
rates diverges); and thus dynamic inefficiency of the OLG model is impossible here. 
3.2 Regulated Banking 
Sinee the competitive equilibrium portfolio of banks is efficient, regulation cannot be welfare 
improving. But what is its amplitude and its effect on the evolution of some major macroeconomic 
6 As pointed out by Alexander (2004), in the 1970s and early 1980s, most countries did not have minimum capital 
requirements for banks. 
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indicators?7 To assess those effects, let us first define the new competitive equilibrium. 
Definition 2. Given ko units of capital in period t = 0, a sequential market equilibrium is de-
fined by the consumption level of the initial old generation cg, the consumption allocation 
for type 1 entrepreneurs {qt(Zt), ê]'t(Zt)}~o, the consumption allocation for the type 2 en-
trepreneurs dealing with the risky bank {~t, ê2t} ~o, the consumption allocation for the type 
2 entrepreneurs dealing with the risk-free bank {c~t,C~t}~o, aggregate capital {kt+1}~o, 
the proportion of the type 1 entrepreneurs in the risky bank {ntl~o, the proportion of en-
trepreneurs who choose the risky bank {mt} ~o, the contracts {(kIt, TIt (Zt))} 00 ,for those 
t=o 
operating the risky technology, {(k2t, T2t)}00 for entrepreneurs implementing the risk-free 
t=O 
technology in the risky bank, {(k2t , T2t)}~O for those operating the risk-free technology in the 
risk-free bank, allocation {yt, Yit, Y2tl~o for firms, and sequences of prices {rt,PIt,P2tl~o, 
such that for all t 2: 0 : 
1. consumers optimize, i.e., Co = ko(1 + ro), for t > 0 C~t = T2t - s(T2t,rt+l) and C~t = 
(1 + rt+l)s(T2t, rt+l), and for i = 1,2 ,ê%(Zt) = 1;t(Zt) - s(1;t(Zt), rt+t) and êit(Zt) = (1 + 
rt+t)s (1;t (Zt) ,rt+t); 
2. contracts are optimal, i. e., they solve the banks' problem; 
3. ex ante, entrepreneurs operating the risk-free technology are indifferent between banks, i.e., 
4. ex ante, entrepreneurs in the risky bank are indifferent between technologies, i. e., 
5. firms optimize, i.e., {yt, Ylt, Y2tl~o solves their problem,; 
7Bernanke and Gertler (1985) state that most of the original regulation was imposed on macroeconorrllc grounds. 
Therefore, to assess the welfare cast of regulation one needs to study its effect on macroeconomic variables. 
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6. aggregate capital stock equals supply, i.e., 
7. the risky input market clears, i.e., Yit = mtntzf(klt); 
8. the risk-free input market clears, i.e., Y2t = mt(l - nt)f(k2t ) + (1 - mt)f(k2t). 
Before characterizing the portfolio of investments in this economy, let us define the new bank's 
problem. The regulated bank's problem is unchanged for those implementing the risk-free tech-
nology, but it is impossible for a bank to be specialized in the risky technology. Therefore, the 
formerly risky bank will now deal with both tYP,es of entrepreneurs. Since, as we stated in the pre-
vious subsection, banks provide risk-free contracts to entrepreneurs, we will not use the expected 
indirect utility function, will determine optimal contracts for entrepreneurs by solving the following 
problem, 
subject to, 
_ m~ v(Tit, rt+d 
(kit, TIt ,k2t, T2t) 
nÔ\t + (1 - nt)T2t + rt (ntklt + (1'- iît)k2t ) 
V(T2t, rt+r) 
ntklt 
< e. 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
Let us describe the objective function and then the constraints. The objective function is 
the indirect utility function of an entrepreneur implementing the risky technology. In fact, banks 
specialized in risky projects only value the welfare of type 1 entrepreneurs. Equation (14) is the 
zero-profit condition for intermediaries, while inequality (15) is the participation constraint for type 
2 entrepreneurs. Inequality (16) is the regulatory constraint, which states that banks' portfolios 
cannot have more than a given proportion of capital allocated to the risky technology.8 In fact, 
8We do not omit t on nt in the ab ove problem because it is a new one and we cannot sayat this point if nt is an 
, independent function of t. 
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in the presence of regulation, there is an additional constraint set for banks specialized in the 
risky technology. They are forced to provide at least a given share (1 - e) of their portfolio to 
entrepreneurs operating the risk-free technology. 
We now characterize this new equilibrium. It depends on the value of e. In fact, we have two 
different types of adjustment depending on the interval to which e belongs. 
Case of e E (n", 1) 
In this case, the equilibrium allocation of capital per entrepreneur satisfies the following property 
kIt = k2t = k2t. Let us consider the following solution: The proportion of type 1 entrepreneurs 
in the risky bank is Tit; = e, while the proportion of people in the risky bank is mt This 
solution yields the same capital, transfer and interest rate to entrepreneurs as the unregulated 
economy solution. In fact, the introduction of regulation drives entrepreneurs to move only from 
the risk-free bank to the risky bank. They move until the transfer in the risky bank equals that 
in the risk-free banle This will be achieved with no deterioration in welfare until this adjustment 
is no longer possible. Since, the maximum proportion of entrepreneurs in the risky bank cannot 
exceed 1, from mt = "'à" , we obtain that this way of adjustment is possible only if () ;:: n *. 
Case of e E (0, n*) 
In this case, banks and entrepreneurs cannot adjust to ob tain the first-best solution. The 
. f~llowing lemma provides the optimal contracts of the regulated risky banks. 
Lemma 3. Optimal contracts proposed by the regulate.d, risky banks are, 
for entrepreneurs using the risky technology, and 
for entrepreneurs using the risk-free technology. Mere 
(17) 
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PROOF. This follows from the FOCs ofproblems (13) and (6). The details are available in appendix 
B .• 
Lemma 4. At equilibrium, in any period t, 
(i) the proportion of risky input produeeTs (nt) is time invariant; 
(ii) the ratio of risky input to risk-free input, KU denoted by cl>t, is time invariant. 
Y2t 
PROOF. These results are obtained using the values of the optimal contracts, the indifferenee be-
tween technologies condition of entrepreneurs, and the market clearing conditions for intermediate 
goods. See appendix B for details. • 
Intuitively, the proportion of entrepreneurs implementing the risky technology and the ratio of 
risky to risk-free inputs depend on the final good technology and on the regulation coefficient. Since 
they are fixed, nt is time invariant. This lemma also implies that input priees are time invariant, 
so we will omit t in the price notation. 
Lemma 5. Ylt and q,t are inereasing and eontinuous funetions of e, while Y2t is a deereasing 
funetion of e. 
PROOF. This result is obtained by using the values of the optimal contracts, the indifference be-
tween technologies condition of entrepreneurs, and the market clearing conditions for intermediate 
goods. The details are available in appendix B .• 
The amount of input produced by risk-free entrepreneurs increases with the amount of capital 
invested; we ean refer to it as the volume effeet, while the risk-free input priee deereases sinee it is 
abundant. Sinee a > 0, the volume effect dominates the price effeet and therefore the anticipated 
transfer to type 2 entrepreneurs is an inereasing funetion of e. Thus, entrepreneurs produce more 
risk-free input. The demand for risk-free inputs by firms remains unchanged after regulation, 
because it is function of the final good's technology. However, as we have proven, its supply changes 
after regulation. In fact, with regulation, more capital is available for the risk-free technology. This 
shifts the supply curve of capital to the right, thus reducing the price of the risk-free input. The 
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price reduction has a negative effect on supply (general-equilibrium effect), but this effect is not 
dominant when a> O. We assume for the remainder of this paper that we are under this condition. 
3.3 The Effect of Regulation on Output 
This subsection investigates the implications of banking regulation on output and growth . 
Lemma 6 Given the capital supply, the equilibrium aggregate output increases with e. 
PROOF. To prove this, we differentiate the expression for aggregate production yt with respect to 
e, using the results in lemma 4 and 5. Details are available in appendix C. 1'1 
Intuitively, when the supply of capital is given, regulation has a negative effect on production 
of the risky input and a positive effect on production of the risk-free input. Regulation thus has 
two opposite effects on aggregate output. This shifts the optimal composition of inputs to the left 
on the transformation frontier (TF). Since the isoquants of production curves are convex, the new 
equilibrium will be on an isoquant with a lower level of production. This is illustrated in Figure 8 
output decreases from VI to v2. 
Proposition 1. When the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, growth is an increasing 
function of 8.9 
PROOF. The idea underlying this proof is to differentiate the expression for growth with respect 
to 8 and verify that it is positive. We split this proof into two steps. The first step provides an 
expression for growth as a function of 8, the second finds its derivative with respect to 8 and verifies 
under which conditions it is positive. Details are available in appendix C. III 
This result also holds in any situation in which regulation has a negative impact on the level of 
savings. Let us show that intuitively, by comparing the dynamics of two economies differing only 
in terms of e. Let 8e and 8d be the maximum shares of the portfolio a bank is allowed to invest in 
the risky technology in economy c, respectively economy d, and suppose Be > Bd. Let us start at 
9Growth refers here to the economic growth in the transition-state since it is well-known that in steady-state there 
is no growth in this mode!. 
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Figure 8: Effect of Regulation on Output. 
~--
lt 
time t = O. Since the initial capital stock is given, the supply of capital by the old generation is 
completely inelastic at ko. The impact of the regulation isrefiected in different demand curves for 
aggregate capital. It results in a lower inter est rate ro in the economy with Bd, and the transfer 
received by entrepreneurs TO is lower. 
Intuitively, since the aJ?ount of capital invested in the production of the risky input is fixed and 
lower in economy d, and given that the demand for capital increases with productivity, demand is 
lower and supply is unchanged, so the interest rate will adjust, i.e., ro is lower. On the other hand, 
the production of the risky input will be lower while the production of the risk-free input will be 
higher. Lemma 6 shows that production is lower, i.e., Yo (Bd) < Yo (Be). It has the same effect on 
priees, that is P2 (Bd) < P2 (Be) . Regulation has two opposite effects on T20, since T20 is an increasing 
function of P20 and a decreasing function of ro. The priee effect is always dominated, because ro is 
proportional to P20 and its weight is less than P20'S weight in the expression for T20. 
Capital demand increases with B. Therefore, economy d's demand curve is to the le ft of the 
economy c's demand curve. A lower value of TO implies a shift in the capital supply curve to the 
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left at t = 1 if the substitution effect deriving from the lower interest rate dominates the income 
\ 
effect. In this case, k1 (Bd) < k1 (Be) . This is always the case when p ::; 1. 
Final1y, this means that for any pair of regulation parameters (Be, Bd) with Be > Bd, 70 (Be) > 
repeating the same argument at any period t, we conclude that capital accumulation is higher in 
the economy with less regulation. 
The result can be generalized when the income effect dominates the substitution effect, but in 
a way that causes the slope of the supply curve to be lower (in absolute value) than the slope of 
the demand curve. In this case, for all t.2: 1, kt (Bd) < kt (Be) . Therefore, even when p > 1, we can 
still have the same result. 
4. The Economy with Banking Crises 
To introduce a possibility of banking failure, we use the competitive equilibrium results from 
section 3. Then we allow the occurrence of an unanticipated state w, in which aggregate produc-
tivity in the risky sector is lower than the banking system's ability to me et its promise to lenders, 
and show that this can provide a rationale for regulation. We then compute the optimal level of 
regulation and study its welfare implications. 
4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium 
With p .2: 1, it is obvious that at any time t an individual must consume a positive amount 
of the final good. Thus, each bank must provide a positive transfer to each entrepreneur. This is 
not only a modeling assumption. In fact, Halac and Schmukler (2004) document many ways that 
borrowers are bailed out in the resolution of crises: (1) when bank loans are transferred to the 
central bank or an asset management company (making it relatively easy for borrowers to default 
on their debts), (2) wh en governments provide debt relief programs, (3) or wh en the central bank 
establishes a preferential exchange rate for foreign-currency denominated debt, i.e., the central bank 
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selis dollars to debtors at a subsidized exchange rate.1° To achieve this, let us assume in the rest of 
this section that banks must provide at least a minimum transfer to each entrepreneur and denote 
by 'I.. this minimum. We assume that the occurrence of the aggregate productivity shock is very 
unlikely. Therefore, it is unanticipated. Following Allen and Gale (2000), the state ro (Zt = zw) 
will occur with probability zero. We also assume that this occurs only at the steady state. Each 
bank is required to meet its promise to paya given interest rate to lenders if it can at least pay the 
minimum transfer to each entrepreneur dealing with it. 
We now describe the equilibrium at time t in state ro. At t, a bank can find itself in one of 
these two situations: It can be solvent, that is it provides the promised interest rate to lenders, or 
it can be bankrupt, that is it cannot pay the promised interest rate to lenders. These definitions 
are motivated by the assumption that lenders are very often the ones who are protected in case of 
banking crisis. In many countries, governments operate a deposit insurance fund that guarantees 
lenders' deposits.11 Governments also stand ready to provide support to banks when they face 
difficulties, or banks can be taken over by the government, which thenguarantees that depositors 
will receive aIl their deposits. 
Lemma 7. If the minimum transfer is strictly positive in any unregulated banking economy, there 
exists a positive number ~ such that if Zw <~, any risky bank goes bankrupt when ro occurs. 
PROOF. We use the resource constraint of a bank specialized in the risky technology to show that 
it cannot fulfill its promise to lenders. The complete pro of is available in appendix D. Il 
When the state of nature is Zt = "i, the economy continues to work as in section 3. But if the 
special state ro occurs, the risky bank in an unregulated economy cannot both pay the promised 
interest to its lenders and provide the minimum transfer to those implementing the risky technology. 
We assume in the rest of this section that Zw < ~. Therefore, when the unexpected state of nature 
occurs, any bank specialized in the risky technology goes bankrupt. In this case, the risky bank 
lOThe transfer to debtors tends to be large because borrowers often take advantage of the bailout and stop paying 
their debts, regardless of their capacity to pay. 
llIn the United States of America, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pays depositors the first 
$100,000 they deposited in the bank no matter what happens to the bank. 
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provides to entrepreneurs the minimum transfer and to lenders an equal share of the remaining 
resources. We will refer to this as the bankruptcy rule. 
4.2 The Effect of Regulation on Banking Crises 
As in the previous section, banking regulation forces risky banks to finance a positive pro-
portion of the risk-free input's production. In the following proposition we show that there is an 
adequate value of e (the coefficient set by the regulation) such that when the unanticipated state 
occurs, the regulated risky bank is able to pay the promised interest rate to lenders and still be 
able to provide more than the minimum transfer to entrepreneurs. 
Proposition 2. There is a non empty set Sc [0, nO] containing an open interval of real numbers 
such that, if e E S, the risky banks can always fulJill their promises toward lenders. 
PROOF. This proof is based on the zero profit constraint. We show that under regulation, banks 
deaIing with entrepreneurs implèmenting the risky technology have enough resources to provide 
at least the minimum transfer to entrepreneurs and pay the promised interest to lenders. The 
complete proof is available in appendix D .• 
It is hard to prove that S is an interval, but for aIl examples we computed numerically we 
obtained that it is an interval. We thus assume untiI the end of this section that S is an interval 
which has as upper bound fi. When e < fi, if Zt = Zw, the risky bank has ènough resources to 
pay lenders and type 2 entrepreneurs and provide more than the minimum transfer to type 1 
entrepreneurs. It is then possible to set a regulation coefficient such that a banking crisis cannat 
occur in this economy. But as we saw in the previous section, it can have a negative impact on 
economic development and growth. The next step is a welfare assessment of regulation. 
4.3 Welfare Analysis of Regulation 
We now turn to study the welfare implications of regulation. First, let us define the welfare 
notion we will use. Since the shock is unanticipated, the appropriate welfare notion is realized 
welfare. It was introduced by Starr (1973) and has been proven to have the best properties for 
• 
117 
Figure 9: Effect of Regulation on Growth and Banking Stability 
Reduces Growth Reduces Growth Irrelevant on Growth 
• • • a 1 
No Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Bankruptcy 
policy analysis. Let Wt(c(Zt), c(Zt+d) be the Von Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare function 
per generation, which depends upon individuals' realized utility. It represents the realized welfare 
of generation t individuals and is defined by 
(18) 
In the case in which the productivity shock occurs, the welfare implications of regulation on gen-
erations living at that time is the result of a trade-off between the growth effect and the stabilization 
effect described by Figure 9. 
With a regulation coefficient lower than ft, regulation helps to protect banks from bankruptcy, 
but it reduces the expected output, which translates into lower growth. We assume in the remainder 
of this section that () ~ f1.., i.e., regulation helps the banking system gain stability-it cannot 
go bankrupt even when the unexpected state of nature occurs. Regulation affects social welfare 
through four channels: 
(1) the weight channel, which is its effect through the proportion of type 1 entrepreneurs (nt): 
Regulation can reduce nt, diminishing the number of individuals exposed to crises in the economy. 
It is then welfare improving in case of a crisis, but welfare reducing in its absence. 
(2) the type 1 revenue channel, which is its effect through the transfer received by type 1 
entrepreneurs ('TIt): Regulation increases 'TIt in case of a crisis, since it exceeds the minimum. 
The type 1 revenue channel is then welfare improving in the case of a crisis and welfare reducing 
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otherwise. 
(3) the type 2 revenue channel, which is its effect through the transfer received by type 2 
entrepreneurs (T2t): Regulation reduces T2t in any case, so it is welfare reducing. In fact, the steady 
state transfer to type 2 entrepreneurs is low in a regulated economy, even in crisis periods, compared 
to in the unregulated economy. 
(4) the interest channel, which is its effect through the interest rate, rt: Regulation reduces the 
productivity of capital, resulting in a lower interest rate. This can reduce the savings rate, or the 
amount saved, thus diminishing the amount of consumption when individuals are old. Therefore, in 
the absence of a crisis, this channel is welfare reducing. However, in the case of a crisis, regulation 
helps banks to provide the promÏsed interest rate. It is then welfare improving. 
The type 2 revenue channel is related to the growth effect, while the interest rate channel is 
related to the stabilization effect. Two others channels, the type 1 revenue channel and the weight 
channel, account for both effects. 
Let us assume that, at t = t 1 , the economy is at the steady state and the shock occurs. Even for 
generation t, the overall social effect of regulation is ambiguous. Regulation is welfare improving 
only if the stabilization effect domÏnates the growth effect. There are two generations living in a 
crisis period. In fact, if the productivity shock occurs at tl, the old (generation tl - 1) will be 
affected through the interest channel. When there is a crisis at tl, the old who are dealing with the 
risky bank cannot obtain the promised interest rate. Thus, the crisis affects the ex post interest 
rate negatively. 
For the rest of this section we will focus on situations in which regulation is welfare improving 
for generations living in a crisis period. In this case, it is obvious that for generations living in 
a crisis period, the optimal regulation is less than fi, i.e., there is an appropriate level of capital 
adequacy requirements that is welfare improving.12 
But there are many generations in the economy, and the above analysis has shown that the 
portfolio composition of banks at time t affects future generations through its effects on the dynam-
12This result helps to provide a rationale for the Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) empirical result. If the regulation 
coefficient is inappropriate i.e., e E (fl.,n·) it will endup with a negative effect on tinancial and economic development. 
119 
ics of the capital stock. If t is an ex ante crisis period, regulation Is welfare reducing as we saw in 
section 3. In fact, in an ex ante crisis period, regulation affects welfare through two channels-the 
revenue channels and the interest channel. In fact, the type 1 revenue channel is exactly the type 
2 revenue channel and the weight channel is irrelevant since type 1 entrepreneurs have exactly the 
same welfare as type 2. It follows from section 3 that the revenue channel and the interest channel 
arewelfare reducing. Therefore, the regulation lS welfare reducing for the generation living before 
a crisis. 
What about generations living after the crisis? At tl + i; i 2:: l, individuals obtain the same 
transfer and the same interest rate regardless of the type of technology they implement. Therefore, 
the weight channel is irrelevant. After the crisis, in many cases there is more aggregate capital in 
the regulated than in the unregulated economy. But the implications for welfare are complex and 
depend on the technology's parameters. After sorne periods, the economy returns to the steady 
state and then regulation has a negative iml?act on the welfare of generations living in those periods. 
To take into account the welfare of future generations, we define a social welfare measure. 
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Ennis and Keister (2003), there is no clear criterion for aggregating 
utilities across generations. Following them, we take a simple approach and define the realized social 
welfare function by 
00 
W(c(zt)) L 8tWt(c(Zt), c(Zt+l)), (19) 
t=O 
with 0 < 8 < 1. 
To assess the welfare cost of banking regulation, we follow Lucas (1988) to define it as the 
additional proportion n of consumption that a representative agent should pay the planner to 
ensure implementation of the regulation. If this proportion is positive, then regulation is welfare 
improving; if it is negative, then it is welfare reducing. We refer to n as the relative welfare gain 
from regulation. n is then the solution of the following equation: 
(20) 
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Due to the complexity of the problem and the number of channels, it is not possible to provide 
an analytical assessment of the effect of regulation on aggregate social welfare. Thus, we will 
conduct a numerical assessment. 
5. N umerical Analysis 
We conduct a quantitative assessment of our model by simulating it with calibrated parameters 
from the US economy. Let us first calibrate the model to fit the observed data. 
5.1 Calibration 
The aim of calibration is to match the proportion of investment in the risky sector and also 
the relative productivity of that sector. Some parameters are taken in the literature as a priori 
information, others are estimated. 
A priori information. We take, as is usual in the literature, the power utility parameter 
p = 1.5, and the share of capital in the production of the inputs, a = 0.34. 
Estimated and calibrated parameters. Table 13 provides the estimated average life ex-
pectancy, the annual interest rate, and the proportion of high-tech production in total exports from 
these economies over the period 1960-2000.13 
Country 
USA 
Table 13: Data, Average (1960-2004). 
Life expectancy 
(years) 
74 
Interest rate High-Tech (%) of Exp. 
(%) (%) 
4.1 33 
Source: WDI 2006 
Given the fact that people typically st art to work at age 16, while in our model individuals 
begin working at birth, we remove 16 years from the life expectancy to obtain the life span of an 
individu al. We obtain 58 years, so we assume that a period represents 29 years. It follows from the 
13This seems the best proxy for the importance of the higher productivity sect or in an economy. 
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annual interest rate of 4.1 per cent that a period inter est rate is T = 2.2. 
To calibrate productivity in the higher productivity sector, we use a proxy for its return. We 
assume that high-tech is usually financed through the stock market. From stock market data, the 
long run annual rate is estimated as 6.8 per cent. This yields a return of R = 5.7 over a period. 
A proxy for the return in other sectors is the average real interest rate. Since we normalized the 
productivity of other sectors to one, we have z = ~ = 2.5. We calibrate the lower productivity to 
a major crisis period, such as the episode in 2001 when the NASDAQ index lost more than 1/3 of 
its value. This also means that, over a period, the return in the high-tech sector is approximately 
the same as the return in the other sector. This allows us to set Zw = 0.8. 
The intergenerational discount rate is f3 = 0.3. It is equivalent to an annual discount factor of 
0.96 which is set to match the steady state interest rate of 2.2. We calibrate (J" so that the effect 
of a shock on prices is less than the productivity effect, precisely (J" = 0.9. We calibrate , to obtain 
the proportion n* = 0.33, i.e., we solve n* = [1 + (~) 1":'0" ] -1 , and we obtain , = 0.3. 
We now need to provide a value for the minimum transfer to type·1 entrepreneurs in case of a 
crisis. We use as a proxy the revenue that the creditor retains in case of bankruptcy. It follows from 
Richardson and T'roost (2006) that, during the great depression, more that 50 per cent of loans 
were not recovered. During the 1980s and 1990s, Mason (2005) documents that the maximum rate 
of loan recoveries was close to 75 per cent. We thus take 'I.. = 0.257 as a proxy for the minimum 
transfer received by entrepreneurs. Finally, we assume that social and individual discount factors 
are the same. Table 14 summarizes the calibrated parameters. 
5.2 Results 
Using the above parameters, we obtain that the optimallevel of regulation, which can prevent 
the banking crisis and be welfare improving for generations living in a crisi.s period, is {}* = 0.3, 
corresponding to a reduction of 10 per cent in the level of investment devoted to the risky technology. 
Figure 9 in appendix E provides several charts on the dynamics of an economy with and without 
regulation using the above parameters. 
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Table 14: Benchmark Parameter Values 
Symbol Value Description 
Preferences 
(3 0.30 individual discount factor 
8 0.30 social discount factor 
p 1.50 coefficient of relative risk aversion 
Technology 
0: 0.34 capital's share of income 
"1 0.30 distribution parameter 
u 0.70 substitution parameter 
OZ 2.50 anticipated productivity 
Zw 0.80 unanticipated productivity shock 
Bankruptcy rules 
!. 0.25 minimum transfer to entrepreneurs 
Period 
t 29 number of years in a period 
123 
Table 15 provides a social welfare assessment as a function of the arrivaI time of the productivity 
shock and the relative risk-aversion coefficient of individuals. 
Table 15: Relative Welfare Gain (%) 
T/* 1 2 3 4 5 
P 
1.5 0.2 -8.4 -10.8 -11.6 -11.8 
2.5 13.4 -3.7 -9.4 -11.1 -11.7 
3.5 37.0 7.2 -5.5 -9.9 -11.3 
4.5 65.3 27.0 4.2 -6.3 -10.1 
5.5 90.4 51.4 21.5 2.6 -6.7 
6.5 101.0 74.0 42.5 18.0 1.7 
/ * is the number of periods before the shock occurs 
The benchmark simulation shows that the relative welfare gain from regulation is a decreasing 
function of the time of the crisis. More specifically, if the crisis occurs at the beginning of the 
steady state, the relative gain from regulation is close to 0.2 per cent. This relative gain declines 
to a negative value if the shock occurs later. It also increases with the power utility function 
parameter, p. In fact, an increase in p improves the stabilization effect of regulation. 
We conduct another assessment assuming that the arrivaI time of the productivity shock is 
unknown. The results are presented in Figure 10 in appendix E. The benchmark simulation shows 
that the relative welfare gain of regulation is a decreasing function of p. More specifically, when the 
relative risk aversion coefficient is lower than 4.7, the stabilization effect of regulation is dominated 
by the growth effect and therefore the regulation is not needed. But when the coefficient is greater 
than 4.7, the stabilization effect is dominant. Specifically, when p = 5.5, the relative welfare gain 
from regulation is evaluated at 15 per cent. However, when p < 4.7, the regulation is welfare 
reducing: e.g., when p = 1.5, the relative welfare gain is evaluated at -13 per cent-it is then a 
cost. The result that the welfare gain of regulation increases with the risk-aversion coefficient is 
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robust to changes to sorne parameters of the model. 
The first parameter which may be relevant, but which has not been calibrated, is the discount 
factor of the regulator. Let us assume now that the regulator discounts the future more than 
individuals (this has sometimes been viewed as a rationale for regulating by the regulator). Suppose 
that the time preference for the planner is 0.98 per year, which corresponds to 0.55 for a period. 
The qualitative results do not change, but quantitatively the risk-aversion coefficient is now lower 
than before. When p = 4, the welfare improvement is up to 7.5 per cent. As before, when p = 1.5, 
the welfare gain is evaluated at-Il per cent. 
Another parameter of interest is the minimum transfer received by entrepreneurs CI:.). Let us 
assume that entrepreneurs receive less; for example, suppose r.= 0.237. The result of the simulation 
is that a decrease in the minimum transfer to entrepreneurs induces a greater welfare improvement 
from regulation. In fact, when entrepreneurs receive less, they save less, so the stock of capital in 
an unregulated economy is lower when r.= 0.237 than when r.= 0.257. This raises the importance 
of ba:nkruptcy rules or liquidation rules in the welfare-gain analysis of regulation. 
6. Discussion 
In the above development we have not taken into account the fact that banking crises often 
have associated costs. Four main costs ~re highlighted by Hoeslcher and Quintyn (2003). Three 
of these costs are fiscal, so are irrelevant when we are studying the economy without modeling 
government, but the macroeconomic cost attributable to the fact that bankruptcy can impair the 
intermediation function of banks is relevant to our analysis. 14 Taking this into ~ccount increases 
the welfare gain of regulation on generations living after the crisis. In fàct, after the crisis, banks 
specialized in the risky technology can suffer under-financing, so risky investments will be lower 
than usual. This can lead to a transitional or permanent structural change in the magnitude of 
inputs into the final good production process. In any case, it will reduce the growth effect of 
14According to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Mishkin (2000), a banking crisis reduces the amount of linancial 
intermediation undertaken by banks and therefore leads to a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity. 
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unregulated ban.king in the post-crisis period-thereby enhancing the welfare effect of regulation. 
This does not change the qualitative result obtain previously. It extends the maximum period 
of time during which the shock can occur and regulation continues to be welfare improving, and 
increases the relative welfare improvement in all periods. 
Also, in the previous developments, two key assumptions explain why the economy is subject 
to banking crises: the productivity shock and the fact that entrepreneurs must receive a minimum 
transfer in any case. A third assumption presented above is the fact that the shock is unanticipated. 
Although we have not provided an assessment of the case in which the shock occurs with a positive 
probability, we believe we can obtain the same results without this assumption. In fact, under the 
second assumption, type 1 entrepreneurs have a kind of insurance in the case of a banking crisis, 
therefore their expected utility is higher than the effective expected utility. Since banks maximize 
only the expected utility of entrepreneurs, they will end up with more risky portfolios, and thus be 
subject to banking crises. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In the first part of this paper we introduced banking regulation in the familiar two-period 
OLG model of capital accumulation, in which technological shocks are idiosyncratic. The level 
of regulation is measured by capital adequacy requirements-the main quantitative component of 
Basel Accords. In this environment, our model produces sever al interesting implications. First, the 
portfolio of ban.ks in competitive equilibrium is efficient. Second, banking regulation is detrimental 
to economic growth. In fact, it constrains ban.ks to adjust their portfolio of investments towards 
safer) less productive assets. This structural change reduces output and also individuals' incomes. 
It then results in decreased savings and, therefore, investment. 
In the second part we introduced an unanticipated sectorial shock, equivalent to overall lower 
productivity in the risky sector. We found that the economy will be subject to ban.king crises. 
In this event, there is an optimal capital adequacy requirement coefficient that can prevent crises. 
Although it is generally welfare improving for generations living in the cri sis period, it is generally 
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welfare reducing for populations living outside of this period. 
We calibrated the model to reflect an economy such as the United States. We found that it is 
socially optimal to regulate when the regulator thinks that a shock will occur soon. This shows that, 
even when banking crises are due to real productivity shocks and impose no extra cost, there still 
exists a rationale for regulation when the magnitude of the productivity shock is sufficiently large 
and the likelihood of the shock is high. When there is no information available on the likelihood 
of shocks, regulation is welfare improving only with a greater level of risk aversion-Ievels that are 
higher than the usual acceptable level of risk aversion for the US economy. We also found that 
parameters on the bankruptcy rule, preferences, and technologies have a significant effect on the 
welfare improvements attributable to regulation. 
Sorne policy implications can be drawn frOID this paper. First, since the welfare gain is a 
function of when the shock occurs, it is important for regulators to predict this time with a great 
degree of accuracy and raise capital requirements only when they believe that a crisis is imminent. 
Therefore, we advocate for a time variant regulation scheme. Second, since bankruptcy rules màtter 
and are country variant, we advocate for country-variant regulation. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1 
PROOF. Tlt is obtained from the risky bank's problem, and since banks provide a risk-free transfer 
to entrepreneurs, this problem is now set as: 
subject to the zero-profit constraint Tlt + Ttklt = Pltzi (klt) . 
Also, T2t is obtained from the risk-free bank's problem: 
subject to the zero-profit constraint T2t + Tt k2t = P2t! (k2t) . 
From the zero-profit conditions, transfers are given by Tlt = Pltzl (klt) -Ttklt and T2t = P2t! (k2t)-
Ttk2t. Then, by strict monotonicity, banks will simply choose capital to maximize transfers. The 
optimal capitallevels derived from the bank's problem are 
ZPltf' (klt) = Tt 
P2t!' (k2t) = Tt 
(21) 
(22) 
From (21), we have klt = 1'-1 (dJ-) , and from (22), k2t = 1'-1 (.!L) Finally, substituting Tt by ZPlt P2t 
its value yields 
• 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Tlt ZPlt [1 (klt) - l' (k lt ) k lt ] 
T2t = P2t [1 (k2t) - l' (k2t ) k2t] . 
PROOF. (i) With Assumption 2, at equilibrium each entrepreneur receives the same level of capital 
at any time t regardless the technology implemented. In fact, from lemma 1, Tt = ZPltf' (k lt ) 
= P2tf' (k2t) , which implies the following relationship between input priees: 
(23) 
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On the other hand, the monotonicity of v(rt, Tt+d in its first argument yields that the indifference 
condition between technologies is given by Tlt = T2t. Substituting (23) in this indifferent condition 
yields f'(k2t = f k2t)- f'(k2t k2t. Given assumption 2 the above equation is equivalent to [klt ] a-l = f' klt f klt)-f' lt)klt' k 2t 
[~] a. This implies that 
(ii) From klt = k2t, equation (23) yields ËE.li = 1. But this is just a relation between prices. To P2t 
obtain nt, we must go further and provide an expression for prices as a function of nt. For that 
purpose, we use the market clearing conditions for intermediate goods; i.e., Ylt = ntzkït, and 
1 
Y2t = (1 - nt)k~t· We recall that Plt = Flt, P2t = F2t , and F(Ylt , Y2t) = ['Yl~ + n -')Y2~F . 
Therefore, 
ZPlt _ zFlt _ ZŒ, (~) Œ-1 
P2t - F2t - 1 - , 1 - nt 
Substituting the above equality in ~ = 1 yields nt = [1 + (~) 1~0" ] -1 Il 
8.2· Appendix B 
Proof of Lemma 3 
(24) 
PROOF. The bank provides capital for both types of technology. The optimal capital supply must 
satisfy the regulatory constraint with equality. The regulatory constraint can then be reset as 
~ nt(l - e)~ 
k2t = e(l _ nt) klt· (25) 
Therefore, to obtain the optimal capital offered by the bank for each type of contract, we simply 
need to maximize the objective function according to klt. Furthermore, we have seen that the 
indirect utility function is a strictly increasing function of its first argument, given the zero-profit 
constraint and the free entry assumption for any type of bank in the economy, the bank will 
provide T2t = T2t to type 1 entrepreneurs. Given 
that there is no uncertainty and that the indirect utility of individuals is an increasing function 
of the transfer, the optimal choice of capital for the risky technology will be one that maximizes 
the amount of transfer provided to entrepreneurs. i.e., klt == argmax{Tlt(k)}. Where Tlt(k) is 
k 
obtained by substituting k2t and T2t with their expressions in the zero-profit condition. Then, 
(26) 
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From the FOC, capital demand for the risky technology is given by, 
(27) 
1 
Given (25), and replacing klt by its value in (27), we obtain k2t = (1- 8)nt [CiT~t] 1-<> • Substituting 
for klt and T2t in the zero-profit condition yields, 
(28) 
T2t is obtained from the participation constraint T2t = T2t and from Lemma 1 (in case of Assumption 
2) .• 
Proof of Lemma 4 
PROOF. (i) The proofwhen () E (n*, 1) is straightforward. We now investigate when 8 E (0, n*) . 
equilibrium proportion of entrepreneurs using the risky technology in the bank is obtained from the 
indifference between technologies condition, Tlt = T2t. Using the optimal transfers given by Lemma 
3, this condition is equivalent to 
To complete the determination of nt, we must determine P2t and Bt. 
1. Computation of P2t : 
(29) 
From the market clearing conditions, we have Ylt = mtntZklt; and Y2t = mt(1 - nt)k~t + (1 -
ffit)k~t. In this case we know that mt = 1, so nt = nt. Substituting for klt and k 2t in the above 
equations yields 
(30) 
(31) 
Let us recallthat, in the proof of Lemma 2, we found that ~plt = ....?::L1z (fuy. )0"-1. Substituting YI 2t -"1 2t 
and 1'2 in the above expression yields, 
(32) 
2. Computation of Bt. 
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We know from (17) that 
We will express this as function of P2t. From (32) we have Plt = I!:.~ [(1-n~~~"'!~:-B)"'] 0'-1 . Substi-
tuting Plt in the expression of Et yields 
,Z nt Z (<> <>-1 
[ 
-(J<> ( 1-<>(J<>- ) 0'-1 1 
Bt = 1 _, (1 _ nt)1-<> (1 _ nt)1-<>(1 _ (J)<> + 1 - (J) nt P2t· (33) 
We now substitute the above expression of Et into (29) and obtain 
This is also equivalent to G(nt) = 0 where 
G(x) = ,zO'(J<>O' x(1-<»O'(l _ x)(1-<»(1-O') (1 _ (J)<>(1-O') _ 1 + (1 _ (J)C\'(1 _ x)1-<>. 
1-, 
Since no term in G(.) depends on t , nt (which is the solution to G(nt) = 0) is independent of 
t , therefore it will be denoted n. 
(ii) The ratio of the aggregate risky input to the aggregate risk-free input is 
(35) 
Substituting Ylt and Y2t by their respective values from (30, resp. 31) yields <Pt = z (1~~t) 1-<> (1~B) <> . 
Since nt is time invariant, it follows that <Pt is time invariant. • 
Proof of Lemma 5 
PROOF. (1) We use the logarithmic transformation to study the monotonicity of Ylt with respect 
to (J. We ob tain 
olog(Ylt ) 1- aon a 
o(J = -n- o(J + O· 
It follows that 
a log (Ylt ) 0 an _ an 
o(J > {:} o(J > (J(1 - a)" (36) 
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(2) We use the logarithmic transformation to study the monotonicity of 4? with respect to B, The 
transformation is equivalent to 
loge 4?) = logez) + (1 - a) loge n) - (1 a) 10g(1 n) + a loge B) a 10g(1 B), 
• 
Lemma 8.1 PROOF, This implies that 
and it follows that 
ôlog(4?) 
ôB 
....;:.(..,..,.1 _-_a~) _ôn + -::-:-:-_a--:::-
n(l - n) ôB 
ôlog(4?) > 0 {=::? ôn > an(l n) 
ôB - ôB - B(l - B)(l a)" 
(3) Following the same method we obtain that 
which implies 
(1 a) ôn 
1 n ôB 
ôlog(Y2t) 0 ôn 
ôB < {:? ôB > 
(1), (2), and (3) are verified if 
It follows that 
an a [, {(l-n) n(l-n) n}] 
ôe > - a) mm (1 - B) '11(1 0)' 7J . 
ôn { ôl1 > 
a n if n < 11 
- (l-a) 7J 
C< t1-nl if not 
- (l-a) 1-8 
So, we now need to compute if to complete this proof. 
We differentiate the logarithm of (34) with respect to B and obtain 
ôn 
ôe 
with C 
= 
an(l - n) [-B + (j (1 - (1 e)a(1 
(1 - a)e(l - 11) [n (j (1 (1- 11)C«1 
an(l - n) [11 - (jC] 
(1 - a)B(l - 11) [n (jC]' 
l-(l-l1)a(1 n)1-a, 
(37) 
(38) 
It follows from direct calculations that the lemma holds under this condition 
{ 
r~-aGl ~ if n e 
n-aG > u=nY < 
fe-aGl· e'f . 
n-aG < Ti 2 not 
When n < e, f~=:gl] > g=~) implies a < b which is obvious since C < 1; 
n < e, it is obvious that fe-aGGl] < !l.. n-a n 
It follows that, in any case, this lemma holds unconditionally. • 
8.3 Appendix C 
Proof of Lemma 6 
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PROOF. The idea of thisproof is to differentiate the expression for aggregate production (yt) with 
respect to e and verify that it is a positive quantity. We can split this proof into three steps. The 
first step provides an expression for aggregate production as a function of e, the second provides 
the derivative of yt with respect to e, and the third verifies under which conditions this is a positive 
quantity. We assume in this proof that kt isgiven . 
Step 1. the accurate expression of yt. 
Let us start with the aggregate production expression 
In the case of regulation, we have found that Ylt = n1-aeazkf and Y2t = (1 - n)l-a(l - e)ak'f. 
1 
Substituting Yit and Y2t into yt = ['Yl~ + (1 - ')Y2~F yields 
(39a) 
But n is a fun ct ion of e. We now use this fact to simplify the above expression for yt. From 
(34), we have that 
l-aea- a (1 - ,) [1 - (1 - e)a(1- n)l-a] 
,(n z) = [(1 _ e)a(l _ n)l-a](l-a) 
Substituting the above expression into (39a) yields, 
(40) 
Step 2. Derivative of yt. 
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It is appropriate, given the above expression for yt, to use logarithmic differentiation: 
atog(yt) = (1 - a) [ a + (1 - a)~l. 
ae a (l-e) (l-n) ( 41) 
Step 3. Discussion. 
The sign of the above derivative is positive if ~~ ~ - (I~o) ti=;l; which is exactly condition (37). 
It follows then from the proof of Lemma 5 that this is always the case. Therefore, 81°,gft) ~ O. Il 
Proof of Proposition 1 
PROOF. The idea of this proof is to differentiate the expression for growth with respect to e and 
verify that it is positive. We will split this proof into two steps. The first step provides an expression 
for growth as a function of e, the second provides the derivative of economic growth with respect 
to e, and verifies under which conditions this is positive. We assume in this proof that kt is given. 
Step 1. Expression for growth as a function of e 
1 
We start with yt = ['YI~ + (1 - ')Y2~F, and obtain, as in the proof of Lemma 5, that yt = (I-
l (cr-1) ( ) ° 
,)u [(1 - e)O(l - n)l-O] cr kf. Therefore, Yw = \:1 . From the definition of equilibrium 
we have kt+1 = St, but 
1 
-1 . 
1 + [,6 (1 + THI)I-P] P 
(42) 
(43) 
Since, at equilibrium, Tt = T2t, from Lemma 3, Tt = (1 - a)p2t [O~t2t] 1~", . Besides, kt = nkIt + 
(1 - n)k2t. Using the expressions for kIt and k 2t provided by Lemma 3, we obtain 
[
aB] 1~", kt = n(l - n) --:;:; (44) 
Furthermore, the indifference between technologies condition of entrepreneurs yields 
1 _1_ 
n(l- n)B1-'" = pt"'. (45) 
1 
Substituting (45) into (44) yields kt = [~] 1-",. We observe that Tt = (1 - a)p2kf. Then kt+1 = 
b(THI)(l - a)p2kf, which implies that the growth rate of capital is given by 
kHI ( )b( ) ko - I T = 1 - a THl P2 t . (46) 
With the logarithmie utility funetion b(rHl) = 1!/3' so (46) is equivalent to 
kHI _ (1 - a)f3 ko - l 
kt - 1+f3 P2t . 
Step 2. Differentiating growth with respect with B. 
a[~tll Sinee, at t, kt is given, ~ has the sign of w.. We will now foeus on P2. 
We obtain from direct ealculation that 
[Y;] 1-0" P2 = (1 - ,) Y:t 
Substituting Yt and 12t by their values in the above expression yields 
l a-l Yt 
P2 = (1 - IF [(1 - B)°(1- n)l-o] a = kO ' 
t 
137 
Therefore, W has the sign of 9Jt. Under the conditions of Lemma 6, !fi is always positive. El 
8.4 Appendix D 
Proof of Lemma 7 
PROOF. The idea underlying this proof is to use the resouree eonstraint of a bank speeialized in 
the risky teehnology to show that it eannot fulfill its promise to lenders. At the steady state, the 
promised inter est rate is given by r = ap2ko-l, it has a constant value, the minimum transfer to 
entrepreneurs is a positive number I., and Tlt has a constant positive value. Banks eannot meet 
their promises toward lenders when the unexpeeted state of nature occurs if resourees are less than 
the promised interest (rk) plus the minimum transfer. i.e., 
(47) 
Sinee I.> 0, there exists a positive number K sueh that I. = KTl, where Tl = (1 - a)Pl(z)zkO and 
rk = ap2(z)kO = apI (z)zko. Substituting rand I. by their values in (47) yields the following 
priee-ratio inequality, 
Pl(Zw)Zw < (1 _ ) + 
( ) 
K a a. 
Pl Z Z 
l-a 
Furthermore, the priee of the risky intermediate good is given by Pl = 1 Yt- l li Y{ + (1 - ,) Y20"j ~ ; 
with YI = nZwko and Y2 = (1 - n)ko. Substituting YI and Y2 in the above expression for Pl(Zt) 
yields, 
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So the price ratio can be rewritten as, 
1-(7 
p1(Zw)Zw = (Zw)O' (,(nzwt + (l-,)(l-n)O')---a 
Pl ( Z ) Z . :z , ( nz t + (1 - ,) (1 - n) 0' 
It follows that (47) is now equivalent to 
1-(7 
( Zw)O' (, (nzwt + (1 - ,)(1 - n)O') ---a < 11:(1 _ a) + a. :z ,(n:zt + (1 - ,)(1- n)O' (48) 
[ 
1 ]-1 
We obtain from n = 1 + (~) 1-(7 that ,nO'-lZU = (1- ,) (1- n )0'-1. It then follows by direct 
calculations that (48) is equivalent to 
1-(7 
z~((nz~ + z<7(1 - n)))---a < (11:(1 - a) + a):Z. 
Since Zw <:Z, when (J > 0, we have z~ < nz~ + :Z0'(1 - n) < :ZO'. Therefore, 
z~((nz~ + z<7(1 - n))) 1;;(7 < z~:zl-O'. 
If z~:zl-O' < (11:(1- a) + a):z, a bank specialized in the risky technology will fail to fulfill its promise. 
1 
This condition is equivalent to Zw < (11:(1- a) + a)~:Z. We can then take ~ = (l«l-~l:o)üZ where E 
is any small positive number. • 
Proof of Proposition 2 
PROOF. This proof is based on the zero profit constraint. We show that under regulation, banks 
dealing with the type 1 entrepreneurs have enough resources to provide at least the minimum 
transfer to entrepreneurs and pay the promised interest to lenders. 
When the aggregate shock occurs, the total resources of the regulated risky bank is given by 
Pl (Zw)nzwkl + P2(zw)(1 - n)k1 == yr(zw). From the expressions for k 1 and k2 given bY,Lemma 3 
~ () ~ ~ ~ ~ 
and direct calculations, we obtain k1 = :nk2 and k2 = Rk2. Therefore, nk1 + (1 - n)k2 = k2. 
The overall interest promised to lenders, r(nk1 + (1 - n)k2) is then equal to ap2(:Z)k2, while the 
promised transfers are T2 (:z) = Tl (:z) = (1- a)P2(:Z)k2. 
We need to make explicit the expressions for P2(:Z) and Pl (Zw)nzwkl + P2(zw)(1- n)k1 in order 
to use them in the zero profit constraint anàlysis. Direct calculations yield 
(1- ,) [(1- n)1-0(1 - Btk2t-1 y(:z)l-O', and 
1 [r (n1-0Bozwt + (1- ,) ((1- n)1-0(1- B)otJ (i k2. 
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Therefore, saying that when the state w occurs the promised transfers and interests will be less 
than the available resources (i.e., rk2 < yr(zw) - (1 - n)T2 - nK;Tl), is equivalent to the following 
inequality, 
yr(z ) 
a + (1 - a) [(1 - n) + nK;] < ()~a' 
. . P2 Z 2 
The explicit form of the right-hand side of the above inequality is, 
(49) 
We now use functional analysis to obtain a set of regulation coefficients under which no banking 
crisis can occur. For that purpose, we use inequality (49) to define G, a continuous function of B, 
as follows: 
G(B) = (1 - 'Y) [a +.(1 - a) [(1 - n) + nK;]] 
[(1 - n)l-a(1- B)a]l-u 
1 
[ 
'Y (n1-aBazwt + (1 - 'Y) ((1 - n)l-a(1- B)at l;;: 
['Y (n1-aBazt + (1 - 'Y) ((1 - n)l-a(l - B)atjl-U 
(50) 
We also recall that in the pro of of lemma 4 (in appendix B), n solves 
Using equations (50) and (51) we obtain that G(O) = -'Y and G(n*) > O. Since G is a continuous 
function of B, there exists at least one Ba such that G (Ba) = O. Let us denote by S == {B E 
[O,n*]/G(B) :s O} and by ~the minimum of B such that G(B) = 0, then (O,~) is an open interval 
included in S . 
• 
8.5 Appendix E 
Figure 10: Comparative Dynamic of a Regulated and an Unregulated Banking Economies 
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1.5 
Figure 11: Relative Welfare-Gain 
2.5 
The Welfare Gail'! of Sanking Regulation 
3.5 • p 
4.5 5.5 
141 
6 6.5 
142 
Conclusion générale 
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous avons passé en revue les études empiriques déjà 
réalisées sur le lien entre la réglementation bancaire et la stabilité du système bancaire et avons 
trouvé que ces études présentent le plus souvent des résultats contradictoires. En effet, il existe 
plusieurs méthodes pour évaluer l'efficacité d'une réglementation donnée. Nous en avons distinguées 
deux grandes méthodes, la méthode de risque implicite et la méthode de risque explicite. Ces deux 
méthodes utilisent des techniques économétriques différentes pour effectuer leurs estimations: la 
méthode de risque implicite repose très souvent sur les modèles à équations simultanées et les 
modèles de survie; alors que la méthode de risque explicite repose très souvent sur les modèles de 
régression logit ou probit. 
De nombreux travaux se sont consacrés à un nombre restreint de réglementations à savoir 
l'exigence minimale de fonds propres, l'assurance dépôts, les restrictions à l'entrée, et la surveillance 
des pratiques dans le secteur bancaire. Jusqu'à présent, ces études n'ont pas réussi à fournir 
un résultat convaincant quant à l'impact de nombreux types de réglementations sur la stabilité 
bancaire. Par conséquent, au lieu de fournir une solution aux résultats théoriques conflictuels, 
ces études empiriques en ajoutent à la confusion. D'autre part, les études utilisant une mesure 
implicite d'instabilité ne font pas l'unanimité dans le sens que l'exposition au risque couplée à une 
bonne technique de gestion de risque n'est en aucun cas un signe d'instabilité. Pour les études 
utilisant la méthode explicite, les résultats sont généralement peu robustes. Ces études souffrent 
principalement du problème de biais de sélection qui provient de la méthode utilisée pour construire 
la variable mesurant l'instabilité bancaire. 
Dans le second chapitre, nous avons développé une méthode d'estimation moins sujette au 
problème de biais de sélection et l'avons utilisée pour évaluer empiriquement l'effet de la réglementation 
bancaire sur la stabilité du système bancaire. Le deuxième objectif a été l'évaluation de l'effet de 
chaque type de réglementation sur la durée des crises. À cette fin, nous avons développé un modèle 
à changement de régime Markovien à trois états. Plus précisément, nous avons introduit quatre 
grandes règlementations (les barrières à l'entrée, l'assurance dépôts, les réserves obligatoires, et les 
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exigences minimales de fonds propres) comme variables explicatives de la probabilité de transition 
d'un état à un autre afin d'évaluer l'effet de ces règlements sur la fréquence et la durée des crises ban-
caires systémiques. Nous avons ensuite dérivé analytiquement l'effet marginal de chaque variable 
exogène sur la probabilité que le système soit dans un état donné. Puis nous avons appliqué notre 
stratégie au système bancaire Indonésien qui a souffert d'une crise bancaire systémique au cours 
des deux dernières décennies et où il y a eu une certaine dynamique sur les mesures réglementaires 
au cours de la même période. 
Nous avons trouvé que: (i) les restrictions à l'entrée réduisent la durée des crises et la proba-
bilité d'être dans l'état de crise. Ce résultat est conforme à d'autres résultats disponibles dans la 
littérature reliant les crises bancaires et l'absence des barrières à l'entrée; (ii) les réserves obliga-
toires accroissent la fragilité bancaire, mais ce résultat est obtenu uniquement lorsque nous prenons 
en compte l'existence de l'assurance-dépôts. Dans le même temps, les réserves obligatoir'es tendent 
à réduire la durée des crises bancaires; (iii) l'assurance-dépôts augmente la stabilité du système 
bancaire Indonésien et réduit la durée des crises bancaires; (iv) les exigences minimales de fonds 
propres améliorent la stabilité et réduisent la durée des crises bancaires. 
Nous avons également fourni une idée du biais de sélection existant dans les travaux précédents. 
Nous avons constaté que les études précédentes présentaient un biais de sélection positif pour 
l'assurance-dépôts et sur les réserves obligatoires, un bais de sélection négatif pour l'exigence min-
imale de fonds propres mais pas de biais de sélection concernant les restrictions à l'entrée. 
Dans le troisième chapitre de cette thèse nous avons étudié l'impact de la présence de la 
réglementation bancaire sur la croissance et le bien-être. Dans la première partie nous avons 
présenté la réglementation bancaire dans le cadre du modèle à générations imbriquées d'accumulation 
de capital, dans lequel les chocs technologiques sont idiosyncratiques. Le niveau de la réglementation 
est mesuré par le niveau d'exigence d'adéquation de fonds propres. Dans ce contexte, notre modèle 
produit plusieurs implications intéressantes. Tout d'abord, l'équilibre concurrentiel est efficace. 
Deuxièmement, la réglementation bancaire est préjudiciable à l'économie. En fait, il contraint 
les banques à adapter leur portefeuille de placements aux actifs plus sûrs mais moins productifs. 
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Ce changement structurel entraîne la réduction de la production et ainsi le revenu des agents 
économiques. Il s'ensuit une diminution de l'épargne et, par conséquent, de l'investissement. 
Dans la deuxième partie, nous avons introduit la possibilité d'un choc technologique non anticipé 
dans le secteur le plus productif et qui équivaut à une baisse de la productivité globale dans le secteur 
à risque. Nous avons constaté que dans ce cas, l'économie sera soumise à des crises bancaires et 
nous avons montré qu'il existe un niveau optimal de fonds propres réglementaires qui est en mesure· 
de prévenir les crises. Bien que ce niveau optimal améliore le bien-être des générations vivant dans 
la période de crise, il induit généralement une détérioration du bien-être pour les populations vivant 
en dehors de cette période. 
Nous avons calibré le modèle afin de refléter une économie comme celle des États-Unis. Nous 
avons trouvé qu'il est socialement optimal de réglementer lorsque le régulateur estime qu'un choc 
se produira bientôt. Cela montre que, même lorsque les crises bancaires sont dues à des chocs de 
productivité, la réglementation reste utile lorsque l'ampleur et la probabilité du choc de productivité 
sont suffisamment grandes. 
Quand on ne dispose d'aucune information sur la probabilité du choc, la réglementation ne 
permet d'améliorer le bien-être que lorsque le niveau de l'aversion pour le risque est élevé, plus 
élevé que les niveaux d'aversion acceptables pour l'économie américaine. 
Quelques implications de politiques économiques peuvent être tirées de cette partie. Tout 
d'abord, puisque l'effet de la réglementation sur le bien-être est fonction du moment où le choc 
se produit (plus précisément le gain en bien-être est plus grand si le choc se produit juste après 
l'introduction de la réglementation), il est important pour les régulateurs de prévoir avec un grand 
degré de précision le moment d'apparition de la crise et d'exiger un plus grand taux de fonds 
propres lorsque qu'ils estiment qu'une crise est imminente. Par conséquent, nous plaidons pour un 
régime réglementaire variable dans le temps. Deuxièmement, puisque les lois sur les faillites sont 
importantes pour savoir si la réglementation bancaire améliore le bien être ou pas et que ces lois 
varient suivant les pays, nous préconisons un niveau de fonds propres réglementaires variable par 
pays. 
